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Taxation, Local Government and Social Control in Sudan and South Sudan, 1899-
1956 
Matthew Sterling Benson 
 
This dissertation provides evidence of at least five ways in which taxes in the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium’s peripheries were primarily used as a ‘technology of 
government’ to socially control these vast regions. The first is that rather than revenue 
raising, taxes in the peripheries acted as a glue to bargain with, and purchase support 
from, customary authorities who were willing to collaborate with the new colonial 
regime. A second way in which taxes were a technology of government included how 
they contributed to the state’s efforts to ‘render a realm into discourse as a knowable, 
calculable and administrable object’.1 This meant making customary authorities in the 
territory legible to the state on terms that the British understood, even as the state 
failed to ‘know’ the majority of people in the peripheries and even deployed 
anthropologists to obtain this knowledge.  
 
The third way taxes were tied to social control was through their role constructing the 
peripheries to in turn make them more ‘legible’ to the British. The fourth manner in 
which taxes contributed to social control was by centralising power in the national 
government rather than sharing it across the territory. All of which inform the fifth way 
in which taxes contributed to the state’s social control over the peripheries, whereby 
the levers to define local knowledge about these dynamics were primarily held by the 
central government. In sum, this dissertation’s findings collapse the differences 
between the peripheries, which have primarily been drawn along religious or ethnic 
cleavages in Sudan.2 Instead, it reveals a coherent relationship between the 
geographically small centre and the considerably larger peripheries.  
  
 
1 Miller, P. and Rose, N. (1990) ‘Governing Economic Life’, Economy and Society, Vol. 19, No.1: pp.1-
30. 
2 Johnson, D. (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Woodbridge: James Currey.; Jok, J.M. 






The Current Context 11 
Part 1: Root Causes of Conflict and Inequities in Sudan and South Sudan 17 
Part 2: Taxation and State Formation 31 
Part 3: Taxes and Colonialism 37 
Part 4: Taxation and Submission in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 42 
Part 5: Dissertation Sources and their Limitations 50 
Part 6: Dissertation Outline 57 
Chapter 1: Constructing the Condominium’s Periphery, 1898-1921 63 
Part 1: Taxes and the Delineation Of The Centre & The Periphery 68 
Part 2: Taxes as a Sign of Submission 76 
Part 3: Administering the Periphery 94 
Conclusion 108 
Chapter 2: Taxation, Decentralisation & Social Control, 1921-1929 111 
Part 1: Devolution & Social Control, 1921-1929 114 
Part 2: Brutality Continues in Upper Nile Province 125 
Part 3: Taxation, Salaries and Sheikh Shopping 133 
Conclusion 142 
Chapter 3: Does the Government Really ‘Believe’ in the Decentralisation Of Finance?, 
1930-1946 145 
Part 1: Revenue Centralisation in Sudan, 1930-1946 147 
Part 2: Taxing the Group Rather than the Individual 159 
 4 
Part 3: Taxes, Labour and Expanding State Control 172 
Part 4: Escaping ‘Implied Tyranny’ via the State 184 
Conclusion 193 
Chapter 4: Taxes, ‘Financial Bondage’ & Local Government, 1946-1956 195 
Part 1: Local Governments at Independence 196 




Unpublished and Archival Sources 237 
Archival Sources 237 
Unpublished Theses, Papers and Dissertations 238 











List of Maps 
 
1. Contemporary Boundaries in Sudan and South Sudan       8 
 
2. State Formation and Changing Boundaries in Sudan and South Sudan, 1874-2011
               9 






This project is the outcome, and continuation, of questions that initially emerged from 
when I first worked with an NGO in West Darfur and Khartoum, Sudan in 2008. 
Considerations about the ethics of humanitarian action in Darfur quickly shifted to a 
focus on how the state operated in the country and this line of inquiry eventually led 
to what initially seemed like tangential questions about taxes and state-formation. 
Subsequent engagement on academic and policy research related to this topic 
highlighted how little is actually understood about the fiscal social contract in 
developing countries such as Sudan and South Sudan. This journey than continued 
in South Sudan in 2011, first as a researcher a few weeks before independence and 
then as a development worker from early 2012 to the day before conflict disrupted 
South Sudan in December 2013. This experience made it even clearer that 
understanding the past was deeply important to better interpret how power 
functioned in both of the Sudans and led to the difficult, important, decision to pursue 
a history PhD.  
 
This project might not have continued were it not for Cherry Leonardi responding to 
my email inquiry into how to develop questions about taxation and governance in 
South Sudan into a doctoral project while I was still working in Juba. Cherry’s support 
led to an unexpected second MA to shift from International Relations and 
Development Studies to History that was generously subsidised by a fee waiver from 
Durham’s History Department. This PhD also would never have been possible were 
it not for the department’s initial support and the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) funding that I was subsequently awarded.  
 
Durham’s History Department became a space for me to move onto the previously 
unforeseen path of becoming an historian. In all their vibrant, effervescent diversity 
Cherry Leonardi and the rest of Durham’s historians of Africa provided the intellectual 
support, critique and encouragement to grow into myself intellectually and personally. 
This list of people quickly bounds outside of Durham’s corridors. It first and foremost 
includes Cherry Leonardi but rapidly jumps to Justin Willis, Jutta Bakonyi, Jacob 
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Wiebel, Leigh Gardner, Rachel Johnson, Nicki Kindersley, Zoe Cormack, Willow 
Berridge, Mareike Schomerus, Chris Vaughan, Alden Young, Eddie Thomas, Francis 
Gotto, Douglas Johnson, Catherine Boone, Elena Vezzadini, Harry Cross, Nisrine 
Omer, Liz Storer, Matthew Gordon, Vanessa van den Boogaard, and Ngala Chome.  
 
In Sudan, my access to the National Records Office was in large part made possible 
through Dr Tarek Mohamed Nour and Mohammed Azraq. Jean-Nicolas Bach and the 
rest of the Khartoum Centre for Social, Legal, and Economic Studies and 
Documentation in Sudan (CEDEJ) community, which included Per Vissers, Azza 
Yacoub, Anaël Poussier and Rebecca Glade provided intellectual support and 
friendship. Old and new friends such as Arek Majak, Larissa Nour, Dimah Gasim, 
Muhammad Salah Abdulaziz, Shaza Faisal and Ahmed Elkhalil plunged me into 
Khartoum’s other worlds that sustained me beyond the archives. And, just as 
importantly, all of Khartoum’s Amateur Cycling Group unreservedly opened their 
hearts and minds to me, which helped make feel at home in Sudan.  
 
Family and friends provided the patience and support to get through the writing 
process. Kevin Brazil, Jaya Brekke, Raga Makawi, Isadora Quay, Luke Grenfell-Shaw 
and Aftab Lall were unreservedly there throughout the highs and the lows and 
immeasurably patient as I was absorbed in the research and writing. My mother, Jill 
Branch, tolerated countless hours of my gripes about the never-ending writing 
process and in her own understated and steadfast way has long provided a model 
for how to persevere. New colleagues in the London School of Economics and 
Political Science-led Conflict Research Programme also graciously provided the 
encouragement, time and office space to prioritise finalising this thesis. And, as 
promised following my initial time in Sudan in 2008, the embers for this thesis were 
first fed by Pedro Ruiz and Tom Clark, who helped me develop the confidence that I 
could even pursue a PhD in the first place and became family the process. Thank you 
for believing in me before I believed in myself.  
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Map 1: Contemporary Boundaries in Sudan and South Sudan 
 
 
Source: Ryle, J. Willis, J., Baldo, and Jok, J.M. (Eds.) (2012) The Sudan Handbook. 
London: James Currey. p.23.  
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Map 2: State Formation and Changing Boundaries in Sudan and South Sudan, 
1874-2011 
 
Source: Willis, J. (2012) ‘The Ambitions of the State’, in Ryle, J. Willis, J., Baldo, 




Map 3: The Hamdi Triangle  
 
 
Source: de Waal, A. (2014) ‘(2) Visualizing Sudan: Geographical Inequality’, Tufts 
University World Peace Foundation Reinventing Peace Blog, 7 May 2014. Available 
at: https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2014/05/07/3-visualizing-sudan-





The Current Context 
 
Taxes and decentralisation are neglected in today’s academic, policy and popular 
debates about Sudan and South Sudan. This is despite the fact that a review of both 
countries’ national budgets underscores how little revenue either government 
generates from taxes even as both desperately require deeper pockets. For instance, 
according to the World Bank, South Sudan is the world’s most oil dependent country, 
raising less than 2% of its state finances from direct taxes. The country, which 
became independent from northern Sudan in 2011, is also one of the world’s largest 
recipients of international donor assistance which largely funds essential public 
services such as education and healthcare.3 
 
Moreover, following the proposed expansion of the number of federal states in the 
country from 10 to 32 in 2017, considerations about whether and how to share 
revenue across decentralised local governments remain contentious.4 Despite 
evidence of direct tax revenue’s small contribution to the national budget, there are 
frequent accounts of the multitude of taxes that are collected in South Sudan. These 
are reportedly levied by a variety of official and unofficial actors, even though most of 
the revenue does not appear to reach national or subnational state treasuries.5 How 
a country can generate so little revenue from taxes even as more people complain 
that they are being excessively taxed and the state is need of additional finances 
remains poorly understood. 
 
Meanwhile, Sudan is undergoing momentous social change that has resulted in the 
ouster of Omar el-Bashir, who had led the country for almost exactly thirty years. 
 
3 World Bank. (2019) The World Bank in South Sudan [Internet], World Bank. Available from: 
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> [Accessed 10 June 2019]. 
4 Aalen, L. and Schomerus, M. (Eds.) (2016) Considering the State: Perspectives on South Sudan’s 
Subdivision and Federalism Debate. London: Overseas Development Institute and Chr. Michelsen 
Institute.  
5 de Waal, A. (2014) ‘When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South 
Sudan’, African Affairs, Vol. 113, No 452. pp.347-369.  
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Though it is sometimes difficult to recall given the trauma of revolution, economic 
frustrations explicitly triggered these protests; the removal of government subsidies 
made the price of bread and petrol untenable for too many people. Though the 
uninspiringly technocratic language of ‘revenue sharing’ has not yet been deployed 
by protestors, one of their most well-known mobilising phrases has been ‘we are all 
Darfur’ – a reference to the country’s marginalised western periphery.6  
 
But this too belies the underlying reality that one of the central issues at the heart of 
the on-going political situation is the longstanding tension over domestic revenue and 
revenue centralisation. However, as the ‘Black Book’, which lists the main grievances 
a Darfuri rebel group had against the government in Khartoum in 2000 reveals, the 
capture of state sponsored economic investments in the riverain north is arguably 
deeply integral to this slogan.7 The spatial and political geography of this 
centralisation is vividly captured in the well-known phrase, the ‘Hamdi Triangle’. This 
region roughly has Dongola at its apex, Khartoum at its centre and Sinnar and Rabak 
at the base and is named after a finance minister who argued for economic 
investments to solely be made within a day’s drive of the capital.8  
 
But financial inequities between the centre and the periphery have not only been 
recognised by activists and rebels as one of the central issues of Sudan and South 
Sudan’s post-colonial conflicts; scholars have also studied this topic. And yet, 
considerations about the role that taxes, rather than natural resource wealth such as 
oil play in shaping the state, and how people relate to it, have often been overlooked 
in these analyses. This is all the more surprising given the importance other 
researchers have placed on taxes in the history of state formation in other continents 
outside of Africa, in which taxes are seen as key to the fiscal social contract.  
 
The countries that are now Sudan and South Sudan were occupied by the British 
from 1899 to 1956. During this time, taxes largely contributed a minor amount to the 
 
6 Economist (2019) ‘Sudan’s Genocidal Regime is Under Threat’, The Economist, 12 January 2019.  
7 Cobham, A. (2005) ‘Causes of Conflict in Sudan: Testing The Black Book’, The European Journal of 
Development Research, Vol.17(3).pp.462-480.  
8 de Waal, A. (2015) The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power. 
Cambridge: Polity. pp.71-72.  
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national budget. However, and surprisingly given taxes’ small financial contribution 
today, historical writing acknowledges that British officials were ostensibly fixated on 
collecting taxes, even though this project illustrates that they raised negligible sums 
of money.9 So why did the British administration collect taxes if the money that they 
raised was relatively insignificant to the national budget? This project’s findings 
illustrate that the answer to this question is that rather than raise revenue, direct taxes 
were primarily levied in the peripheries to socially control these vast regions and 
maintain power in the central government.  
 
This thesis therefore argues that taxation was significant less for its revenue 
contribution than as a ‘technology of government’, which contributed to the state’s 
efforts to ‘render a realm into discourse as a knowable, calculable and administrable 
object’.10 Taxation was central to the process of constructing the peripheries and in 
turn making them more ‘legible’ to the British.11 Specific forms and methods of 
taxation (tribute and poll and hut taxes) were imposed on regions that the British 
considered ‘backward’ or ‘primitive’. From the outset, the unit of taxation in such 
regions was a group of people, defined by the colonial government in ethnic or sub-
ethnic terms, with a leader recognised by the government as a customary or 
traditional authority over these people. Over time these became the basis for a 
hierarchical structure from sheikh to omda and with a nazir or sultan at the top. In the 
Southern provinces these Arabic terms were replaced with the hierarchy of headman 
– sub-chief – chief (and sometimes paramount chief), while in other non-Arabic 
speaking regions a range of vernacular terms survived such as mek in the Nuba 
Mountains or shartai in Darfur. 
 
The remittance of tribute or taxes by these figures became a measure not only of their 
own loyalty and effectiveness as government-recognised authorities, but also of the 
 
9 Johnson, D. (1982) Tribal Boundaries and Border Wars: Nuer-Dinka Relations in the Sobat and Zaraf 
Valley’s, c.1860-1976, The Journal of African History, 23(2), pp.183-203.; Collins, R. (1971) The Land 
Beyond the Rivers: The Southern Sudan, 1898-1918. New Haven: Yale University Press.   
10 Miller, P. and Rose, N. (1990) ‘Governing Economic Life’, Economy and Society, Vol. 19, No.1: pp.1-
30.  
11 Scott, J. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp.53-83.  
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‘submission’ of their group to the colonial state. Even when the unit of taxation 
apparently shifted to the individual subject with the introduction of poll taxes from the 
1920s, these were still collected through the hierarchy of customary authorities – now 
termed the ‘Native Administration’ – and their purpose was primarily to enable greater 
control and legibility through the listing of taxpayers in registers. Even by the final 
decades of the Condominium, maintaining control over the peripheries remained the 
primary imperative of taxation policies, even leading to a return to the notion of a 
collective ‘tribute’ to forestall individual rights and citizenship. 
 
Taxes further contributed to political control through the ways in which they 
centralised power in the national government rather than shared it across the territory. 
Even as the Native Administration structures were theoretically being developed into 
local governments from the 1930s, they still depended on the central government for 
fiscal transfers. And with these moves, local governments in the peripheries were 
subordinated to the central government in a perpetual, relatively undefined, state of 
becoming ‘modern’ according to terms that the British rather than the Sudanese 
initially determined. Meeting this illusory endpoint was difficult if not impossible for 
local governments to achieve without somehow reconciling the financial and social 
self-interest of customary authorities with the idea of local government as a force for 
public good.  
 
This informs the final way in which taxes contributed to the state’s social control over 
the peripheries. As Philip Abrams’ notes on the difficulty of studying the state, one 
key lever that the British-led government had in the territory was the ‘straightforward 
ability to withhold information, deny observation and dictate the terms of 
knowledge’.12 This dissertation provides evidence that one of the key areas the 
Condominium state attempted this in the territory’s peripheries was via overarching 
control over local government finances that bound people to broad categories of 
‘African’ and ‘nomadic Arabs’.  
 
 
12 Abrams, P. (1988) ‘Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)’, Journal of Historical 
Sociology, Vol 1(1). pp.58-89. 
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‘Social control’ in the context of this dissertation broadly draws on Michel Foucault’s 
interrelated concepts of ‘governmentality’ and ‘disciplinary power’. Governmentality 
is concerned with the ‘rationalities and practices of power’, which ‘does not act 
directly and immediately on others’.13 Instead, it is exercised via disciplinary power 
that involves ‘techniques of objectification, classification and normalization, a power 
deployed through the whole social body’.14 As Kaspar Hoffman and Judith Verweijen 
note, governmentality is a useful concept because it helps ‘transcend forms of binary 
thinking (such as state versus non-state, coercion versus freedom)’.15 This is 
especially helpful as wide body of scholarship argues these kinds of dichotomies limit 
the study of state-society relations.16  
 
In the Condominium, these techniques of objectification and classification involved 
the designation of people as ‘Africans’ and ‘Nomadic Arabs’ by the British-led state, 
which were notably upheld through tax practices. For instance, the British led state 
and government selected customary authorities co-produced state power by 
grouping people according to these broad categories that were defined and 
reinforced through tax practices that insisted upon the group over the individual. 
These tax practices also attempted to bind effected peoples to land and geographic 
boundaries. And, they also sought to commodify their labour practices and placed 
them within constructed categories and definitions of subjecthood and incomplete or 
near citizenship that the British largely dictated the terms of. While there is a large 
literature on the role that justice and courts have played to enforce similar dynamics 
 
13 Foucault, M. (1982) ‘The Subject and Power’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4. pp.777-795.; Foucault, 
M. (1991) ‘Governmentality’ in Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (Eds.) The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.; Hoffmann, K. and Verweijen, J. (2018) ‘Rebel Rule: A Governmentality 
Perspective’, African Affairs, Vol. 118, Issue 471. pp.352-374.  
14 Lacombe, D. (1996) ‘Reforming Foucault: A Critique of the Social Control Thesis’, The British Journal 
of Sociology, Vol. 47, No. 2. pp.332-352.  
15 Hoffmann, K. and Verweijen, J. (2018) ‘Rebel Rule: A Governmentality Perspective’, African Affairs, 
Vol. 118, Issue 471. pp.352-374. 
16 Leonardi, C. (2013) Dealing with Government: Histories of Chiefship, Community and State. 
Woodbridge: James Currey.; Mitchell, T. (1991) ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches 
and their Critics’, American Political Science Review, No. 1. pp.77-96.; Lund, C. (2006) ‘Twilight 
Institutions: An Introduction’, Development and Change, 37(5). pp.673-684. 
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in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, this thesis is the first work to systematically 
study how taxes were also an integral part of this process.17  
 
In sum, this dissertation’s findings collapse the differences between the peripheries, 
which have primarily been drawn along religious or ethnic cleavages in Sudan.18 
Instead, it reveals a common relationship between the geographically small centre 
and the considerably larger peripheries. These ties were bargained and mediated 
through tax collection and they distinctly highlighted the importance of the 
peripheries in defining the terms of this relationship, rather than being acted upon by 
an all-powerful core. In so doing, this process illustrates elements of what Timothy 
Mitchell describes as the ‘actual contours’ of the ‘amorphous organisation’ of the 
state, in which ties between the centre and the peripheries were negotiated through 
tax. This therefore helps illuminate the blurred boundaries between state and society 
in the process.19  
 
The next parts of this introduction review the literature on the historical causes of 
conflict and inequities in Sudan and South Sudan. This section illustrates the 
longevity of the scholarship on revenue and state centralisation in these now 
bifurcated countries. It specifically pinpoints what key works on the Condominium’s 
economic, political and social dynamics say about taxes and highlights gaps that this 
thesis addresses. Likewise, this part of the introduction also indicates how the 
Condominium was bound to the international system since its economy was driven 
by international exports. All the while, the British still had to somehow maintain control 
over the vast peripheries to maintain control over the territory.  
 
The next part of the introduction reviews the literature on taxation and state formation 
more broadly. This includes key works on European state formation and recent texts 
 
17 Leonardi, C. (2013) Dealing with Government: Histories of Chiefship, Community and State. 
Woodbridge: James Currey.; Willis, J. (2011) ‘Tribal Gatherings: Colonial Spectacle, Native 
Administration and Local Government in Condominium Sudan’, Past and Present, 211. pp.243-268. 
18 Johnson, D. (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Woodbridge: James Currey.; Jok, J.M. 
(2007) Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence. Oxford: One World Books.  
19 Mitchell, T. (1991) ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics’, American 
Political Science Review, No. 1. p.82.  
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from across disciplines such as political science, anthropology and development 
studies. This section examines whether and how taxes contribute to considerations 
such as the social contract and considers whether there is sufficient historical 
evidence for these types of dynamics in African countries such as Sudan and South 
Sudan.  
 
The third section of the introduction examines the literature on taxes and colonialism. 
This review is essential because it illustrates the various logics that existing 
scholarship argues contributed to tax policy when most countries on the continent 
were occupied by European powers. This is followed by a review of the historiography 
on taxes and submission in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. This section indicates 
that the ways in which taxes have been consistently discussed by various scholars 
even as considerations about how taxes were used as a form of social control have 
not been explored in detail. This introduction concludes with a discussion of the 
limitations on sources and a brief overall dissertation outline.  
 
Part 1: Root Causes of Conflict and Inequities in Sudan and South Sudan 
 
Conflict over revenue raising and revenue sharing date back until at least Turco-
Egyptian rule over Sudan, or the Turkiyya, which lasted from 1820 until 1885. Indeed, 
part of the reason that the Turkiyya fell was because the rulers lost control of taxes 
on agricultural irrigation in the riverain north that funded the administration. In fact, as 
taxes spiralled out of control and became increasingly more punitive, people rebelled 
against government.20 Scholarship by Anders Bjørkelo and Janet Ewald details the 
build-up to, and the fallout from, these dynamics. In different ways, each illustrates 
how the need to obtain tax revenue and to escape its exaction contributed to a push 
for slave and ivory raiding and trading between different parts of the northern riverain 
core and other parts of what became the Condominium’s peripheries. In these 
 
20 Bjørkelo, A. (1989) Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region, 1821-1885. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.82-103.; Clarkson, A. (2005) ‘Courts, Councils and 
Citizenship: Political Culture in the Gezira Scheme in Condominium Sudan’. Unpublished Doctoral 
Thesis, Department of History, Durham University, Durham. 
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analyses the peripheries were in part defined by their economic, social and religious 
resistance against predation by the riverain core.21  
 
Moreover, they also highlight the multitude of kingdoms and alliances that were 
configured and re-constituted during these years. Rather than a coherent state, the 
vast territory that eventually constituted the Condominium included both formerly 
stateless societies and several kingdoms that sought to ally and distance themselves 
from each other depending on internal and external threats. And in 1885 Khartoum, 
the effective ‘centre’ of the region that became the Condominium was taken over by 
Muhammad Ahmad, a Muslim religious leader who had declared himself to be the 
Mahdi. According to some interpretations of Islamic theology, the Mahdi is the 
‘divinely guided leader who would unite and purify the Muslim community in 
preparation for the end of the world’.22 The establishment of the Mahdiyya was in part 
enabled by the Mahdi’s promise of lower taxes; and yet, harsh taxes were still 
imposed in parts of Darfur and Dar Masalit.23  
 
Following the Anglo-Egyptian ‘reconquest’ and establishment of the Condominium in 
1899, the British claimed to be wary of the history of taxes and conflict in the region 
and were cautious of taxing people in the Condominium heavily when they arrived. 
However, as this dissertation illustrates, the British had a poor understanding of who 
they were governing in the peripheries and also had weak knowledge of what 
constituted wealth so as to determine what a ‘low’ tax was. Despite this caution that 
was mixed with a lack of understanding on the part of the British, this dissertation 
shows that they nevertheless did expand tax collection efforts to the peripheries.  
 
 
21 Bjørkelo, A. (1989) Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region, 1821-1885. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Ewald, J. (1990) Soldiers, Traders and Slaves: State 
Formation and Economic Transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700-1885. Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
22 Ewald, J. (1990) Soldiers, Traders and Slaves: State Formation and Economic Transformation in the 
Greater Nile Valley, 1700-1885. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.p.118. 
23 Pankhurst, R. and Johnson, D. (1988) ‘The Great Drought and Famine of 1888-92 in Northeast 
Africa’, in Johnson, D. and Anderson, D. (Eds.) The Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from Northeast 
African History. London: Lester Crook.p.62.  
 19 
Despite this, the historiography on state centralisation in Sudan and South Sudan 
under British occupation argues that the British shifted to revenue sources that did 
not rely on direct taxes. In so doing, they merely deepened the centralisation of 
revenue in Khartoum, Omdurman and the rest of the riverain north rather than expand 
it throughout the rest of the peripheries. For instance, Tim Niblock argues that the 
British reinvested most of their revenues into the central government. This began with 
export revenues at the start of British rule and continued with cotton revenues 
towards its end.24   
 
This dissertation’s review of the main sources of revenue in the Condominium 
illustrates that this was also reflected in the budget. Profits from budget categories 
such as ‘Railways and Steamers’ and the ‘Irrigation Department’ were reinvested into 
these sectors, which were tied to the export orientation of the economy. This also 
consequently benefited those with closer ties to the centre who could more readily 
benefit from the pooling of resources there, which ‘buttressed an existing position of 
social influence or social control’.25  
 
These in turn eventually contributed to elite class formation in the political centre, 
which in Niblock’s estimation included: religious leaders, tribal leaders, merchants, 
civil servants and politicians.26 However, while Niblock examines how the British 
ostensibly managed elites from each of these and other groups through privileged 
access to the state, he neglects how the state dealt with or managed their elite 
counterparts in the peripheries. And, as evidence in this dissertation illustrates, these 
elites had to be managed, not least because of the British fear of nationalist uprisings, 
but also because of how difficult these regions were to control.  
 
Importantly, centralisation did not just concern the ‘state’, which is the heuristic term 
this thesis henceforth uses for the initially British led and later Sudanised 
administration or government. It also included northern riverain merchants: both 
 
24 Niblock, T. (1987) Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985. 
Albany: State University of New York Press.pp. 50-51.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. 
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Fatima Babiker and Niblock argue that a class of Sudanese merchants, the jellaba, 
contributed to an extractive relationship between the centre and the peripheries in 
the Condominium. Babiker details how the jellaba ‘created a chain of small traders 
and brokers’ to exploit agricultural commodities such as gum arabic, livestock, oil-
seeds, and cotton from the peripheries.27 Meanwhile, Jay Spaulding argues that the 
jellaba had already been partly pushed into the south in a relationship that was often 
deeply predatory to the extent that it also included slave raiding, in part because of 
the Turkiyya’s and the Mahdiyya’s excessive tax policies.28 And Peter Kok, 
representing a critical Southern Sudanese political perspective, claims that the 
groups from which the jellaba were drawn rapidly dominated the public administration 
and military during and after British rule.29  
 
While these analyses helpfully detail how a small elite that endures today emerged, it 
perpetuates a narrative that the peripheries were somehow docile or even absent 
from this process.30 This is despite the fact that earlier scholarship details the ways 
in which these regions ordered and re-aligned themselves against threats from 
different parts of the region that became the Condominium.31 Likewise, this 
dissertation clearly indicates the ways in which the peripheries violently contested the 
imposition of British rule and in so doing left the state with little choice but to engage 
with them by buying off local elites via taxes at various points. Thus, to varying 
degrees different parts of the peripheries firmly pushed back against British rule, 
which sometimes led the state to pursue a bargaining strategy rather than one of 
forceful incorporation.  
 
 
27 Babiker Mahmoud, F. (1984) The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development?. London: Zed; 
Niblock, T. (1987) Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
28 Spaulding, J. (1982) ‘Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class in the Northern Turkish Sudan’, The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 15(1). pp.1-20.  
29 Kok, P. (1996) ‘Sudan: Between Radical Restructuring and Deconstruction of State Systems’, 
Review of African Political Economy, No.70.pp.555-562. 
30 Babiker Mahmoud, F. (1984) The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development?. London: Zed.   
31 Bjørkelo, A. (1989) Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region, 1821-1885. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Ewald, J. (1990) Soldiers, Traders and Slaves: State 
Formation and Economic Transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700-1885. Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
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Given resistance to monetised labour in the 1930s and 1940s, the peripheries barely 
contributed to local budgets, let alone the national one. As such, direct taxes 
collected from the Condominium’s peripheries emerged as an important tool for 
social control rather than one that was used to finance the state. This did not take 
place in an economic or political vacuum as it was enabled through the 
aforementioned early shift towards customs and export revenue to finance the 
Condominium.32 It was also facilitated by an Egyptian loan that was initially used to 
finance the national government, although this had to be repaid. Thus, the policy of 
using local governments in the peripheries to centralise authority was inextricably tied 
to national economic realities, which were in turn embedded in economic interactions 
with the international system.  
 
Evidence in this dissertation illustrates that these ‘peripheral’ regions were deemed 
best left at a distance even though some limited attempts to improve upon their 
perceived economic unviability persisted. So, while the state still required sustainable 
sources of finance, it largely failed to obtain it from people in the peripheries. Instead, 
as several works illustrate, capital indeed accumulated within the centre, but namely 
through cotton revenue generated by the Gezira Cotton Scheme, which was in part 
obtained through relatively inexpensive West African migrant labour. The Gezira 
Scheme was, and still is, the world’s largest irrigation scheme, which was constructed 
between the Blue and White Niles south of Khartoum. Critical works detailing these 
dynamics include Tony Barnett’s and Abbas Abdelkarim’s 1988 study of the mass 
concentration of wealth in the riverain north. 33  
 
Other scholarship on economic centralisation in Sudan explains what was in effect a 
Herculean effort to engineer and economically and politically control what is still the 
world’s largest irrigation scheme that provided the vast majority of state revenue. For 
instance, Maurits Ertsen’s history of the Gezira usefully highlights how the financial 
 
32 Massoud, M. (2013) Law’s Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.50. 
33 Barnett, T. and Abdelkarim, A. (1991) Sudan: The Gezira Scheme and Agricultural Transition. London: 
Frank Cass & Co.; Mills, D. (2014) Dividing the Nile: Egypt’s Economic Nationalists in the Sudan, 1918-
56. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.; Ertsen, M. (2016) Improvising Planned Development 
on the Gezira Plain, Sudan, 1900-1980. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.  
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aspects of the scheme were negotiated between the Government, the Sudan 
Plantation Syndicate (SPS) and Gezira tenants. Each respectively received 40%, 25% 
and 35% of profits. However, the British-led state had the advantage when 
bargaining over profits and losses from the scheme, notably by indebting tenants 
along terms that favoured the government and the SPS when crops were poor or 
international economic shocks happened.34  
 
While this tactic was highly effective in asserting centralised control over the Gezira 
Scheme, it cannot explain how the state conquered or incorporated all of the 
peripheries. Moreover, other scholarship on the transformation of the rural Sudanese 
economy during British occupation by Steven Serels has taken the argument that 
debt was the primary modality that transformed Sudan’s economy too far.35 As this 
dissertation illustrates, the struggle for people to obtain tax revenue was the main 
factor that motivated monetary participation in the economic peripheries, and even 
then it was patchy at best.  
 
It is striking that previous historical writing on state centralisation has painted the 
peripheries in such broad strokes as these ‘peripheral’ regions actually constituted 
the vast physical majority of the territory’s landmass and population. This land was 
difficult for the British to control but vital for the survival of their efforts to occupy the 
territory. It therefore seems unlikely, particularly given the persistent fear of economic, 
political and social unrest that plagued the Condominium’s duration that the centre 
could have thrived on Gezira cotton exports without these regions being somehow 
managed.  
 
Thus, this dissertation reinforces the applicability of Frederick Cooper’s ‘gatekeeper 
state’ concept to Sudan, which, as Justin Willis argues, means that its ‘existence is 
predicated on its ability to mediate between powerful external forces and subject 
 
34 Mills, D. (2014) Dividing the Nile: Egypt’s Economic Nationalists in the Sudan, 1918-56. Cairo: The 
American University in Cairo Press.; Ertsen, M. (2016) Improvising Planned Development on the Gezira 
Plain, Sudan, 1900-1980. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
35 Serels, S. (2013). ‘Indigenous Debt and the Spirit of Colonial Capitalism: Debt, Taxes and the Cash-
Crop Economy in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1956’. In Campbell, G. and Stanziani, A. (Eds.) 
Debt and Slavery in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Worlds. London: Pickering & Chatto. p. 141.  
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peoples’.36 This meant that the priority for the Condominium was to contain potential 
uprisings or rebellion in the peripheries that would have drained state resources. This 
would leave the government free to focus on maintaining cotton production via the 
Gezira Irrigation scheme, which provided the main revenue source.  
 
Indeed, as Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale highlight, in contrast to other parts of 
the African continent, the colonial state in East Africa was rapidly restructured to 
benefit from commodity booms, and Sudan was no exception.37 More critically for 
this project, Berman and Lonsdale illustrate the ways in which the finances and 
economics of the colonial state became mired in their own contradictions. And, as 
this dissertation argues in the case of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the British-
led state sought to decentralise authority while effectively controlling the financial 
levers that would have made any type of broader power sharing possible. But 
scholars such as Berman and Lonsdale are also predominantly concerned with class 
and state formation at the centre of each colony. However, this dissertation illustrates 
that this process also shaped how power was exercised within the peripheries and 
between the peripheries, which were not as vital to the colonial economy as the 
Gezira scheme, and the economic core.  
 
Furthermore, other corners of the literature are also quiet on how the administrative 
arms of the state might have contributed to the centralisation of power beyond a 
cursory analysis on how indirect rule divided up the territory. In this respect, John 
Howell’s 1974 edited volume Local Government and Politics in the Sudan is one of 
the most unsatisfactory. Throughout this book, Howell uncritically engages with the 
key texts related to local government, such as the 1949 Marshall Report, and 
unquestioningly adopts the language that the British used to supposedly civilise the 
backward peripheries.38  
 
 
36 Willis, J. (2012) ‘The Ambitions of the State’, in Ryle, J. Willis, J., Baldo, and Jok, J.M. (Eds.) The 
Sudan Handbook. London: James Currey. p.54.; Cooper, F. (2002) Africa Since 1940: The Past of the 
Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
37 Berman, B. and Lonsdale, J. (1992) Unhappy Valley Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Book One: State 
and Class. Woodbridge, James Currey.  
38 Howell, J. (1974) Local Government and Politics in the Sudan. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press.  
 24 
Howell also problematically frames local government reforms, which, as Chris 
Vaughan and Justin Willis have argued, practically did not represent a shift from 
indirect rule as if it they were welcomed by people in the peripheries.39 Instead, they 
were deeply, often violently, contested and negotiated as this dissertation and other 
scholars demonstrate. And, though Howell also argues decentralisation in fact 
centralised the Condominium, he does so without evidence or deeper analysis.40 
While these types of oversights underscore the significance of this dissertation’s 
analysis, they also made the journey to identifying and analysing sources for this 
project that much more difficult.  
 
This dissertation argues that taxes were key to understanding how and why the state 
centralised as it did, even though direct taxes are generally overlooked in prior 
analyses. This oversight easily arises when taxes are solely examined through a 
revenue-centric lens that emphasises their financial contribution to national and local 
budgets, which as Table 1 illustrates was indeed paltry. Moreover, the primary 
tranche of literature detailing taxes in the Condominium includes historical works on 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s bureaucracy, such as Martin Daly’s histories of 
British rule in Sudan and South Sudan.41 Though useful for this project, these texts 
have previously overlooked the potentially transformative role that some types of 
taxes have played in shaping the politics of Sudan and South Sudan that this 
dissertation provides evidence for.  
 
By the end of British rule, the centralisation of authority in the national government 
was cemented through the creation of local government councils, which sought to 
model local governments in the Condominium on English local councils. At the core 
of this transition was the push towards treasuries, which the British called ‘native 
treasuries’, as the heartbeat of local governments. Without a native treasury financed 
 
39 Vaughan, C. (2010) ‘Reinventing the Wheel? Local Government and Neo-Traditional Authority in 
Late-Colonial Northern Sudan’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 43, No 2. 
pp.255-278.; Willis, J. (2003) ‘Violence, Authority and the State in the Nuba Mountains of Condominium 
Sudan’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 46, Issue 1. pp.89-114. 
40 Howell, J. (1974) Local Government and Politics in the Sudan. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. 
pp. 26-27.  
41 Daly, M. (1986) Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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by locally generated direct taxes, which in the peripheries were namely poll taxes and 
tribute, some British officials argued local governments could not transition to an 
‘advanced’ stage of government. As Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate, these types of 
taxes did not contribute much to the percent total of direct tax revenue and generated 
even less for the national budget.  
 
But the reality is these governments could not sufficiently generate local revenues 
and were dependent on transfers from the centre to finance their operations. And 
with this, local governments in the peripheries were subordinated to the central 
government in a perpetual, relatively undefined, state of becoming ‘modern’, 
according to terms that the British rather than the Sudanese initially set. Moreover, 
meeting this illusory endpoint was difficult if not impossible for them to ever achieve 
without somehow reconciling the financial and social self-interest of customary 
authorities with the idea of local government as a force for public good.  
 
This thesis illustrates that one of the key ways in which the state did this was through 
tight control over local government finances. Moreover, this dissertation shows that 
fiscal decentralisation paradoxically centralised authority in the central government 
even as it ostensibly delegated revenue raising authority to customary authorities at 
the local level. The persistent failure to redress this dynamic is perhaps key to 
understanding how economic power has been centralised in Sudan after 
independence and appears to be replicated in South Sudan after it acquired its 
independence from Sudan in 2011.  
 
This finding supports work by Chris Vaughan that argues that decentralisation, or 
devolution, which was the catch name for indirect rule towards the middle of the 
British occupation of the Condominium, was effectively a way to centralise 
authority.42 This finding is counterintuitive, as the contemporary development studies 
literature generally presumes that decentralisation contributes to enhanced local 
 
42 Vaughan, C. (2010) ‘Reinventing the Wheel? Local Government and Neo-Traditional Authority in 
Late-Colonial Northern Sudan’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 43, No 2. 
pp.255-278. 
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representation and leads to less overtly centralised state control.43 However, even as 
Vaughan focuses on the delegation of political authority, he neglects the role that 
taxes, and subnational revenue flows, played in this centralisation. This is despite the 
fact that taxes were the primary lever through which the British imagined how local 
governments would be instituted.  
 
In addition to taxes as a tool for monitoring, territorialising and centralising authority, 
this project provides evidence of how taxes also framed relations between 
geographic and socioeconomic conceptions of the centre and the peripheries. For 
example, at the end of British rule, the predominant areas where poll and hut taxes 
and tribute were levied included Darfur, Kassala and Kordofan provinces. It also 
encompassed most of what is now South Sudan, which, in 1956 included Bahr al-
Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria provinces. But in Sudan’s political core in the 
riverain north, which included Northern Province and parts of Blue Nile Province, 
people were subjected to a different tax regime that included land taxes, pump fees 
and business profits taxes.  
 
Part of the differences between tax regimes emerged from who collected taxes: 
customary authorities or a Sudanese civil servant or ‘effendi’. Poll and hut taxes and 
tribute were collected by government-selected customary authorities. Whereas by 
the end of British occupation, government administrators, who were likely to have 
been Sudanese but were civil servants rather than chiefs or sheikhs, collected taxes 
such as the business profits tax and pump fees.  
 
While this dissertation is focused on the logics of tax collection in the Condominium’s 
peripheries, the novel ‘Seasons of Migration to the North’ by Taleb Saleh contains a 
useful anecdote that illustrates the contrast between tax regimes. As this example 
indicates, distinct from the peripheries, in the riverain north taxes were collected by 
Sudanese administrators who were overseen by British officials:  
 
43 Oluwu, Dele, W.J. (2004) Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralisation. 
London: Lynne Rienner.; Ribot, J. (1999) ‘Decentralisation, Participation and Accountability in Sahelian 
Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control’, Journal of the International African 
Institute, Vol. 69 (1). pp.23-65.; Crook, R. (2003) Decentralization and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The 
Politics of Local-Central Relations’, Public Administration and Development, 23. pp.77-88. 
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“The English District Commissioner was a god who had a free hand over 
an area larger than the whole of the British Isle and lived in an enormous 
palace full of servants and guarded by troops. They used to behave like 
gods. They would employ us, the junior government officials who were 
natives of the country to bring in the taxes. The people would grumble 
and complain to the English Commissioner and naturally it was the 
English Commissioner who was indulgent and showed mercy. And in 
this way they sowed hatred in the hearts of the people for us, their 
kinsmen, and love for the colonizers, the intruders”44 
 
These reflections on the differences between tax regimes in the peripheries rather 
than the riverain core resonate with broader scholarship. For instance, Steven Serels 
notes that in northern Sudan during the early days of British occupation the state 
used land taxes, and land registration, to encourage migration to develop key 
industries. But this precluded the peripheries and was limited to the northern riverain 
core. Indeed, the main aim was to forge an ‘indigenous economy based on small 
scale, individual land ownership that was protected by the colonial government’. This 
was ‘designed’ to trigger migration of ‘indigenous elites’ to shore up their support 
and to also encourage the continued production and export of the gum trade, which 
formed a key part of the national budget throughout British occupation.45 Indeed, 
Sudan remains the world’s largest gum producer, generating an estimated 80 percent 
of gum arabic in the world market in recent years.46 
 
Further, this project provides evidence of the ways in which the centre constructed 
and engaged with the peripheries during the first forty years of British occupation, 
which underscores the strength rather than the weakness of the peripheries. British 
tax policies ostensibly began with an attitude that suggested they considered 
 
44 Saleh, T. (1969) Seasons of Migration to the North, Oxford: Heinemann Publishers, p.53 
45 Serels, S. (2007) ‘Political Landscaping: Land Registration, The Definition of Ownership and the 
Evolution of Colonial Objectives in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1924’, African Economic History, 
No. 35.p.62. 
46 Yasseen, G., Salih, A. and Ahmed, M. (2014) ‘Competitiveness and Profitability of Gum Arabic in 
North Kordofan State, Sudan’, Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, 120.p.705.  
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themselves to be politically and militarily unrivalled; however, this quickly proved 
unrealistic. While the British clearly had superior military weaponry, including access 
to military airplanes that had both a strategic and symbolic advantage, their tax 
policies still had to adapt to how power functioned in the peripheries.47  
 
Significantly, this project is not the first to demonstrate that the peripheries had an 
outsized relationship on the politics of the centre. For instance, Peter Woodward 
argues that ‘[i]t was not the state that changed the south[ern] [Sudan], so much as it 
was the south that changed the state’.48 This thesis’ findings simply expands this type 
of analysis and illustrates that the relationship the peripheries had with the centre was 
broadly similar even if the regions were, and remain, distinct. This counters other 
explanations that point to ethnic, religious, cultural, and geospatial differences 
between and within the peripheries while neglecting the broadly similar patterns of 
relative non-incorporation in these regions.49 It also adds to Douglas Johnson’s 
analysis of Sudan’s civil wars. Johnson argues that the role of repeated state-building 
attempts in constructing centre-periphery disparities is a more adequate overarching 
explanation than inherent racial and religious differences for why ‘regional 
underdevelopment and racial and cultural antagonism’ erupted in the first place.50 
 
47 Thomas, E. (2015) South Sudan: A Slow Liberation. London: Zed. p.77.; Vaughan, C. (2015) Darfur: 
Colonial Violence, Sultanic Legacies and Local Politics, 1916-1956. Woodbridge: James Currey.p.8.  
48 Woodward, P. (1990) Sudan, 1898-1989: The Unstable State. Boulder: Lynne Reinner. p.48.  
49 Jok, J.M. (2007) Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence. Oxford: One World Books.  
50 Johnson, D. (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Woodbridge: James Currey.pp.1-2. 
Source: Author’s Calculations based on ‘Annual Reports of the Governor General’ (1906-1949), Available at the Sudan Archive 
Durham.  
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Part 2: Taxation and State Formation 
 
Even as tensions over taxes had the capacity to lead to the successive downfall of 
governments in Sudan and other countries, new research argues they are key to 
improving the capacity, accountability and responsiveness of governments.51 
Furthermore, if we take the following definition of the importance of taxes as a 
singular focus of critical inquiry, then there is an even more robust case for reading 
into how these sources inform understandings of governance in these regions:  
 
There are good reasons why many scholars have recognised the 
importance of taxation. Taxes formalise our obligations to each other. 
They define the inequalities we accept and those that we collectively 
seek to redress. They signify who is a member of our political 
community, how we draw the circle of “we”. They set the boundaries of 
what our governments can do. In the modern world, taxation is the social 
contract.52 
 
In sum, the European-inflected thinking on the theory is that when people pay their 
taxes they acquire enhanced say in government decision-making. This in turn 
improves a state’s capacity to collect more taxes, because people should be more 
willing to pay them if they feel that the government is representing their interests.53 
According to these logics, taxes enhance accountability within a country because 
governments depend on revenue to exist and it should also make a government more 
responsive to the needs of taxpayers. This dynamic is often referred to as the fiscal 
 
51 Moore, M., Prichard, W., and Fjeldstad, O-H. (2018) Taxing Africa: Coercion, Reform and 
Development. London: Zed.  
52 Martin, I., Mehrotra, A. and Prasad, M. (2009) ‘The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development 
of the New Fiscal Sociology’ In: Martin, I., Mehrotra, A. and Prasad, M. (Eds.) The New Fiscal Sociology: 
Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.p.1.  
53 Moore, M., Prichard, W. and Fjeldstad, O-H. (2018) Taxing Africa: Coercion, Reform and 
Development. London: Zed.; Prichard, W. (2015) Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-
Saharan Africa: The Dynamics of Tax Bargaining. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Prichard, 
W. (2010) ‘Taxation and State Building: Towards a Governance Focused Tax Reform Agenda’, Institute 
of Development Studies Working Paper, Vol. 2010, No. 341, Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies.; Prichard, W. (2010) ‘Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa’. 
Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.; Bräutigam, D., 
Fjeldstad, O-H. and Moore, M. (Eds.) (2008) Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: 







social contract, whereby tax money is paid to governments in exchange for public 
services and an enhanced say in what the state does.54 
 
Furthermore, this literature argues that the fiscal social contract is an extension of the 
social contract, which essentially links taxation to ‘wider dynamics of politics and 
governance’.55 Effectively, as Martin et al argue, ‘[i]n the modern world, taxation is the 
social contract’ between people and government.56 Much of this scholarship emerges 
from works on the ‘New Fiscal Sociology’, which draw from the influential theoretical 
works on taxation and governance of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter.57  
 
This literature indicates that several factors contribute to the ways in which this 
dynamic of social contract formation emerges, one of which relates to the directness 
by which different types of taxes are raised. Direct, rather than indirect, taxes are 
considered important because direct taxes are more visible to taxpayers and 
therefore, so the thinking goes, more likely to contribute to bargaining over taxes.58 
In contrast, indirect taxes are less visible to taxpayers and therefore less likely to 
contribute to bargaining.59  
 
54 Tilly, C. (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.; 
Ertman, T. (1997) Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe. Cambridge: CUP.; Levi, M. (1988) Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California 
Press; Fukuyama, F. (2011) The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French 
Revolution. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux.  
55 Meagher, K. (2016) ‘Taxing Times: Taxation, Divided Societies and the Informal Economy in Northern 
Nigeria’. Journal of Development Studies. pp. 1-17.  
56 Martin, I., Mehrotra, A. and Prasad, M. (2009) ‘The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development 
of the New Fiscal Sociology’ in Martin, I., Mehrotra, A. and Prasad, M. (Eds.) The New Fiscal Sociology: 
Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
57 Weber, M. (1958) ‘The Types of Legitimate Domination’, in Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (Eds.) (1968) Max 
Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. pp.212-297.; Schumpeter, J. (1954) ‘The Crisis of the Tax State’, in Peacock, A. [Ed.] 
International Economic Papers: Translations Prepared for the International Economic Association, Vol. 
4. London: Macmillan.  
58 Lieberman, E. (2002) ‘Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: Possibilities and Pitfalls 
in Cross-National Research’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 36(4). pp.89-115.; 
Bates, R. and Lien, D-H. (1985) ‘A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government’, 
Politics and Society, 14, No. 1. pp.53-70.; Havik, P. (2013) ‘Colonial Administration, Public Accounts 
and Fiscal Extraction: Policies and Revenues in Portuguese Africa (1900-1960)’, African Economic 
History, Vol.4. pp.159-221. 
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Partly for these reasons, indirect taxes are therefore easier for governments to 
impose. For instance, Mick Moore writes that, in British occupied India, poll taxes 
were the most direct and thus visible of taxes, which in turn made them challenging 
to introduce and levy.60 Indeed, the often-violent military ‘pacification’ campaigns that 
took place among Nuer and Dinka sub-clans in Upper Nile Province were often over 
chiefs’ refusal to pay taxes. Moreover, the Poll Tax was subsequently abolished in 
the 1960s after Sudan became independent from Britain, which also suggests that it 
was untenable in Sudan, too.  
 
While some taxes were also contentious in the Condominium, the specific pathways 
through which they were volatile add nuance to Mick Moore’s observations about the 
poll tax in India. For instance, as this dissertation illustrates, one of the most 
significant rebellions against the British-led state in the Condominium was over taxes. 
Though this was not over poll taxes, it was instead over the herd taxes that were 
applied to a section of the Hamr tribe in Darfur. Though this hems to the theoretical 
literature on taxes and governance the British were initially reluctant to recognise this 
as the root of the problem.61 
 
The forms and perceptions of taxation are closely tied to ideas about citizenship. This 
dissertation shows that because taxes were collected by customary authorities in the 
peripheries, some interactions between people and government were concordantly 
structured or bounded. Customary authorities such as chiefs and sheikhs and omdas 
became the primary mediators between people and government, which was 
embodied by a Sudanese or British official, rather than people directly interacting with 
the state. Rather than taxes as a form of ‘political liberation’, given their purported 
capacity to contribute to more representative governments, as seminal works by Max 
 
60 Moore, M. (2004) ‘Taxation and the Political Agenda, North and South’, Forum for Development 
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Weber and others argues, taxes in the Condominium tightened colonial control over 
the population.62 
 
Even this preliminary analysis makes clear that very different fiscal dynamics and thus 
preconditions for a fiscal social contract were at play in Sudan than might have been 
found in the European or Chinese contexts. Indeed, the theories underpinning these 
findings are generally rooted in an interpretation of the European state-formation 
experience that might radically diverge from how African states such as Sudan and 
South Sudan were forged.63 And there is little historical evidence that the fiscal social 
contract as it is understood in European countries has robust foundations in African 
territories, such as the regions that are now Sudan and South Sudan.  
 
Moreover, though much of the recent research on tax is also focused on vital 
contemporary policy concerns, it tends to be dominated by timeframes that are 
frustratingly short for many historians. This is despite the fact that state-formation is 
by necessity a long-term, essentially centuries’ long-process. Not to mention that 
some of the seminal ideas on tax and European state-formation were generated by 
historians such as Charles Tilly.64 Tilly’s work on European state formation still 
importantly argues that war and the threat of war contributed to the push for standing 
armies in several parts of Europe that needed to be financed by a reliable revenue 
source. The furtherance of these dynamics contributed to a shift from taxes that were 
also known as tribute in Europe, which were also primarily about asserting allegiances 
as they were in the Condominium, to other types of taxes. But the transition to a more 
invasive tax regime consequently required greater negotiation between taxpayers 
and the state as the former demanded greater say in how their monies were being 
spent. In turn, the European states actually developed more ‘capacity’ or the ability 
 
62 Ibid.; Weber, M. (1958) ‘The Types of Legitimate Domination’, in Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (1968) Max 
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to assert power over the people and territories they sought to govern. James C. Scott 
argues that this shift consequently allowed the state to acquire ‘direct knowledge of 
and access to a previously opaque society’ even though it also led to conflicts 
between people and government.65 In theory at least, these improvements in state 
officials’ knowledge of the people they governed contributed to states that could 
better respond to people’s demands. Conversely, the state also increasingly had the 
power to more readily assert its authority over the territories it governed in ways that 
could still be coercive.  
 
Though the theories that can be derived from this work are deeply compelling, more 
scholarship is needed to reconcile whether and how European colonisation of Africa 
disrupts or perhaps even accelerates these types of dynamics. And yet, some of the 
findings in the development studies literature glosses over these kinds of potential 
inconsistencies or knowledge gaps. For example, a recently published introductory 
text on tax and governance in Africa co-authored by the three most prominent 
scholars on the field, Mick Moore, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Wilson Prichard, skims 
over the relevance of colonial taxes. This is despite the fact that they introduce their 
book by acknowledging that people in Sierra Leone continue to discuss the legacy 
of a tax revolt that took place in 1898 today.66  
 
History, these authors paradoxically recognise, is alive and well for people who live 
in African countries; and yet, they neglect to explore or adequately question the 
origins of contemporary tax practices on the continent. This is even as economic 
historians of Africa such as Ewout Frankema note that following the 1898 conflict over 
taxes in Sierra Leone, in which around one-thousand soldiers, traders and 
missionaries died, chiefs assumed responsibility for taxes. As a consequence, British 
historical sources claim, chiefs often ‘exploited’ these positions for their own 
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benefit.67 Moreover, akin to how the British engaged with people in Sudan’s 
peripheries, the British also opted for a ‘low’ tax regime in Sierra Leone that also 
appeared to have been invested in using taxes to illustrate that the state controlled 
the territory.68 More research is needed to explore whether and how Sierra Leone and 
Sudan’s experience of taxation under British occupation were broadly similar and 
whether and how they contributed to similar governance outcomes.    
 
Instead, Moore et al breezily brush over the continuing legacy in African countries 
inherited from the time in which they were colonised by European states whereby 
taxes were collected by customary authorities. This phenomenon is treated like a 
curious but largely unremarkable anomaly by these authors. This is despite the fact 
that they recognise that this practice is an enduring feature across the continent and 
devote a full chapter to informal taxation, which includes taxes collected by 
customary authorities.69 As a consequence of this type of oversight, the origins and 
the potential implications for how this informs how people relate to government 
remain severely under-researched. Moreover, akin to some of the main findings in 
this thesis, this very example illustrates the ways in which chiefs used taxes to bargain 
with government or at the very least to modify their position within the state.  
 
This dissertation’s findings suggest that this kind of inattention is significant because 
evidence from the British occupation of Sudan and South Sudan provides substantial 
insights into the nature of the fiscal social contract that are likely still relevant. Indeed, 
the collection of taxes by chiefs and other types of customary authorities on behalf 
of the state is far from a quirky facet of Africa or Africans; instead, it was an invention 
imposed by Europeans. Moreover, as other scholars have argued, this move had 
inexorably political origins. Indeed, as this thesis illustrates, it was a way of governing 
‘on the cheap’ and of keeping people in the periphery away from the nationalist ideas 
 
67 Frankema, E. (2010b) ‘Raising Revenue in the British Empire, 1870-1940: How ‘Extractive’ Were 
Colonial Taxes?’, Journal of Global History, 5. p.467-468. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Moore, M., Prichard, W. and Fjeldstad, O-H. (2018) Taxing Africa: Coercion, Reform and 







of the intelligentsia who more often worked as civil servants.70 Indeed, other historians 
note that in some parts of Africa, the colonial policy of contracting taxes to customary 
authorities revitalised the power of chiefs and sheikhs akin to how taxes enabled the 
Condominium government to centralise its authority.71  
 
Part 3: Taxes and Colonialism 
 
Given the aforementioned gaps in the political science and economic literatures it is 
helpful that economic historians of Africa have also contributed new research that is 
relevant to this project. However, much of the work done by the latter has focused 
on reconciling the concerns of economists and historians, who are often interested 
in different questions and treat theory and evidence differently.72 Nevertheless, 
detailed, cross-country, economic histories of how revenue concerns and financing 
considerations shaped how European countries colonised the continent have 
emerged.  
 
Akin to the tax and governance literature, the African economic history literature and 
contemporary works on tax and governance tend to assume that this was always 
primarily about revenue raising.73 Perhaps as a consequence it devotes its attention 
to the finances of central governments rather than the peripheries, which were often 
peripheral in the eyes of the state precisely because they were not economically 
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viable. Indeed, French colonisers in Africa referred to these regions as Afrique inutile, 
or ‘useless Africa’.74  
 
Likewise, this dissertation’s findings reveal and challenge a blind-spot in the 
burgeoning and increasingly pervasive literature on tax and state-formation, which 
generally presumes that colonial tax policies were largely about raising revenue. While 
this appears to have been the case in some British colonies in Africa, such as Kenya 
and Northern Rhodesia, this project illustrates that this does not fit the Sudanese 
experience.75 As most revenue needs were addressed by exports rather than direct 
taxes, the latter were notably important as a policy lever for the British to understand 
and experimentally shape people in the Condominium’s peripheries.  
 
Meanwhile, Crawford Young’s seminal text, ‘The African Colonial State in 
Comparative Perspective’ argues that the Condominium was an outlier to how other 
European colonies in Africa were financed because it had an Egyptian loan.76 
However, a closer reading of more recent African economic history literature by Leigh 
Gardner suggests that though having a loan was distinct, all other British colonies in 
Africa were financed by exports, just as Sudan was.77 Moreover, the Condominium 
was not somehow liberated from the revenue imperative because of this loan since it 
did not cover all the expenses needed to run the territory. Similarly, the British 
ultimately had to repay this loan and therefore needed to rapidly generate funds to 
achieve this.  
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Digging deeper, as Gardner has quoted, the sociologist Rudolph Goldscheid argued 
that ‘the budget is the skeleton of the state, stripped of all misleading ideologies’.78 
Likewise, contemporary Horn of Africa scholars such as Alex de Waal have also 
rigorously applied this dictum to recent influential theorisations of how political 
authority is ‘bought’ in Sudan, South Sudan and other countries in the region.79 And 
yet, the applicability of this vivid analogy has been recently questioned by historians 
of Sudan. Indeed, even as Alden Young’s work on economic planning in Sudan 
acknowledges that this was also his starting point, Young found that the 
Condominium’s budget was instead ‘chock full of ideology’. Building on Gardner’s 
arguments, Young found that the politics of the Condominium’s budget ‘fram[ed] 
questions of who, what, and where [were] worthy of receiving resources of the 
state’.80  
 
But even Young’s vital text neglects to examine how taxes surprisingly fell outside of 
most administrative discussions on economic planning, which is in itself revealing as 
it further underscores the political rather than economic importance of taxes. These 
types of gaps are problematic given regular reference to the role that taxes have 
played as an integral, albeit overlooked, role of chieftaincy and sheikhship throughout 
important anthropological works on Sudan.81 However, often missing from these 
works are vital questions that address whether and how a ‘fiscal social contract’, 
which is deemed so essential in the normative conceptions of statehood that prevail 
today, exists in these countries.  
 
Indeed, on the whole, the African economic history literature has not adequately 
integrated the findings from the ‘anthropology of tax’ literature and scholarship on 
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Sudan’s economy under British occupation is no exception. Roughly speaking, the 
anthropology of tax literature provides evidence for the diverse ways in which ‘value’ 
can be constituted in a variety of non-monetary and monetary forms. Moreover, non-
monetary transactions such as cowrie shells in different parts of Africa, or cows in 
parts of Sudan and South Sudan today, come with monetary and social significance 
that can be highly context specific and variable in space and time.82 Likewise, ideas 
about ‘value’ call into question the very idea of what money is, which is easy to take 
for granted in parts of the world where it has been the predominant form of exchange 
in recent memory.  
 
And yet, in the Condominium and other parts of European occupied Africa there have 
been longstanding ties between anthropological ideas and colonial tax methods. For 
example, the anthropologist Geoffrey Lienhardt even went so far as to claim that in 
parts of what are now South Sudan the ‘whole fiscal system depend[ed]’ on the 
mutual acceptability of the group over the individual.83  Lienhardt justified this on the 
grounds that the British were understaffed and had little choice but to accept the 
logics that emerged through discussions between chiefs and British District 
Commissioners.84 Though this might have somewhat been the case in some parts of 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Lienhardt downplays the application of force, or 
the threat of violence, that underpinned these interactions. He also privileged the 
perspective of chiefs, who presumably would have benefitted from this position as 
the primary intermediary between people and government.  
 
The importance of taxes as a driver of colonial knowledge-production that helped the 
state ‘see’ customary authorities rather than raise revenue, while overlooked by 
historians of Sudan, has been acknowledged by others. For instance, the role that 
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seemingly mundane, but critical, processes such as tax collection plays has been 
addressed by historians such as Mahmood Mamdani, who persuasively argues that 
taxes were the lynchpin of indirect rule.85 Indeed, as Richard Reid argues of British 
colonialism in Africa in general, taxes such as the poll tax were explicitly about their 
symbolic value as ‘the most visible, and the most dreaded, manifestation of 
conquest’. And that this was the ‘key purpose’ of colonial rule.86 
 
But unlike Mamdani’s argument that there was pervasive revenue hunger throughout 
all parts of the colonial state, this dissertation’s findings suggest that taxes were 
deployed by the government as a tool to purchase allegiances and monitor people. 
The revenue hunger was not on behalf of the British led state, or the Sudanese 
leadership that followed; instead, to the extent that there is evidence for it in the 
Condominium, it came from customary authorities. Given the sources that this 
dissertation analyses, more research is needed to understand why customary 
authorities collected taxes and whether and how personal enrichment was a driver 
for obtaining and maintaining these positions. Likewise, further scholarship is also 
required to adequately study whether and how these positions were desirable at 
different points in British occupation; after all, collecting taxes is exceptionally 
difficult. Nor was reporting tax collection proceeds to the British state easy, which 
might depose or punish customary authorities if their performance was deemed 
unsatisfactory.  
 
But, much like the contemporary literature on tax and governance, it is not obvious 
why the transition to using taxes to bargain with local elites and then using taxes to 
finance local governments would be straightforward. This dissertation’s analysis 
suggests that these efforts did not reconcile the tension between taxes as a tool to 
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recruit local elites, which created what Mahmood Mamdani describes as 
‘decentralised despotism’ and using taxes to fund services.87 Further, although some 
British officials were aware they had turned chiefs and sheikhs into ‘tyrants’ they 
failed to acknowledge the difficulty of compelling local elites to work as quasi-public 
servants rather than contracted colonial collaborators. So, although there is some 
indication that taxes contributed to tyrannical customary authorities, more research 
is needed to understand whether and how these dynamics emerged as it is not 
apparent in adequate detail from the British sources analysed.  
 
Part 4: Taxation and Submission in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
 
By using taxes to purchase collaboration in the peripheries, the British-led state 
engaged in what Philip Abrams characterises as any state’s ‘cardinal activity’: ‘the 
legitimating of the illegitimate’.88 This included both the institution of the British led-
state and also the formalisation of government-selected customary authorities. 
Indeed, the former Governor of Berber and Halfa Provinces, H.C. Jackson, wrote that 
the tax collecting duties of sheikhs were deeply avoided during the Turkiyya. 
Unsurprisingly, few people appeared to have held tax collectors in high regard; 
however, during the Turkiyya, sheikhs had to squeeze people for taxes and also 
report to a government that might mete out punishment if its tax quotas were not 
met. As a sign of how low the social standing of sheikhs in parts of Sudan was during 
these years, Jackson claims that villages often selected a person with diminished 
social status, such as a slave, to become a sheikh.89 Likewise, Cherry Leonardi 
illustrates that nineteenth century Europeans reported how people that were labelled 
sheikhs could be ‘punished, tortured or killed’ by ivory and slave traders or Egyptian 
government forces. As a consequence, Leonardi notes that ‘it was probably common 
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[…] for relatively marginal men (or even some women) to take on the role of 
negotiating with foreigners’.90  
 
Thus, indirect rule represented a time of profound change rather than logical, 
supposedly natural, continuity of pre-existing socio-political relations, and taxes were 
the primary lever through which this disruption was implanted. Paradoxically, 
something the British led government seemed to be unaware of even as they devoted 
tremendous energy to ‘ordering’ people in Sudan through taxes, was that their arrival 
in part triggered years of substantial disorder in the peripheries. This change 
extended to how political authority was negotiated, obtained and maintained by 
customary authorities in the peripheries who essentially were transformed into tax 
collectors that derived their authority from government. And, even though the British 
actively sought to mould these efforts on their historical and ethnographic 
impressions of how power functioned in Sudan and other parts of Africa, they were 
still in part imposing a new order on the region. 
 
Indeed, as this dissertation’s findings illustrate, by the early 1930s the state shifted 
from the comparatively violent application of taxes as submission to the government 
to taxes as acknowledgement of it. The latter meant that customary authorities 
‘acknowledged’ government by regularly remitting taxes. This transition was in part 
motivated by the begrudging realisation among different British officials in the state, 
particularly in Upper Nile Province, that forcefully collecting taxes undermined British 
rule. It also acquired high-level approval from the 1920 Milner Report, which 
advanced indirect rule, which essentially formalised pre-existing policies in the 
Condominium of working through customary authorities.  
 
As part of the shift, taxes were primarily used to monitor customary authorities such 
as sheikhs, chiefs and omdas in the peripheries; thus, once again, the British 
justifications for collecting taxes were primarily non-monetary. Throughout British 
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rule, taxes were used as a measuring stick to assess the extent to which a customary 
authority was legitimate according to British logics. If there were plenty of taxpayers 
but not enough tax revenue, the British could interpret this in two ways. One was that 
the chief, sheikh or omda was taking too much taxes on the side and was therefore 
untrustworthy. But this was only a problem if the individual was considered 
strategically or politically unimportant to government; otherwise, the British had little 
choice but to permit it to continue. Or the British could read this as a sign that the 
customary authority was too weak to assert his authority over his people and region 
and might need to be removed.91 These dynamics were not necessarily unique to 
Sudan, as research by Jutta Bolt and Leigh Gardner has found evidence that this was 
the main justification for dismissing chiefs throughout British held-Africa.92  
 
The British therefore also used taxes to confer or at least justify customary authorities’ 
positions based on their understanding of the number of taxpayers in each area and 
the territory that each customary authority lorded over. This was particularly useful in 
the absence of a census, which the British never implemented until the year before 
independence.93 Taxes were also a component of a conscious British strategy to 
embed different customary authorities to parts of the Condominium’s peripheries and 
were integral to attempts to create and maintain internal and international boundaries. 
For example, as Chris Vaughan argues, part of the push for territorialisation in Darfur 
came from Darfuri sheikhs who were interested in ‘maintaining their base of tax-
paying subjects’.94 
 
In return, customary authorities could assume lofty titles such as paramount chiefs 
with backing from the state, which appeared to have conferred social status on an 
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otherwise potentially perilous and therefore undesirable position. This echoes 
elements of Deborah Poole’s formulation of the state as a harbinger of ‘threat and 
guarantee’.95 Indeed, scholars of Sudan such as Chris Vaughan have usefully 
recontextualised this formulation to the territory as the idea of the state as ‘located 
between threat and opportunity’.96 This project adds to these arguments by providing 
evidence for the ways in which these opportunities were often for customary 
authorities while the larger threats appeared to have been for other types of non-elites 
in the peripheries.  
 
This thesis also illustrates that the British also held essentialist ideas about people in 
the peripheries versus the ‘intelligentsia’ in Khartoum and other urban centres. This 
was because the British thought the latter were more susceptible to nationalist 
fervour that would threaten their rule. Moreover, customary authorities were also in 
part romanticised as the ‘true’ representatives of the people in Sudan and the regions 
that were to become South Sudan.97 And, by assessing taxes along a group rather 
than an individual basis via customary authorities as Lienhardt advised, the British 
actively sought to encode and embed the importance of the social group, such as 
the clan or tribe. This distinction was significant to some British thinkers because the 
group rather than the individual was considered the cornerstone of ‘African’ societies, 
as the British conceptualised them. This in turn also reified sheikhs and chiefs as 
pivotal intermediaries between people and government. 
 
This dissertation’s findings therefore adds nuance to Mamdani’s thesis, which 
suggests that the British use of African customary authorities as tax collectors led to 
‘pervasive revenue hunger’ throughout local governments.98  However, in Sudan, 
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though taxes were important for customary authorities they were more vital for the 
state as a tool for social control rather than revenue raising. Indeed, they emerged as 
a substantial ‘technology of government’ that motivated collaboration between 
customary authorities and government.99 Moreover, the application of taxes as a 
technology of government used for social control also contributed to the state’s 
efforts to ‘render a realm into discourse as a knowable, calculable and administrable 
object’.100 Which, in the case of Sudan meant deploying customary authorities as 
agents of the state who mediated between people and government in the peripheries 
to make these regions, and the customary authorities within them, more legible to the 
British.  
 
Wielding taxes as a form of experimentation or social engineering in the 
Condominium thus also informs the literature on how Africa was a ‘living laboratory’ 
for European imperial ideas. These subjects of such experimentation included 
science, geology, ‘racial sciences’ anthropology and so forth.101 The vital works 
produced through such initiatives reveal how European colonisers deployed 
ethnographers such as Evans-Pritchard, who researched the Nuer in the 
Condominium, to classify and study people on the continent. Indeed, as Chinua 
Achebe eloquently, and succinctly, noted in 1975:  
 
‘To the colonialist mind it was always of the utmost importance to be 
able to say: I know my natives, a claim which implied two things at once: 
(a) that the native was really quite simple and (b) that understanding him 
and controlling him went hand in hand – understanding being a pre-
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condition for control and constituting adequate proof of 
understanding’102 
 
The surreal and dystopian underbelly of these studies was that they contributed to 
British thinking about how to subordinate and control the territories and the people 
that resided in them. This has been widely critiqued by numerous scholars such as 
Veena Das, Deborah Poole and Freddy Foks.103 But thus far, these analyses on the 
production of scientific knowledge as a mode of control during and through European 
colonisation of Africa have principally focused on the role of ethnographers, 
environmental practitioners and scientists.104 Though Stoler acknowledges that her 
work is the tip of the iceberg, the socio-economic role of routine state functions such 
as taxes have fallen outside of the ways in which the colonial state experimented in 
the Condominium and Africa as a whole. However, this type of inquiry has also been 
raised by other influential scholars more broadly and is therefore not wholly unique 
to this project; for instance, James C. Scott acknowledges how taxes are a tool of 
control in some of his more recent works.105  
 
Nevertheless, this gap remains striking because some early anthropologists, some of 
whom had a complicated relationship with colonialism as both handmaidens and 
critics, flagged the centrality of taxes in European efforts to occupy the continent. For 
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instance, the French Anthropologist Michel Leiris wrote the following diary entry while 
working for an ethnographical expedition in French West Africa, from contemporary 
Dakar through to Djibouti, sometime in 1934:  
 
The idea of colonisation becomes increasingly more repugnant to me. 
To collect taxes, that is the chief preoccupation. Pacification, medical 
aid, have only one aim: to tame the people so that they will be docile 
and pay their taxes. What is the object of tours, sometimes 
accompanied by bloodshed? To bring in the taxes. What is the object 
of ethnographical studies? To learn how to govern more subtly so that 
the taxes shall come in better.106 
 
This dissertation also provides evidence of the ways in which taxes were a central 
part of constructing the margins in Sudan and South Sudan. Part of this was achieved 
by using taxes to buy collaboration of elites in the peripheries by granting them taxing 
power that could lead to personal self-enrichment and heightened social status. 
Indeed, this project illustrates that hut and poll taxes and tribute were unique to the 
Condominium’s margins; the presence of these taxes actually came to define the 
contours of the peripheries. Nor was this type of regionally specific tax regime unique 
to the peripheries; for instance, Steven Serels argues a similar pattern of misleading 
regional uniformity among the ordinances on northern land taxes that only applied to 
certain areas.107 This further implies that there was a diversity of tax regimes with 
different social, rather than financial, aims in the territory; however, this project is 
specifically concerned with these dynamics in the Condominium’s peripheries. More 
research is needed to conduct a comparative analysis of the tax regimes throughout 
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the spatially vast and economically and ethnographically diverse regions that 
constituted the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.  
 
Nevertheless, beyond these types of primarily elite bargains that were required 
between customary authorities and government this dissertation illustrates the ways 
in which the British consistently struggled to make the peripheries legible to the state.  
Though the government tried to make these regions economically vital to the centre 
through the forced imposition of agricultural cultivation to pay tax money these efforts 
often backfired. Further scholarship on what taxpayers thought of paying taxes in 
money rather than in-kind is necessary. However, this dissertation’s findings suggest 
that it is plausible that one of the reasons why these initiatives appear to have failed 
was because the British did not make a compelling case for joining the monetary 
economy. British tax collection methods could also be damaging; for instance, this 
project indicates that attempts to tax livestock led to rebellions in different parts of 
the territory. Likewise, other efforts exacerbated food insecurity to the point of famine 
in Red Sea and Kassala.  
 
These findings thus illustrate some of the ways in which the British colonial 
administration had limited knowledge or understandings of the people it appointed 
itself to oversee. Moreover, the Condominium’s administration was internally at odds 
with what they were meant to achieve in these regions, and the confusion over what 
a tax was or ought to be or how it should relate to local government underscored this 
reality. Rather than acting as a supreme authority, the British were often largely 
fumbling their way forward instead of asserting a coherent strategy. And, as this 
project indicates, taxes were one of the most visible indicators of this illusion of state 
authority. Thus, this dissertation provides evidence that tax policy in the 
Condominium was what the political scientist Christian Lund might describe as a 
show of ‘stateness’. British officials often presumed much deeper knowledge and 
control over the peripheries than the state ever had.108  
 









These dynamics, which primarily centre on the interactions between customary 
authorities and government over taxes, provide preliminary indications that taxes 
were unlikely to have contributed to western notions of the fiscal social contract. 
Instead, customary authorities were at times ‘purchasing’ their authority from the 
British by somewhat reliably collecting and reporting their tax revenues to the British 
and Sudanese administrators who oversaw their efforts. At various points and in 
different parts of the territory, the British were ‘buying’ collaboration from customary 
authorities. These types of dynamics appear to have been exceptionally difficult to 
dislodge, even when key officials attempted to shift taxes from a tool of submission 
to one of creating quasi-citizens.  
 
These findings support aspects of Chris Vaughan’s scholarship on British rule in 
Darfur whereby the British ‘play[ed] on and exacerbat[ed] local divisions in order to 
find ways into the societies it wished to control’.109 This thesis echoes another of 
Vaughan’s key findings, whereby ‘bargaining between centre and periphery – and the 
crucial importance of local intermediaries with government – clearly remains crucial 
to state formation in the region’.110 
 
Part 5: Dissertation Sources and their Limitations 
 
Though this project initially set out to understand Sudanese impressions of how taxes 
shaped how people related to government, it is difficult to develop a clearer picture 
of these views from available sources. This thesis is built upon research conducted 
in the National Records Office in Khartoum, the British Library and the UK National 
Archives in London, and the Sudan Archive at Durham University. A handful of 
sources were also drawn from the South Sudan National Archives. But all of these 
are entirely British, rather than Sudanese, sources and are therefore inevitably tainted 
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by the perspective of the colonisers rather than the people the British-led state 
attempted to control.  
 
Nevertheless, as work by Ann Laura Stoler compellingly argues, colonial archives still 
reveal a great deal. In the case of archives related to tax policy in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium, they lay bare the objectives and the surprising confusion among 
British officials on what their taxes were meant to achieve in Sudan and South Sudan 
in the first place.111 For instance, the most significant challenge that confronted this 
dissertation was coming to grips with the reality that Anglo-Egyptian tax policies were 
not written down in any one place. Nor was there much a ‘road-map’ of where these 
documents would be or how they changed over time. Local budgets also did not 
reveal much and were not consistently generated across regions and the 
Condominium’s duration and were therefore of limited utility for this project.  
 
Indeed, there was a dizzying variety of taxes in the Condominium. These included: 
tribute, ushur (a tax on a tenth of the profits from agricultural harvests), land tax, date 
tax, hut tax, poll tax, herd tax, animal tax, royalties, traders taxes, boat taxes, taxes 
on land sales and road taxes.112 As for the laws that touched on taxes, these ranged 
from: the Taxation of Land and Date Trees Ordinance from 1899, the House Tax 
Ordinance which is also from 1899, the Taxation of Animal Ordinance from 1901, the 
1901 Tribute Ordinance, the Taxation of Rainlands (ushur) Ordinance from 1924, the 
1925 Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance to the Traders Licence and Taxation of Profits 
Ordinance from 1930. There were also several amendments to these and other 
ordinances at various points during British rule.113 As for legislation that touched on 
how taxes could be collected, this notably included the 1951 Local Government Act. 
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Given the breadth of taxes and tax legislation that shaped taxes in the territory, it was 
difficult to ascertain whether and how taxes were collected. Likewise, it was also 
challenging to verify the extent to which the execution of these ordinances confirmed 
with how they were legislated in these documents. For instance, the number of 
amendments to ordinances suggests that taxes were not straightforward or at least 
required regular tweaking to get the system to work as the British intended. This 
provided insights into how taxes were collected, as well as the reasons for changes 
to the legislation on taxes collection, which cannot be easily gleaned from the tax 
ordinances themselves.  
 
However, in reading such sources ‘along the grain’ they clearly reflected the enduring 
ways in which the state was less interested in the taxes levied in peripheries for how 
much revenue they brought in as much as for their capacity to exert control.114 Thus, 
this dissertation has predominantly examined the communiques on the tax legislation 
in the Condominium, which reveals the often-considerable gap between how officials 
imagined or hoped taxes functioned and the reality. It also speaks to the numerous 
objectives that taxes were linked to, even if the ordinances did not explicitly detail 
them. Requests often emerged that spoke to the confusion among administrators 
over what constituted a tax and how it ought to be collected or whether it was even 
legal. These communications therefore reveal that though the central government, in 
the form of the Financial, Civil and Legal Secretaries (and, by the end of British rule, 
the Ministry for Local Government) had a strong say in tax policy, tax policy was often 
in practice determined within provinces.  
 
But this peripheral influence is unclear in the existing historiography, and therefore 
presented challenges in this dissertation’s archival review, as it was initially uncertain 
which types of files to review. In the end, province files, as well as Governor-General 
Reports, Intelligence Reports, local government ordinances and a broad selection of 
patchy files that detailed tax policy for specific types of taxes throughout the territory 
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were key for this thesis. Similarly, some private communications, including letters to 
family and to British officials throughout the British empire and in the UK, were also 
reviewed. Throughout these documents, discussions about taxes were seemingly 
everywhere, but very rarely was it understood as the primary topic of debate. Instead, 
concerns were about asserting control over people in these regions, with taxes 
serving as a symbolic tool that embodied this relationship.  
 
When examining the Condominium’s budget, this dissertation also began with 
Goldsheid’s dictum that taxes reveal a state’s ‘skeleton’ as a starting point. However, 
consensus was gradually reached with Alden Young that the budget was deeply 
ideological.115 The Condominium’s budget initially appears detailed, and yet upon 
deeper review, including the construction of a revenue dataset that expands across 
all the years for which data is comparable, it is notable how much it conceals rather 
than reveals. Foremost among these considerations is that the budget fails to 
acknowledge where different revenue sources came from. Given this dissertation’s 
focus on the economic peripheries in Sudan and South Sudan, it is impossible to 
discern where different revenue sources were derived from solely by reviewing 
national budgets. Likewise, though Governor-General Reports provided some local 
budget information, these were not systematically generated and were often from 
provinces that were not part of the peripheries. Though initially confusing, this also 
underscores the ways in which taxes were used as a tool for political rather than 
financial gain in the peripheries. Indeed, the parts of the territory that justified local 
budgets in part reflected how they appeared to the central state, which is to say 
befuddlingly vestigial and relatively unknown.  
 
The budget still provides some insights that are useful for this project. For example, 
in a strategy that was typical for other British colonies in Africa, the British 
emphasised exports, which were relatively easy to control by the central government. 
This also contributed to initial investments in railways and steamers, so as to get 
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exports out of the country, as well as in the development of what is still the world’s 
largest irrigation project, the Gezira Scheme, to develop the cotton export industry. 
As Table 1, which was compiled from Annual Reports of the Governor General from 
1906 to 1949, reveals, export revenues quickly outstripped other revenue sources 
and contributed the bulk of the territory’s finances. 
 
There are, or course, limitations to this overall approach to sources. For example, it 
is notably difficult to understand what customary authorities’ thoughts and intentions 
were when they bargained with government. It is likewise impossible to study what 
people who paid taxes to customary authorities thought about the relationship they 
were engaged in when they took part in this act. Indeed, by all indications, this 
remains an important area for future study; for example, Andrew Mawson notes that 
in the 1980s members of the Agar Dinka in Southern Sudan interchangeably used the 
term ‘juer’ for paying taxes and for religiously sacrificing animals.116  
 
Likewise, Michael Tuck argues that in colonial Uganda, chiefs collected taxes on 
behalf of government but occasionally did so by lending their subjects money ‘and in 
return took livestock worth many times the amount of the loan’. However, when the 
British demanded that taxes were to be paid in cash this relationship was 
undermined.117 Though there is limited evidence of this type of dynamic in this 
project’s analysis of taxes in the Condominium’s peripheries, it suggests that there 
are likely to be complicated dynamics between customary authorities and taxpayers 
at play. Indeed, Chris Vaughan argues that the extraction of ‘bribes, fines and extra-
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Further, it also raises questions about the idea of citizenship in these countries. For 
instance, when people were paying taxes in either territory, what did they understand 
themselves to be ‘buying’ when they remit them? And, did they imagine or 
conceptualise themselves as citizens?  More concretely, does the word ‘juer’, or 
sacrifice, still apply among the Dinka Agar when paying taxes and what might this 
say about their idea of the state? Though deeply compelling, these types of questions 
fell outside of this project’s purview. Moreover, given the different cycles of conflict 
and revolution that have impacted Sudan and South Sudan in the past four years, it 
was not feasible to conduct interviews. This was, however, the researcher’s intention 
at the proposal stage of this project, but given the longstanding difficulties associated 
with research in both countries, it was not possible to conduct both archival research 
and detailed interviews.  
 
This dissertation nevertheless lays substantial groundwork for future research. For 
instance, local histories of how taxes were collected within the political centre are 
therefore also needed to complement this dissertation’s findings and to further 
explore whether and how ideas about the state and of citizenship might have varied 
across the territory. This would helpfully highlight the political distinctiveness of poll 
taxes and tribute in relation to other types of direct taxes such as pump taxes that 
were levied in the riverain northern core. Oral histories would therefore supplement 
this project and might enrich future research into these questions.  
 
Any other ways in which the legacy of British tax practices might persist into the 
present is also a compelling subject for further inquiry. For instance, during South 
Sudan’s wars for independence that continued after unified Sudan became 
independent in 1956, the main rebel group, the Sudan’s Peoples’ Liberation 
Army/Movement (SPLA/M), collected ‘unofficial’ taxes.119 What was the idea of the 
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liberated state that they were advancing when collecting these taxes? Likewise, did 
taxpayers’ have any ideas about citizenship when they paid them, and do these 
remain salient in post-independence South Sudan? These types of questions have 
long been systematically overlooked in South Sudan and would make for a 
captivating research project.  
 
Indeed, research by Kaspar Hoffmann, Koen Vlassenroot and Gauthier Marchais in 
contemporary Democratic Republic of the Congo suggests these types of patterns 
are likely to endure into the present. They argue that taxation is ‘at the core of armed 
group’s production of public authority and citizenship’ and that such techniques are 
rooted in colonial practices similar to those described in this dissertation.120 
Nevertheless, though these important questions are likely to be strongly influenced 
by the historical factors that this project identifies, they will require further study given 
the limitations of the sources and the timeframe that this project is based upon.  
 
Likewise, research by Lidwien Kaptiejns and Jay Spaulding from 1982 argues that 
strategies of gift-giving and tribute were integral to how relations between pre-British 
colonial states were managed from 1700 to 1900.121 Meanwhile, Rex O’Fahey 
illustrates similar dynamics in Darfur and Chris Vaughan underscores the salience of 
these arguments.122 This is reinforced by evidence uncovered during the research of 
British officials claiming that they were relying on practices that were indigenous to 
people in the region that then became Sudan. Thus, more research is also needed to 
explore the potentially deeper historical roots of patterns of bargaining through tax 
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collection. In sum, it is not safe to presume that the British uniquely invented the types 
of dynamics illustrated in this dissertation; however, it is likely that they transitioned 
during their occupation of the territory. 
 
Finally, prominent historians of Africa, such as Gareth Austin, have openly questioned 
why other parts of the world, such as China, are not more readily included in 
comparisons about state-formation. For Austin, it makes sense for researchers to 
‘ask why both Europe and China were different from Africa, as well as why Africa was 
different from either’. This project is not separate from these debates. However, it 
endeavours to examine the history of taxation in Sudan and South Sudan as the 
starting point for deriving insights in these processes rather than taking Europe, China 
or even other parts of the vast African continent as a template.123 Future studies might 
wish to expand the findings in this dissertation to other countries in Africa , such as 
Sierra Leone, and across the world, including but not limited to Europe and China.  
 
Part 6: Dissertation Outline 
 
 
This dissertation illustrates how taxes and local government reforms were used to 
control the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s peripheries in four chapters. The first 
demonstrates how from 1899 to 1921 the direct taxes levied in the peripheries were 
almost entirely about submission rather than revenue raising. It also argues that this 
practice was the precursor to indirect rule. Moreover, even at the start of British 
occupation, taxes defined the ‘centre’ and the ‘peripheries’, or where the economic 
centre began, and the vast peripheries unfolded. 
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Submission was entirely about demonstrating that a customary authority, which was 
normally a sheikh or chief, recognised the state as the supreme power in the then 
unified territory. But, once this collaboration was ‘bought’ by the British state, the 
customary authority appeared to have had relatively free rein to do as they wished, 
at least from the state’s perspective, so long as they reliably remitted tribute. If they 
failed or resisted to transfer their tax money, such as the Sultan of Darfur, Ali Dinar, 
did in 1916, the British might depose the individual, sometimes in collaboration with 
other people in the region who recognised the British as a preferable authority.  
 
But throughout these years the British stubbornly applied violence to tax collection 
methods in the peripheries, even though this generally pushed people away from the 
state rather than pull them into it. The Zeraf Valley was a major site of violence in the 
south, and though the British were slow to acknowledge it, the first uprising against 
British occupation took place in Nyala, Darfur after animal taxes were levied too 
harshly following a cattle plague.124 The need for more effective tax collection 
practices eventually compelled some recognition that the British needed a different 
approach to occupying the peripheries and served as the trigger for de facto indirect 
rule.125  
 
The periodisation of this chapter is dated from 1899, which was the start of the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium, until 1921, when indirect rule was formally legislated 
following the Milner Report. It also includes the first de jure measure that was the 
precursor for the use of taxes as a tool for ruling the peripheries, via the Power of 
Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance in 1922. This was in part legislated to appeal to Sheikh Ali 
el Tom who had helped overthrow the Sultan of Darfur by embedding taxing powers 
in the role of a government selected sheikh.126 This ordinance eventually became the 
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model throughout the peripheries, including parts of what are now South Sudan and 
along Sudan’s boundary with what is now Ethiopia and Eritrea.  
 
The 1920s, covered in the second chapter, saw continuing violent imposition of 
colonial government and taxation, particularly in Upper Nile Province. But with 
heightened fears of nationalist uprisings such as that of the White Flag League in 
1924 the British became increasingly concerned to contain the peripheries, into 
separate units isolated from nationalist ideas. This period therefore saw the 
strengthening of government-selected customary authorities, now termed the ‘Native 
Administration’, in line with the broader indirect rule ideology that was at its height in 
the 1920s. And taxes increasingly became a means of not only securing ‘submission’ 
but of regulating, counting and controlling the population under these authorities. This 
was epitomised by the introduction of the poll tax in regions, which required the listing 
of individual taxpayers, and keeping of tax registers by the Native Administration. 
Sources from the period lay bare the British tolerance for a degree of what they 
deemed corrupt tax collection practices by chiefs, so long as the higher-level 
objective of maintaining strong ties with customary authorities was preserved. Any 
financial gain from taxes mattered far less to the central government than maintaining 
control, or at least the appearance of imposing order, onto the vast peripheries which 
constituted most of the territory’s landmass and populace.  
 
As the third chapter illustrates, by the 1930s the central government was boosted by 
revenue from cotton exports and the finances from direct tax revenues in the 
peripheries vastly paled in comparison. Even so, the British struggled to implement 
contradictory logics of modernisation and traditionalising through taxes and the belief 
that engaging in the monetary economy was a symbol of ‘civilisation’. Taxes 
increasingly were demanded in cash during these years, but the British were also 
concerned that this was contributing to individualising processes that would break 
down the collective ‘compartments’ and customary authorities on which colonial 
governance depended. The continuing conservatism of colonial policies is 







endured throughout the period of this chapter from 1930 to 1946.This period also 
saw the beginning of a shift away from poll or hut taxes back to the notion of ‘tribute’ 
– that is, a group defined by ethnicity or kinship as the unit of taxation, rather than 
the individual. 
 
As the fourth chapter illustrates, by the 1940s until the end of British occupation in 
1956, discussions about local government and to a very limited degree, taxes, 
transitioned to considerations around Sudanese self-rule. But the peripheries were 
by this time deeply subordinated to the centre, even though successive British and 
Sudanese administrators thought about the ‘evils of centralisation’.127 Even so, the 
need to socially control the peripheries by any means necessary, which largely meant 
relying on taxes, customary authorities and the financial subordination of the 
peripheries to the centre, vastly outweighed attempts to share revenue. This chapter 
spans from the start of the 1946 Sudan Administrative Conference, which sought to 
transition the administration of the state from British to Sudanese rule, until unified 
Sudan’s independence from British occupation in 1956.   
 
This chapter illustrates that the ‘real politics’ of taxes and local government emerged 
as interlinked tools for controlling the peripheries, which outweighed any practical 
gain that could have otherwise been had in the form of additional tax revenues. And, 
the solutions that were provided in subsequent tax and local government reforms 
failed to address the actual politics of taxation as a mode of social control and were 
instead couched in performative language of modernisation. Even as the territory 
decolonised, it is unclear how the Sudanese administration that followed could have 
subverted these.  
 
And yet, throughout these chapters, in addition to the overarching finding that taxes 
and local government were primarily tools for social control, is evidence that the 
British were often fumbling towards a tax policy. This is revealing because taxes are 
 








generally listed as one of the main ways in which states ‘see’ their people; instead, 
this project finds evidence for how taxes in the Condominium’s peripheries emerged 
as a way for the state to make customary authorities legible.  Indeed, beyond binding 
customary authorities to the state, British tax policies drastically backfired in a few 
instances. This includes the aforementioned 1921 Nyala Rising but also touches on 
the economic devastation punitive tax policies caused in Red Sea and Kassala in the 
mid-1920s that contributed to famine. Less egregious examples include a 1929 Dinka 
protest song that was sung in defiance of a British official making a routine visit that 
complained of how ‘the red people who have spoilt everything have prevented the 
Dinka having children’.128  
 
Indeed, despite claims of knowledge that were bolstered by interactions with some 
of the biggest thinkers on indirect rule in Africa, such as Margery Perham and 
Frederick Lugard, Condominium tax policy repeatedly illustrated how little the state 
knew. Instead, tax collection emerged as a performance that British and eventually 
Sudanese administrators engaged in to assert their authority. But the assertion 
arguably struck to the deeper insecurities of British imperial objectives, particularly 
when administrators allowed themselves to wrestle with deeper questions about what 
taxes were meant to achieve.  
 
A closer perspective on what might come across as two quintessential state 
functions, revenue mobilisation and revenue sharing, thus shines a deeper light on 
how weak the colonial state was. The only way the British could control the regions 
that could threaten its rule if they rebelled was through government backed 
chieftaincies or sheikhships. These individuals were chosen for their ability to 
command the authority of people and in turn also ‘bought’ their authority from the 
state so long as they performed reasonably adequately.  
 
 









This finding is important because of the narrative, or general assumption, that the 
colonial government enjoyed what Catherine Boone characterises as ‘virtually 
unbridled state autonomy’.129 While this perspective appears to have been held by 
some British administrators, and the Sudanese officials who rose during 
Sudanisation, it was far from true in the peripheries. Forceful tax collection methods 
were only useful in the short-term and for embedding what Evans-Pritchard referred 
to as the ‘memory of force’ among the populace.130 Otherwise, the British had to work 
with whomever they could collaborate with and woo into the state with the chance 
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Chapter 1: Constructing the Condominium’s Periphery, 
1898-1921 
The government has established a system of taxation over the tribes […] 
not because [it is] poor and [in need of] money, but because it is desirous 
that all should understand that they [have] a legal allegiance to the 
government who protect them and to whom they can appeal for justice.  
“The government […] has taken no taxes from you because you were 
poor and the Dervishes [the Mahdists] had plundered your country, but 
now that you have had rest and that the country is recovering, the 
government intends to treat you like the rest of its legal population by 
calling upon you to provide a small contribution of cattle and grain”.131   
 
1902 Governor General Wingate’s notes on taxes to be imposed on the Shilluk and 
Dinka tribes 
 
[T]here is a marked change in the attitude of Southern Gaweir [Nuer] 
towards Government, it is now by no means satisfactory, the people 
generally are unfriendly not to say truculent, although their feelings did 
not prompt them to offer the slightest resistance to tax collection in the 
face of our 40 odd rifles, they however paid under compulsion or 
attempted, in some cases, to escape payment by running away before 
we reached them. From the running sections I was on each occasion 
fortunately able to collect cattle somewhat in excess of their tax, but the 
point is that the collection was by compulsion and would not have been 
possible in the absence of troops.132 
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22 April 1913 Letter from Captain G. B. Wauhope, Inspector Zeraf valley, to Captain 
F.W. Woodward, Governor of Upper Nile Province  
 
When the British first occupied Sudan in 1898 large parts of the territory were only 
nominally under British control. These disparate regions that the British had a limited 
foothold in included: Darfur in the west of the country; the Nuba Mountains, which 
were part of what is now Southern Kordofan that straddles both northern and 
Southern Sudan; Red Sea Province, which borders Egypt and Abyssinia; and, the 
Sudan-Abyssinian borderlands.  
 
Not only were these regions spatially distinct, the degree to which they were 
autonomous also varied. For instance, Darfur was under the semi-autonomous rule 
of its Sultan who paid tribute to the British administration in Khartoum to maintain his 
position, but this ultimately proved tenuous and temporary. And, across the 
peripheries, these regions had been governed by different kingdoms and other semi-
autonomous forms of rule prior to British rule. This included the Taqali Kingdom in 
the Nuba mountains, which was later defeated by the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad. 
Similarly, much of the Nile Basin in Southern Sudan was governed by autonomous or 
semi-autonomous chiefships or kingships prior to British occupation.133  
 
Importantly, though the peripheries geographically and politically varied, they were 
not isolated and engaged in multiple types of exchanges between and among 
different societies throughout the Condominium and neighbouring countries.134 
Essentially, the peripheries were in part ‘peripheral’ because they were 
geographically, politically and economically distinct from the Condominium’s ‘centre’ 
which included Khartoum, Omdurman and other parts of the riverain north. This 
increased towards the middle and end of British rule as the territory increasingly relied 
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on revenue from the Gezira cotton growing scheme, which was spatially and 
economically bounded in the centre rather than the peripheries.  
 
Nevertheless, the peripheries were far from secondary to the centre in either a 
geographic or a political sense as these regions constituted the majority of the 
country’s landmass and population. The state’s margins were therefore deeply 
central for the British to assert their authority over to secure their grip over the territory 
and its diverse peoples even if they did not contribute much to the national budget. 
Even so, conquering the peripheries was not straightforward. Large parts of the 
Southern Sudan were particularly difficult for the British to access owing to the Sudd 
wetlands, which is the vast swamp formed by the White Nile that the British struggled 
to penetrate.135 And, even for areas that were not divided by the Sudd, the absence 
of road networks posed logistical hurdles associated with arduous travel by camel, 
horseback and donkey across difficult terrain that included deserts, mountains and 
thick forests.  
 
Indeed, though this chapter and this dissertation are overwhelmingly concerned with 
the political considerations about taxes, logistical and administrative considerations 
when collecting them were not inconsequential and therefore require mention. Early 
British tax collection efforts required multiple people with planned stops for livestock 
and people to rest and hydrate depending on water availability. Though there were 
some variations among administrators, during the initial years of British rule covered 
in this chapter, tax collection was overseen by British officials such as Wauhope. 
These administrators commanded Egyptian and Sudanese subordinates who rolled 
up their sleeves as British administrators adjudicated. And, while tax policy across 
the Condominium was overseen by the Governor-General, the Civil, Financial and 
Legal Secretaries each shaped tax policy in the peripheries. But, more practically, 
individual Governors and lower level administrators such as Inspector Wauhope had 
a large function in determining tax policy on the ground.  
 








Politically, even as the British sought to distinguish themselves from the ‘Dervishes’ 
that preceded them, taxes were perhaps one of the most visible manifestations of the 
palimpsest of different state-building attempts in the region. Indeed, prior to British 
arrival, when it came to taxation, swathes of the country, notably including a 
substantial proportion of it that is now South Sudan, had complicated interactions 
with different states over taxes. For instance, parts of the south had been subjected 
to slave, ivory and grain raiding from northern slave traders and from rival 
communities, and these practices endured in the years leading up to British 
occupation even after the British outlawed them.136  
 
Meanwhile, the Sultan of Darfur in a sense ‘bought’ the right to maintain semi-
autonomous status by paying ‘tribute’ to the British. Tribute was a type of tax 
assessed on a group basis that could include non-monetary items such as cattle and 
grain as well as in money. Similar practices of tribute paying, and conflicts over 
tribute, also shaped relations between people in the peripheries including different 
parts of the Southern Sudan and within Darfur.137 And, even in the riverain north, taxes 
were deeply contentious; for example, the historians Janet Ewald and Anders 
Bjørkelo separately write of the ways in which excessive taxes contributed to the 
downfall of the Turkiyya and Mahdiyya.138 British officials such as Wingate were 
sensitive to this legacy, which is reflected in his reference to the Dervish ‘plunder’ that 
opens this chapter.  
 
Given these political and practical barriers, collecting taxes in the peripheries was 
deeply challenging and was coupled to a fraught history that still remained legible 
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when the British arrived. These difficulties raise the question: what were the British 
trying to achieve by collecting taxes at the start of their occupation of Sudan? 
According to Governor-General Wingate’s opening quote, which references tax 
collection among two tribes that largely resided in the Southern Sudan, taxes were 
imposed to convey an ‘understanding’ that taxpayers had a ‘legal allegiance’ to the 
‘government’ which would in turn ‘protect’ them. The new British-led government 
also declared itself as a ‘legal’ entity that people could ‘appeal for justice’. Taxes, 
according to the Wingate’s perspective as the highest administrator in the 
Condominium government, were meant to help foster this relationship and as an 
apparent symbol of goodwill the British only demanded a ‘small contribution’ from 
them. 139   
 
This chapter explores this question and highlights the tension between Wingate’s 
proclamation and the brutality and frequent disorder associated with a government 
that was self-proclaimed as fair and just. Instead, despite Wingate’s suggestion that 
the British were distinct from previous regimes, British tax collection methods still 
drew on practices that had been applied by preceding states. This notably included 
the act of creating ‘zaribas’, or fences, and holding livestock within them until 
taxpayers paid a tribute, which could come in non-monetary guises such as grain or 
livestock as well as money. One British administrator, Robert Vesey Savile, recorded 
these practices in detail in a 1903 diary of a tribute collecting tour in Northern Kassala 
and even referred to the act as ‘ransoming’ people for tax money.140 And, as the quote 
from Captain Wauhope that also opens this chapter illustrates, extractive tax 
practices were not unique to Kassala; instead, taxes were collected by ‘compulsion’ 
that included ’40 odd rifles’ wielded by troops.141  
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Indeed, the first two decades of British rule were particularly brutal for taxpayers and 
to a much lesser extent, a few British administrators. Though much of the violence of 
the first decades of British occupation has been remarked upon in previous historical 
writings, the centrality of taxes in catalysing it has been overlooked. Moreover, even 
though their monetary value was comparatively small, taxes also served a variety of 
functions that have been previously ignored as the British experimented with different 
forms of taxes in the region. In particular, taxes were used by colonial officials to 
measure the extent to which people recognised the new government’s authority. 
Likewise, taxes were also integral to strategies to delineate national and international 
boundaries and catalysed the de facto, rather than the legal, implementation of 
indirect rule in the territory.  
 
This chapter proceeds in three parts. The first examines how a particular kind of tax 
known as tribute effectively defined the geographic and ethnographic boundaries of 
the centre and the peripheries. The second illustrates that the British practically 
understood that the monetary value of taxes was far less important than the potential 
for taxes to control people in the peripheries. And the final section reveals how the 
challenges of tax collection compelled the de facto rather than the de jure imposition 
of indirect rule as the British begrudgingly realised that violent tax collection practices 
undermined their grip on the peripheries.  
 
Part 1: Taxes and the Delineation of the Centre & the Periphery 
 
Taxes in the peripheries were used as a tool of government to monitor boundaries 
and try and assess the power of different customary authorities in these regions. 
Customary or traditional authorities included chiefs, which in general but not 
exclusively governed people in the territory that were deemed ‘African’, even if the 
distinction between Africans and ‘Arabs’ was and remains blurry in several instances. 
It also included sheikhs, which had authority over people that the state labelled ‘Arab’; 
but again, the Arab-African binary was not and continues to be nondistinctive in 







customary authorities encompassed meks, which are traditional chiefs typically 
found in Kordofan, paramount chiefs, nazirs and omdas, which were subdistrict 
customary authorities that oversaw more than one sheikh or chief depending on the 
part of the territory and the people within it.  
 
Using tools to monitor boundaries and customary authorities outweighed taxes’ 
financial importance, despite the government’s need for revenue during these years. 
This section analyses how tax policies in Sudan’s peripheries during British 
occupation diverged from the taxes that were levied in most parts of the riverain 
north. The main point of departure between the taxes levied in the centre versus the 
Condominium’s peripheries at this time was that taxes in the north were largely 
assessed on cultivable land and the profits from the sale of agricultural goods such 
as dates. But regions in the Condominium’s peripheries were placed on a tax regime 
that was largely referred to as tribute, and later came to include poll taxes and hut 
taxes.  
 
However, since poll and hut taxes were not formally introduced until 1925, this 
chapter is primarily concerned with tribute. Tribute was assessed on a group, rather 
than an individual basis, and could be monetary and non-monetary. Whereas poll 
taxes, which are addressed in the next chapter, were levied on adult men and were 
assessed on an individual basis. Meanwhile, hut taxes were collected on a household 
basis but were also not levied until later years of the Condominium.  
 
Throughout British occupation of Sudan, the collection of tribute and eventually poll 
and hut taxes came to roughly define where the peripheries began, and the economic 
centre ended. As other chapters illustrate, in the eyes of the British, the peripheries 
were in turn economically unviable and potentially unruly. And yet, in other British 
occupied parts of the world, including India, poll taxes were actually avoided in large 
part because of their potential to provoke unrest.142 Meanwhile in Sudan, tribute 
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collection had a contentious history within the territory and between the 
Condominium and neighbouring states. So why did the British turn to this type of tax 
in some of the most volatile regions, which they also had the weakest control over?  
 
Indeed, the exclusive turn towards a different tax regime in the peripheries was not 
instantaneous or even necessarily what officials who administered the territory had 
initially set out to impose at the start of British occupation in 1899. Though land taxes 
were not collected in the Condominium’s peripheries, the British initially attempted to 
remodel the taxes collected in the peripheries along the lines of ushur, which the 
British perceived as a stepping-stone towards a land tax. Ushur is Arabic for ‘tenth’ 
and was applied to one tenth of the harvest among cultivators in the riverain north. 
But these attempts failed in what is now South Sudan and contributed to the formal 
adoption of tribute in the region although it was initially strictly legislated for Arab 
nomads. In practice then, the commonalities of taxation across different regions 
came to define and homogenise the Condominium’s peripheries as economically 
marginal, and as ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’ in the British imaginary.  
 
Although ushur was only successfully levied in the riverain north, it nevertheless 
served as a model for various British attempts to unify the tax system in Sudan’s 
economic peripheries. Ushur was not formally legislated until 1924 in the Ushur 
Ordinance though it was collected from people before then. In addition to cash 
payments, this tax could be paid in kind.143 An early effort to introduce ushur in a 
Southern province is documented in a series of exchanges between the Governor of 
Mongalla Province and the Financial Secretary.  
 
But this attempt led to the extra-legal imposition of tribute as the main tax in the 
province instead, even though it was not initially intended for people the British 
categorised as ‘African’. Tribute during the early years of the Condominium was a 
symbolic payment a customary authority made to the British. It was assessed on a 
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group, rather than individual basis. As Wingate’s statement indicates, the British 
understood that the tax illustrated that the tribute-payer recognised that the British-
led state was the legitimate authority over the people and territory.  
 
Initially, despite the objection that this tax was not African, the British did not appear 
to have an overarching policy for how they categorised people as African and Arab 
Nomad at the start of British rule. Nor did the British have a clear notion of the social 
relations that paying these types of taxes might have fostered. Unlike in later years of 
the Condominium, discussions about what the tax came with or signified other than 
‘allegiance’ or ‘submission’ were limited. As Wingate noted in 1902, tribute was so 
urgent so that ‘all should understand they [have] a legal allegiance to the 
government.144 This was opposed to using this type of payment to finance the state.  
 
Indeed, in 1901 the Governor of Mongalla informally levied tribute in the territory, even 
though the 1901 law that governed tribute explicitly noted that it was only for ‘Nomad 
Arabs’. The request was made in part because it was suggested that tribute could be 
a stepping-stone to ushur, which was imposed in the north and was therefore 
considered a potential model for the tax system in the peripheries. The British hoped 
that these regions could be economically viable, and therefore less ‘backward’ and 
taxes were part of their poorly articulated transition plan.  
 
But over a decade later, in 1915, the Governor of Mongalla wrote to the Financial 
Secretary to request that people in the province be switched from ushur to tribute. 
The Governor claimed that: ‘The Ushur System is useless here as many villages thogh 
[sic] thickly populated are lazy and [cultivate] less than smaller villages’. He 
consequently requested that tribute be formally introduced in the province, even 
though it was initially only legislated for ‘nomad Arabs’ rather than the ‘Africans’ in 
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Mongalla Province.145 In a subsequent 1915 telegram to the Financial Secretary the 
Governor of Mongalla Province repeated that ‘the Ushur system is impossible here 
and also grossly unfair as often larger villages are lazy and smaller ones industrious 
and [the] latter do double [the] cultivation of larger villages and therefore pay double 
as much tribute though half the size’. This was such an egregious problem that the 
Governor wrote he had emphatically described ‘verbally and telegraphically already 
several times’.146 Taxes, even in the earliest years of the Condominium were 
attempted in part to compel the population to participate in the labour economy; 
subsequent chapters illustrate that this would be far more systematically attempted 
in the 1930s.  
 
In the meantime, though hut taxes were not formally legislated until the 1925, the 
Mongalla Province Governor resorted to collecting a tax that was a poll tax in all but 
name. Poll taxes were legally instituted in 1925 and were levied on men who were old 
enough, in British eyes, to earn a wage. For instance, the Governor wrote in 1915 that 
‘every able bodied man is now being made to pay twenty piasters’ as ‘this system 
catches the shirker [of ushur] and will double revenue in some places’.147 This 
emerges as one of the few instances where the financial impact of direct taxes was 
addressed, even if this prediction of increased monetary windfalls proved incorrect.  
 
In response, the Assistant Financial Secretary, W.S.R. May, wrote to the Financial 
Secretary in 1915 to clarify whether the shift towards tribute was legally possible. May 
noted that the 1901 Tribute Ordinance was specific to ‘Nomad Tribes’, which was a 
problem because the Governor of Mongalla was collecting it from tribes that were 
‘not nomad’. He also added that there was a precedence for this request as it was 
also being imposed on people in parts of Upper Nile Province that were ‘African’ 
rather than ‘Nomad’:  
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‘Tribute has for years been collected from Tribes in the Upper Nile 
Province – Nuers which are not nomad, and the same has been done in 
Mongalla’148 
 
But the discussions articulating the weak logic that underlined these different types 
of taxes revealed that the distinction between Africans and Arab Nomads in the British 
imagination collapsed or were at minimum inadequate. Not only was the law only 
applicable to ‘nomads’, ‘strictly according to the law [the 1901 Tribute Ordinance] the 
practice by the Governor of Upper Nile Province and the Governor of Mongalla’s 
request had “probably been illegal”’. The Financial Secretary also noted that the 
Governor of Mongalla nevertheless wanted to levy tribute ‘in the form of cattle & dura 
[a type of grain]’.149 Indeed, the Financial Secretary replied to this request for 
clarification over the legality of the collection of tribute from non-nomad tribes in the 
south by noting the following precedent:  
 
As tribute in kind has for years been collected from non Nomad Tribes 
in the Upper Nile and Mongalla Provinces and as the Governor Mongalla 
states in his telegram […] it seems to me to be both unnecessary and 
undesirable to risk the cancellation or interruption on legal grounds of a 
system which appears to be both fair and judicious as regards the 
People – [it] is probably the most convenient if not the only practicable 
system of taxation in the Districts concerned and results in an increase 
of revenue.150 
 
But some British officials also tried to impose other types of taxes in the peripheries. 
This notably included animal taxes, which were essentially the same as tribute in that 
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they were assessed on a group basis but rather than non-monetary items such as 
grain or ivory was strictly limited to livestock. But this attempted transition 
spectacularly backfired in 1921; throughout the British occupation in the 
Condominium animal taxes rather than poll taxes or tribute often emerged as the 
most volatile tax in the peripheries.  
 
There were at least three strands of difficulty with animal taxes: The first was that it 
proved exceptionally difficult to uniformly determine the wealth of animals given the 
extent to which livestock prices could vary throughout the vast Condominium. As 
early as 1903, Lord Cromer, who served as the British Agent and Consul-General in 
Cairo, acknowledged animal taxes were challenging to assess. This was largely 
because of the difficulties associated with developing a ‘complete knowledge of the 
wealth or poverty of the various tribes’.151  
 
The 1901 Tribute Ordinance was initially shaped by the difficulties British 
administrators had collecting other types of taxes in Kordofan Province. These origins 
are documented in the Sudan Intelligence Report from December 1900 and January 
1901 which notes that:  
 
‘It has been decided to take tribute from Nomad Arabs and tribes of 
Kordofan; the scheme has been planned and will be brought into use in 
the year 1901. All Nomad tribes in the Sudan are to gradually come 
under this system of paying yearly tribute to Government’152 
 
The 1901 ordinance asserted that tribute was to be exclusively levied on pastoral 
peoples in the Condominium, however non-nomad Arabs in the peripheries, or 
‘sedentary’ Arabs were initially meant to be assessed on the basis of animal taxes. 
Despite the attempt to split hairs over the appropriate tax regime for different types 
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of Arabs, practically this too was complicated by the difficulties the British had levying 
animal taxes. These challenges were not limited to southern Sudan and were a 
defining feature of the peripheries. So even though tribute in Kordofan initially 
included animals, they remained one of the most contentious aspects of the tax. 
Indeed, taxing animals alone rather than poll taxes or tribute proved to be the most 
politically contentious tax in the territory.  
 
Another reason why animal taxes and herd taxes were difficulty to impose and was 
commented on by British administrators in more detail in subsequent years is 
because there was robust cultural resistance to taxing cows. This is perhaps because 
of the role cows have historically played, and continue to play, as a means of storing 
wealth and weathering an uncertain agricultural and socio-political context that has 
forged social relations among some pastoralists.153 These difficulties persisted 
through British rule and are explored in more depth in subsequent chapters.  
 
The third challenge associated with taxing animals was that it could trigger violent 
rebellions against British rule. Indeed, an increase in the herd tax was the leading 
cause of the 1921 Nyala Rising, which was one of the first major uprisings against 
British rule in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.154 But this lesson took surprisingly 
long for the British to learn as British officials reporting on the event, which even 
resulted in the death of a British officer, initially overlooked the taxes in their 
synopsis.155 The cumulative British response to the challenges of imposing ushur and 
animal taxes was to push for the widespread adoption of tribute and poll and hut 
taxes in the peripheries.  
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The narrative that emerges from these exchanges reveals that even at the start of 
British rule, despite the considerable diversity within the peripheries, British attempts 
to assert control over people within them through taxes were relatively unified. This 
is despite the fact that the British classed taxes in the Condominium’s peripheries 
into separate policies for ‘Nomad Arabs’ and ‘Africans’, when in practice tax policies 
for these categories were blurred. And although taxes were nominally divided along 
these lines, people in both instances were exclusively placed on tribute and 
eventually hut and poll taxes. This is significant because the historiography often 
argues that southern Sudan and Darfur were unique entities in relation to the rest of 
the Condominium.156  
 
As the rest of the dissertation illustrates, these events laid the groundwork for how 
the British constructed the peripheries for the rest of British occupation of Sudan. 
These regions were perceived as ‘backward’ akin to blank slate or terra nullius that 
British could impose their will upon to remake. These debates especially pick up in 
the 1930s, but the foundation for how the peripheries were imagined for the rest of 
British occupation took place in the first couple decades of British arrival. Moreover, 
the difficulties of imposing any other tax other than tribute and eventually poll and hut 
taxes explains why the British made an early shift towards relying on tribute and poll 
taxes in the peripheries. However, this outcome was contingent rather than planned 
from the outset.  
 
Part 2: Taxes as a sign of Submission 
 
To help illustrate how taxes were a tool for social control rather than revenue raising, 
it is useful to begin with an analysis of the different narratives around what taxes were 
used for in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. As this chapter’s introductory quotes 
highlight, British officials in the Condominium had two competing ideas about taxes 
in the Condominium’s peripheries: On one side, high-level figures such as Governor-
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General Wingate espoused a narrative that the state was financially stable.157 As part 
of this line of reasoning, Wingate claimed that taxes were intentionally low so as to 
ensure the new administration was politically tolerable to the resident populace. But 
an analysis of British reporting on how taxes were actually collected immediately 
contradicts the narrative of taxes as gentle. Instead, populations in the 
Condominium’s peripheries were much more likely to be forced by British 
administrators to pay taxes under the application or threat of violence.  
 
Starting with the national budget, contrary to Wingate’s claim that the government 
did not ‘need’ a financial contribution from the resident population, this dissertation’s 
budgetary review reveals that the government was in fact poor and in need of money. 
This dataset is reflected in Tables 1 and 2 of the thesis introduction and was compiled 
from Governor-General Reports from 1899 to 1949. And, in 1906, which is the first 
year for which there is comprehensive regularly reported revenue data, the 
government spent 101.6% of the revenue it generated. This increased to 104% in 
1907 and jumped to a high of 120% in 1908. Indeed, from 1898 to 1921 the lowest 
percent of expenditure against national revenue was 80.6% in 1920 but by 1922 the 
government spent 95.8% of the revenue it generated.158  
 
Further complicating Wingate’s pronouncement, direct taxes also added a 
meaningful contribution to the national budget during these years. In fact, they 
amounted to the highest percentage of the national budget throughout the time the 
British occupied the Condominium in both 1906 and 1910, when direct taxes 
constituted 20.7% of the national budget in each year. At no other point in British 
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occupation of Sudan did direct taxes contribute such a high amount to the national 
budget.159  
 
Though direct taxes constituted a sizeable proportion of the national budget they 
were, of course, not the primary revenue source for the territory. So how was the 
government primarily funded, if not through tax revenue? Instead of direct tax 
revenue, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was largely financed by customs revenue 
and eventually revenue from railways and steamers and the Irrigation Department. 
The latter became increasingly important as the cotton industry expanded following 
the expansion of the Gezira Cotton Growing Scheme in the 1930s. Meanwhile, 
railways and Nile steamers were useful to generate the transport linkages to support 
the growth of this industry and ensured that cotton could be reliably exported.160  
 
Likewise, irrigation fees were steadily important as they generated dependable water 
access to ensure cotton could be cultivated. These would swiftly become both the 
financial heart and arteries of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.161 Thus, this export-
orientation strategy, which was trudging along at the start of British occupation of 
Sudan appears likely to have undergirded Wingate’s claim that the government did 
not need direct tax revenue.   
 
And, as recent research by Leigh Gardner and other economic historians of Africa 
highlights, these national revenue and expenditure patterns were not unique to the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.162 All European sub-Saharan African colonies had to 
be financially self-sustaining and the Condominium was no exception. Even if it 
received windfalls from an Egyptian loan to finance the colony, Egyptian payments 
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were reflected in the budget from 1899 to 1906 and from 1925 to 1940, meanwhile 
the British still had to pay back a proportion of the loan.163 Like other colonies, the 
British turned to large-scale investment in export-driven industries to ensure the 
financial stability of the colonial state. But in the Condominium, these investments 
were spatially bounded since they were largely centred on the riverain north rather 
than the peripheries that this dissertation is concerned with. 
 
Gardner’s research on British colonies in Africa is undoubtedly pathbreaking. 
However, its narrower focus on the national revenue story risks overshadowing some 
of the less financially important but arguably vastly more politically significant stories 
that took place in territories such as the Condominium. Indeed, the long history of 
centralised state revenue is reasonably well understood in Sudan and its 
historiography. For instance, there are relatively detailed studies on the economic and 
social impact of the Gezira Scheme, then the world’s largest irrigation scheme, which 
was centred in Sudan’s riverain north.164  
 
Furthermore, at least in the case of Sudan, applying a limited focus on the national 
budget risks overlooking how taxes shaped the experience of government for most 
of the people who lived in the territory. Indeed, previous research on taxes in the 
Condominium’s peripheries is lacking. And, the limited extent to which direct taxes 
in these regions are commented upon essentially takes Wingate’s proclamation on 
direct tax policy as both factually true and the end of the story.165 This is problematic 
because existing historical research on taxes in the Condominium have tended to 
narrowly highlight the financial insignificance of direct taxes rather than their political 
impact, which this dissertation argues is sizeable. So, what were the main taxes in 
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the Condominium and did the direct tax regime that was applied throughout the 
territory vary?  
 
The main taxes imposed in the Condominium at the start of British rule were tribute, 
which was a tax collected on a group basis and could be levied in monetary and non-
monetary items such as cattle, ivory and grain; ushur, which is Arabic for ‘tenth’ and 
was derived from a tenth of the profits from agricultural production; land tax; date 
tax; hut tax; poll tax; herd tax; animal tax; royalties; traders’ taxes; boat taxes; taxes 
on land sales; and, road taxes. Poll taxes were not formally legislated until 1925, 
though they were practically collected from people before then.  
 
Crucially, however, this dissertation’s research indicates that tribute and hut and poll 
taxes were regional as they were relatively spatially bounded to the peripheries. These 
regions included: Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, parts of Kordofan and Red Sea 
Province and the Sudan-Ethiopian borderlands. In contrast, the other taxes were 
collected in the ‘centre’, which essentially constituted the riverain north. These 
provinces included Khartoum, Dongola and Blue Nile.  Indeed, as research by Steven 
Serels indicates, land taxes, land registration taxes and settled irrigated agricultural 
taxes were primarily levied in these regions. Moreover, these types of taxes had 
political aims, which were in part intended to create a protected regime of land 
ownership that could ensure the sustained production of gum arabic, which was an 
important export commodity.166  
 
In order to revaluate Wingate’s claim that direct taxes were financially insignificant it 
is helpful to briefly place the taxes levied in the peripheries within the context of this 
dissertation’s budgetary review. Indeed, from 1907 to 1921, tribute only contributed 
between 5 to 11 percent of total direct tax revenue. This is relatively small given the 
fact that it was ostensibly collected throughout the largest territorial swathes of the 
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Condominium and was likely assessed from the largest number of individual 
taxpayers. So even if it was the most ubiquitous tax in the territory it appeared to 
have a comparatively limited financial return to total direct tax revenue, let alone the 
national budget.  
 
Even if the financial value of the taxes levied in the peripheries was small, a different, 
almost exclusively political, story emerges when British accounts of tax collection 
throughout the peripheries are carefully considered. In sum, tribute was particularly 
crucial for controlling the population in the peripheries rather than paying for the state. 
This also explains the trouble taken and willing recourse to violence to enforce tax 
collection, despite its relative financial insignificance.  
 
For instance, in 1903 , the British official leading the occupation of the Southern 
province of Bahr el-Ghazal, Colonel Mahon, claimed that an apparently small amount 
of tribute was ‘in most cases willingly paid’ by the population. This tribute was 
explicitly ‘exacted from them with a view to showing their allegiance to Government 
[rather] than with the object of increasing revenue’.167 This account is one of the 
earliest indications that tribute was primarily levied to assert economic and social 
control over the territory rather than to generate revenue. Indeed, this dissertation’s 
findings illustrate that since the revenue imperative was met by export revenue, the 
taxes raised in the peripheries could be used for other aims. Practically this meant 
that for the majority of the population in the Condominium taxes were linked to 
‘submission’ rather than financial gain for the state.  
 
Other early indications of the British logics that linked taxes to submission emerges 
in another of Wingate’s statements, this time from 1903, in reference to tax collection 
in both the centre, referred to as the ‘people’, and the Arab tribes in other parts of the 
Condominium such as Red Sea and Kassala:  
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‘I am convinced that the burden of taxation does not weigh heavily on 
the people, and the readiness which they and the Arab tribes meet the 
demands of the Government is, in my opinion, one of the most 
satisfactory evidences of their contentment with the existing regime’.168  
 
In this declaration Wingate claims that tribute was neither harsh nor difficult to collect 
and that this was a sign of how well received the new regime was by the resident 
population. But a close reading of this type of statement suggests that Wingate 
spouted this type of propaganda to justify the continued British presence in Sudan to 
the British political class that read the report that this quote is enclosed in. Though 
impossible to verify, it also suggests that Wingate might have also been espousing 
the narrative of beneficent government to himself and his colleagues so as to also 
legitimate his own role in the occupation of Sudan.   
 
On first glance, Wingate’s touchy preoccupation with how the British were perceived 
by taxpayers, particularly ones who are not all that essential to the national budget, 
might come as a surprise. As the historiography on the early years of Sudan’s 
colonisation notes, the British were essentially a military regime at the start of British 
rule.169 The resident population was presumably outgunned if nothing else, so why be 
so concerned about how ‘content’ taxpayers were with the new regime?  
 
Indeed, at least in the instance of the Condominium, the British administration was 
sensitive to previously ill-fated attempts at occupation that resulted in the beheading 
of the British General Charles Gordon by the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad, in 1885. 
The administration in the territory was also famously understaffed and few other 
routine state functions such as tax collection underscored the weakness, rather than 
the technological supremacy of the British attempt at ‘re-occupation’. The British 
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were afraid of the potential for a revolt to destabilise their rule and this fear was 
particularly evident in the first few decades of British occupation of the territory.  
 
So, even if the peripheries were not integral to the Condominium’s financial stability 
owing to a rapid expansion of the state’s reliance on exports, establishing control 
over them was vital. And underscoring the fragility, rather than the vast superiority, of 
the new state, submission was not easily achieved and the British regularly turned to 
violence or the threat of force to collect the most ubiquitous tax in the territory. For 
instance, the Governor of Upper Nile Province in 1913, G.B. Wauhope, detailed the 
violence of tax collection in the Zeraf Valley. The Zeraf Valley is part of the Sudd 
floodplains and at the time of British occupation was the site of a series of British 
pacification campaigns against parts of the Nuer and Dinka tribes. Indeed, the British 
were particularly concerned with listing taxpayers and ordering people within districts 
as part of these violent efforts that endured longer than any other pacification 
attempts.170  
 
Wauhope bluntly acknowledged that in these years, taxes could only be collected 
‘under compulsion’, which was a euphemism for collecting taxes through the use or 
threat of violence. Indeed, in Wauhope’s same tribute collection account he notes 
that the Gaweir Nuer section of the province failed to offer ‘resistance to tax collection 
in the face of our 40 odd rifles’.171 Wauhope added that some of these individuals 
paid ‘under compulsion or attempted, in some cases, to escape payment by running 
away before we reached them’. In return, Wauhope ‘was on each occasion 
fortunately able to collect cattle somewhat in excess of their tax’, which underscores 
the punitive nature of the taxes that some British officials levied.172 Wauhope 
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concluded the report on this incident by noting that ‘the point is that the collection 
was by compulsion and would not have been possible in the absence of troops’.173  
 
These events were not isolated and violent tax practices such as these led to conflict 
between taxpayers and government. As early as 1913 taxpayers resisted with reports 
that some of the Gaawar Nuer refused to pay any tribute cattle. This subsequently 
escalated tensions even further and the next British tribute-collecting patrol resulted 
in the shooting and death of several members of the tribe, which underscored that 
the threat of violence could have dire consequences.174 Meanwhile, Justin Willis 
records similar tensions over taxes in the Nuba Mountain Hills in Kordofan.175 
 
Other accounts highlight the extent to which British attempts to levy taxes in the Zeraf 
Valley involved violence. For instance, by 1916 the Eastern Jikany Nuer were reported 
by the soon-to-be Governor of Upper Nile Province, Major C.H. Stigand, to have 
‘abandoned paying their tribute’ that they had been paying when they were ‘still 
unsophisticated’. Even so, Stigand noted that the government did not have the 
capacity to ‘use force towards the disaffected ones’, which had contributed to an 
overall stop in tribute payment and justified the policy of violent tribute collection. 
Indeed, Stigand used this as justification for the sustained application of force when 
collecting taxes and noted that the Jekany in Sobat, which were more accessible 
than other parts of the region, paid tribute ‘when intimidated into doing so’. 176 Nor 
was this the only account of taxpayers refusing to pay taxes to the British in the Zeraf 
Valley. This includes the refusal of three Shilluk chiefs to pay taxes, raiding by the 
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Despite the brewing tensions over violent tax practices in the region, Stigand was 
one of the biggest British advocates for heavy-handed tribute collection on the 
grounds that tax evasion was rife. He described the situation as follows:  
 
‘Practically all tribute, except from a few sections close to Nasser, has 
to be collected by force. Almost everywhere the Inspector goes he finds 
the kraals [livestock enclosure] empty and the people gone, his coming 
having been announced by scouts. No chiefs ever come to the station. 
The Inspector seldom sees a chief or even any responsible person. If a 
village is surprised and has not time to fly the people are either surly or 
hostile. If a village has already paid tribute the people may not run away, 
but their one idea is to get the Inspector to move on. No chief or other 
[official] comes to greet him, and the chief is only produced after a 
lengthy palaver and when it appears that the Inspector is not going to 
move until he sees him. Sometimes whole villages will take to flight, 
leaving their durra [grain] and belongings, to avoid payment of one or 
two bulls’.178   
 
Some of Stigand’s pacification campaigns pushed people into neighbouring 
Abyssinia, which he was keen to prevent. For example, Stigand went on to note that 
if tax evaders were ‘not caught at the right time they will be found to have moved into 
Abyssinian territory East of Pibor, mingling with Laos and Garjaks’. This is because 
some of the sections were ‘fairly difficult to catch’. Given how brutal Stigand’s tribute 
collection methods were, he noted that this had a knock-on effect for other tribes 
who also ‘successfully resisted paying tribute’ as they too might flee to Abyssinia, 
which was undesirable to the British.179 Indeed, as Douglas Johnson notes, the flow 
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of people across the Condominium-Abyssinian border was a regular tactic to avoid 
taxation on both sides of the boundary.180  
 
Though the Zeraf Valley was the site of considerable conflict over taxes during the 
early years of British rule, it was hardly the only place where taxes were associated 
with submission and violence. In 1902 in the Kafia Kingi region bordering Darfur, one 
of the head authorities in the region had refused to pay tribute to the British.181 The 
authority also reinforced his territory with what the British reported as approximately 
200 rifles, which the British perceived as an explicitly ‘mutinous’ act.182  
 
And the imposition of taxes on the ‘nomad Arabs’ in Kordofan presented significant 
challenges that echo those that confronted the British in the Zeraf Valley. Indeed, 
even as the British tried to distinguish between nomad Arabs and ‘Africans’, at least 
when it came to taxes the state engaged with both categories in similar ways. For 
instance, in Kordofan in 1907, all but one Baggara sheikh in the Halifa had ‘[avoided] 
paying any tribute’. In return the British ‘recommend[ed] that their cattle be seized 
unless the whole of their 1906 tribute and arrears were paid up’. The non-payment of 
tribute, or of outstanding arrears, was perceived as a direct threat to British rule in 
part because the British thought that it would be ‘most demoralising’ to other parts 
of the region.183 These fears appear to have motivated the persistent collection of 
tribute even though it was not financially vital.   
 
But the application of tribute as a tool for political control was not limited to illustrating 
acknowledgement of, or submission to, the state. Taxes were also used as a tool for 
territorial control that included demarcating boundaries and delineating which 
authority controlled each part of the peripheries. For instance, research by Cherry 
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Leonardi argues that the establishment of local taxation regimes contributed to the 
creation and maintenance of administrative boundaries.184 Moreover, Chris Vaughan 
argues that sheikhs in Darfur also pushed for defined territorial boundaries so as to 
maintain their control over their tax base.185 
 
Similarly, in the Nuba Mountains, pacification efforts began with the British trying to 
establish contact with ‘Arab Nomads’ in the area. But the area was described as one 
of ‘extreme insecurity’ in some British officials’ eyes. They therefore made plans for 
it to become a frontier region within the Condominium that would provide something 
of a buffer between the north and Darfur, Kordofan, and Southern Sudan. This 
insecurity was in part caused by the region’s effectiveness at subverting previous 
attempts to assert authority over the region by Darfur, Sennar, and the Turco-
Egyptians. Consequently, people in the region had been pushed into the province’s 
mountains and hills. The British response also included forcible efforts to move 
people into lowland areas where they could be more easily monitored.186 
 
Moreover, some of the motives for linking taxes to territoriality appear to have 
emerged out of the difficulties some British administrators had collecting tribute in 
the peripheries. An example of the latter comes from Kordofan in 1902. In this report 
from the very early years of British engagement in the region, an official remarked that 
the Selim Baggara ‘seem to have hitherto to have been somewhat neglected through 
their country being on the border of, if not actually within, three or even four Mudirias 
[provinces]’.187 As a consequence, taxpayers within the region:  
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‘[Professed] to have paid Ushur tax to Kordofan (Dueim) and herd or 
animal tax to Khartoum (Goz Abu Guma), and meanwhile on paper they 
have belonged to Fashoda, to which Mudiria they used to belong in the 
days of the old Government, and by which they are now being taken in 
hand. As a matter of fact, they have probably hitherto, to a great extent, 
escaped any sort of taxation’.188  
 
As this example illustrates, there could be a considerable gap between a British 
administrator’s attempts to assert territorial boundaries that neatly aligned to British 
‘paper’ descriptions of where customary authorities operated. Moreover, as Chris 
Vaughan argues in Darfur, these examples might have actually been instances where 
customary authorities were ‘competing’ for the ‘loyalty of tribute or tax-paying 
subjects in an under-populated environment’.189 This importantly highlights the ways 
in which customary authorities likely had some level of agency in efforts to define and 
delineate chieftaincies and sheikhship.  
 
Meanwhile, these concerns about the linkages between taxation and territoriality 
increased in the years prior to and after the incorporation of the Lado Enclave into 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium from neighbouring Congo Free State, which was 
held by the Belgians. A 1907 Intelligence Report on events in Mongalla Province, 
which bordered the Lado Enclave, notes that:  
 
“The [Belgian] Lado authorities are perfectly courteous, and willing to 
meet us [the British] in every way, but with the introduction of taxation 
in this Province [Mongalla] it is easy to see that these differences of 
opinion will become less capable of adjustment in the absence of some 
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Indeed, taxes were also used to delineate the Condominium’s frontier with Belgian-
occupied Congo Free State. For instance, in August 1919 a British official reported 
‘that 200 men, who paid their tax last year, had bolted across the Belgian Congo 
boundary’ after they were approached by a representative of the British government 
in the Condominium. This took place in the Lado Enclave, which bordered Congo 
Free State and had recently come under British control after having initially been 
leased to the Belgians.190 The official also remarked that the Boundary Commission 
that had been established to demarcate the boundary between the two territories 
needed to carefully consider these types of factors.  
 
And in Darfur and Darfur’s frontier with the rest of Sudan taxes again featured strongly 
in how the British engaged with people within it and in neighbouring territories. Before 
and following the incorporation of the region in the Condominium in 1916 after the 
British killed the Sultan of Darfur for failing to submit tribute to them and for 
supporting the Ottoman Sultanate in World War I, the British carefully monitored tax 
collection along the boundary. This included regular reporting on the amount of 
tribute that the Sultan of Darfur remitted to the British, which in turn ensured that the 
region had semi-autonomous status. The British also paid particular attention to 
whether and how people under the Sultan’s geographic remit collected tribute from 
areas that were exclusively under British control. Similarly, taxpayers were also 
recorded travelling across the boundary to escape taxes.191  
 
In the build-up to the Sultan’s overthrow, one of the British state’s concerns was 
whether Ali Dinar, the Sultan of Darfur, had allowed people under his authority to 
collect tribute outside of Darfur. For instance, a 1904 Sudan Intelligence Report notes 
that:  
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‘Sheikh Azib Idris of the Zeiadia Arabs, together with 18 men, 20 women 
and children, 9 horses, 20 cows &c., have fled from Darfur to Foga. They 
complain of excessive taxation, and desire to settle in Kordofan’.192  
 
During previous instances when this took place, the British admonished one of Ali 
Dinar’s representatives for ‘crossing the frontier and collecting tribute from people in 
Kordofan’. A British official also ‘informed him [the representative] fully of the detail 
of this part of the frontier and communicated the same by latter to Ali Dinar’.193 Other 
accounts from Darfur prior to the region’s 1916 incorporation into the Condominium 
echo concerns about the relations between Darfur and neighbouring regions in 
Sudan. For instance, another Sudan Intelligence Report from 1906 wrote that:  
 
‘News has been received from northern sources that the Agid of 
Mahamid of Wadai attacked a force of Ali Dinar’s in Dar Tama, where it 
was collecting tribute, that the Agid Mahamid’s force was victorious and 
carried off as spoil to Wadai the tribute which had been collected. This 
news has not yet been confirmed from other sources’.194 
 
These sources highlight that the British were using tribute to monitor the Sultan of 
Darfur’s authority over the Darfur region and the extent to which he might have been 
over-extended his authority into neighbouring region. Meanwhile, other accounts 
from the build-up to the British overthrow of the Sultan underscore how taxes were 
used to monitor what the Sultan was collecting as a tax. They also illustrate how 
information about taxes were regularly used to assess the strength of his authority.  
 
For example, the British remarked in 1906 that people from neighbouring Libya 
bought ivory and sold weapons in El Fasher and the Sultan collected one-fifth of it as 
 
192 SIR 123, October 1904, p.1, TNA 106/227. 
193 SIR 114, January 1904, p.3, TNA WO 106/226.  







a tax. That same year, the British not only monitored the tribute that Ali Dinar collected 
for that year, they also revealed that yet another group under his control had refused 
to pay tribute to him. Ali Dinar consequently dispatched ‘a force of 300 cavalry’ that 
was expressly used to ‘enforce his authority’.195 The latter suggests that Ali Dinar 
could still wield considerable force, if necessary.  
 
Meanwhile along the Darfur-Kordofan boundary, from the perspective of taxpayers, 
this presented a complicated balancing act for people in Kordofan that were caught 
between the emergent British state in Sudan and Ali Dinar’s waning rule. This was 
made all the more troublesome because the British were desperate to assert their 
authority and ensure that people in the frontier had submitted to their government 
rather than the Sultan of Darfur. For example, there were British reports that:  
 
‘Rashid Koroma, a Habbania sheikh, who recently arrived from El Fasher 
[the capital of Darfur] says that the Taaisha, Habbania, Beni Helba, and 
western tribes of Darfur, all send tribute in ivory or kind to Ali Dinar as 
they did to his ancestors, though many of the head sheikhs and sultans 
refuse to visit El Fasher’.196  
 
These examples effectively illustrate how taxes were used in the absence of a census, 
which did not take place in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium until 1955, to forcibly 
determine where people spatially ‘belonged’ in the vast peripheries. Likewise, it also 
provides examples of some of the first attempts to make customary authorities more 
legible to the state. These types of exercises in ordering were a particularly pressing 
concern to the British in the Condominium’s borderlands as their authority was more 
often challenged or encroached upon by neighbouring states. But this was hardly 
unique to Sudan. For example, research by Helen Tilley and James C. Scott detail 
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how map-making is typically one of the primary aims of colonial administrations’ 
efforts to ‘make the state legible’ according to high-modernist ideas of the state.197  
 
In addition to using taxes to assert boundaries the British also used taxes being to 
measure ‘satisfactory’ attitudes towards government within the people traditional 
authorities represented. For instance, a Sudan Intelligence Report from 1906 notes 
that the ‘attitude of the Dinka at present is not at all satisfactory’ as they were 
struggled to ‘supply the small amounts of grain and cattle’ they demanded from their 
subject populations.198  
 
Meanwhile in Dar Fung, another Sudan Intelligence Report from the same year noted 
how ‘the general situation is satisfactory’. This is on account of how ‘[a]ll the people 
pay the Ushur, Herd and Ghaffir taxes without trouble, except some of the Burun, 
who have not yet been called upon to do’.199 Other examples from 1906 report that 
the Hamegs, which resided along the Condominium’s border with Abyssinia were 
‘friendly to Government, and pay the taxes’. And yet despite indications of 
submission to the British, it was still ‘impossible to arrest a man by means of the 
police, as his friends shelter him, though a Sheikh or Mek of another hill may catch 
him’.200 This observation indicates that the British still had limited control over some 
of these areas and hints at the emerging authority of customary officials, and the 
people they were tasked with representing, to avoid the state. It also strongly alludes 
to how illusory control was during these early years.  
 
Indeed, another example from the same Intelligence Report similarly reports that the 
Ingassana, who resided in the Tabi Hills were ‘truculent’ however they were ‘now 
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thoroughly under our [Anglo-Egyptian Control]’ as they ‘pay their taxes without 
demur’.201 However, once again, this was imposed through the threat of force as the 
report notes that this was the consequence of ‘the visit there of the troops last 
year’.202  
 
Similarly, in the Zeraf Valley in Upper Nile Province in 1913, the Governor, Wauhope, 
argued that the inability of ‘Sheikhs [to have] their tax ready’ revealed ‘the truth of the 
matter being that no Nuer Sheikh has any real authority over his people’. He added 
that ‘with the best intentions in the world [Nuer Sheikhs in the Zeraf Valley] cannot do 
more than collect such cattle as are paid voluntarily’.203 Wauhope’s account also 
provides evidence of how British perspectives on the utility of force when collecting 
tribute if taxes were to achieve distinctly political aims increasingly diverged during 
these years. For instance, Wauhope also noted that in the Lak Nuer section of the 
province that the ‘forceable measures’ which Koebel took contributed to conflict 
between government and the tribe.204  
 
This section of the chapter has illustrated that taxes were a tool for social control 
rather than revenue raising in the peripheries. This dynamic, which subsequent 
chapters indicate endured throughout British occupation of Sudan, was in part 
enabled through the country’s financial dependence on cotton exports rather than 
direct tax revenue. Vitally, the two types of taxes this dissertation is primarily 
concerned with, tribute and poll taxes, were primarily spatially bounded to the 
Condominium’s peripheries. But in contrast to later years of the Condominium, tribute 
collection was primarily about ‘submission’ or allegiance to government, as the first 
step towards additional measures that deepened how the British-led state used taxes 
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Moreover, despite Wingate’s high-level declarations that taxes were low so as to 
appease people in the territory, evidence from British tax collection efforts in the 
peripheries indicates that the British were in fact very brutal when levying them. Taxes 
were in part used to define boundaries and delineate which authority controlled 
different parts of the peripheries. All the while, some British officials bumped up 
against the limits of force and some conflicts over taxes between taxpayers and the 
British emerged. This is meaningful because it would eventually contribute to a 
concerted push towards different types of tax collection modalities that other parts 
of this dissertation illustrate in more detail.  
 
Part 3: Administering the Periphery 
 
Towards the end of the first two decades of British rule in the Condominium, a gradual 
chorus emerged among administrators that argued that violence associated with 
tribute collection was counterproductive. And a large part of this insecurity was 
associated with the collection of taxes through a British or Sudanese administrator. 
The British reaction among some administrators to this challenge was to advocate 
for tribute to be collected through customary authorities rather than directly.  
 
And with this, another key distinction emerged between the taxes that were levied in 
the peripheries versus those that were collected in the riverain north, where taxes 
were more often collected or mediated through Sudanese administrators. These 
officials were generally referred to as a mamur or ‘effendi’ and were overseen by a 
British administrator. More practically, in the peripheries, this meant that some British 
officials were fixated on trying to define who were ‘legitimate’ traditional authorities, 
and these individuals were tasked with tax collection.  
 
The gradual turn towards this type of governance are significant in part because they 
laid the foundations for the formal introduction of indirect rule that was mandated in 
the territory in 1921 following the publication of the Milner Report. Several scholars 







indirect rule in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.205 And though Abushouk and 
Bjørkelo also advance this argument, they neglect the role of taxes in shaping this 
decision.206  
 
Instead, this chapter’s analysis of how the British constructed and administered the 
peripheries indicates that the 1921 introduction of indirect rule was more of a 
continuation of earlier policies. This supports the findings by other historians of 
Sudan, including Cherry Leonardi, Justin Willis and Chris Vaughan who all illustrate 
the ways in which customary authorities were ‘invented’ by the British when they 
occupied the territory. More broadly, as Thomas Spear illustrates, this pattern of neo-
traditionalism involved a complex exchange between the British occupiers and the 
people they sought to colonise in Africa renegotiating how authority was 
constituted.207  
 
Beyond these realisations and the rising British obsession with the origins of 
customary authorities that persisted throughout their occupation of Sudan, 
approaches to collaborating with customary authorities were not unified. In some 
instances, they used lower taxes to buy collaboration from key customary authorities. 
But in other parts of the peripheries, most notably in Upper Nile Province’s Zeraf 
Valley and Nyala in Darfur, disputes over taxes contributed to considerable 
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violence.208 And in other regions of the territory, the British begrudgingly 
acknowledged that they could only collect taxes if they provided some sort of 
administration in return, a frequent example of which was ‘justice’ in the forms of 
courts. This section of the chapter explores these three findings.  
 
On the gradual call for de facto, if not de jure, imposition of indirect rule, one of the 
earliest advocates for providing some sort of administration to collect taxes comes 
from the Governor of Upper Nile Province C.H. Stigand in 1913. Though Stigand’s 
tribute collection practices in the Zeraf Valley were some of the most brutal he 
nevertheless argued that:  
 
‘The Policy [emphasis original], which has been adopted here, of 
collecting a tax without attempting any administration appears to me 
unjust and worse than that unsound also. Such a policy has always 
required a large Military force to uphold and has always resulted, sooner 
or later, in arousing the hostility of the people so governed. It is not 
necessary for us to seek examples of the workings of this policy in other 
countries for we have one to hand in the attitude of the Old Egyptian 
Government.  
 
I do not suggest by the comparison that any lack of humanity has been 
shown here. The tax in itself is light, far lighter than that paid cheerfully 
by many other tribes, ow[n]ing less cattle and other material wealth. My 
point is not this, but that the policy in itself is unsound, in so much as it 
contains within itself the seeds of its own failure. It utterly neglects the 
fostering of a native organisation and chain of responsibility, and the 
[interest] of the natives themselves in their own Government, by which 
methods alone a large body may be controlled by an insignificant 
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minority. It claims a tax whilst failing to construct the machinery by which 
it may be collected in an orderly and just manner’. 209  
 
This statement and others reviewed in this chapter suggests that the difficulties of 
tax collection motivated the de facto introduction of indirect rule early on in the 
Condominium. Indeed, the aforementioned challenges posed by widespread 
resistance to having their animals taxed at the individual level through animal and 
herd taxes meant that these taxes were often operationally and politically unfeasible 
in the peripheries. This is opposed to tribute, which could also be paid in animals but 
was more feasible because it was collected through a government-selected 
customary authority. This persisted throughout British rule in the territory.  
 
And as the previous section illustrates, tribute, and eventually poll and hut taxes, 
therefore became the most politically viable tax to apply in the peripheries. This is 
despite the fact that they were ostensibly one the most volatile taxes a government 
could impose owing to their potential to catalyse rebellion. The British response for 
containing this risk was to put a more recognisable face, and ostensibly a less 
invasive form of government onto the region. However, first they had to grapple with 
the very institution of chieftaincy and sheikhship and in effect make customary 
authorities legible to the state.  
 
Another notable facet of Stigand’s observation is the push for Sudanese engagement 
in the ‘machinery’ of tax collection and therefore also, according to Stigand’s logic, 
spurring ownership in the very idea of the state. A central observation among the 
sources reviewed, is that even in the first few years of British rule, taxes were linked 
to a rudimentary idea of civilising through localised experiments in self-rule but only 
one that was not a threat to British occupation. ‘Civilising’ through taxes and 
eventually local government were potentially desirable. However, this was limited to 
the extent to which they conveniently justified the sustained subjugation of these 
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regions and did not give rise to nationalist threats or religious uprisings that posed 
existential threats to British rule.  
 
And Stigand was hardly alone. Sentiments that echo his 1913 call for some sort of 
native administration that the British could work through gave rise to considerations 
of how to identify ‘legitimate’ customary authorities that the British could work 
through. And these too notably predated the formal introduction of indirect rule even 
though this is a key facet of indirect rule or ‘Native Administration’. For instance, in 
Mongalla Province the British attempted to impose authority over the region 
expressly involved weeding out what they considered were ‘false chiefs’ who 
collected taxes outside of the state’s remit.  
 
Some of these chiefs derived their authority from divine, spiritual or customary 
practices, and in many instances these were the pre-existing sources of legitimacy 
prior to British efforts to replace chiefs with those that were backed by the state. For 
instance, in 1907 the Governor of Mongalla Province visited Bor in what is now part 
of contemporary South Sudan. This visit was prompted by a report that detailed how 
an individual from a Dinka clan had gone ‘about levying contributions under guise of 
being divinely commissioned to do so’. The Governor failed to find evidence that 
could criminalise this individual as other members of the Dinka in the area held ‘his 
powers as a magician in some respect’.210  
 
Moreover, granting tribute collection power was one of the ways in which the British 
‘wooed’ sheikhs and chiefs as collaborators with government, though the extent to 
which the British applied violence or used taxes to attract collaborators varied. For 
instance, though Darfur was semi-autonomous at the start of the Condominium, 
British officials appear to have been wary of the Sultan of Darfur, who ruled the 
territory. These concerns emerged in part because they were concerned that he could 
 







spur a religious uprising akin to the Mahdi.211 Indeed, the British were particularly 
threatened by what they termed as ‘religious fanaticism’ because the Mahdist state 
had effectively expelled the Turco-Egyptian state from Sudan in 1885.  
 
Tax policies in strategically significant borderland regions were consequently more 
conciliatory. As another example, in response to these types of threats, some British 
officials identified key authorities from along the Darfur-Kordofan boundary lands 
from people that were dissatisfied with the Sultan of Darfur’s rule and enlisted them 
in the conquest of Darfur and subsequent establishment of administration in these 
borderlands. Taxes were integral to the British negotiation strategy to effectively 
obtain the collaboration of leaders like Ali el Tom.212  
 
Nor did the pattern of ‘buying’ collaboration through tribute appear to have been 
entirely new to the region as it had some historical precedents that the British drew 
upon. However, in some instances, some British officials were ostensibly bolting their 
objectives onto patterns of rule that were negotiated between customary authorities 
and British administrators. Indeed, the new state’s application of violent tax methods 
catalysed reactions from people in the Condominium’s peripheries that were not 
necessarily counterproductive to British efforts to ensure people had submit to it. In 
a few cases, these extractive tax practices even compelled people to even request 
to be taxed by the British-led government to obtain ‘protection’.213  
 
For example, the historian Robert Collins argues that several Nuer clans in Upper 
Nile’s Zeraf Valley, ‘actually asked to be taxed’ and regarded their payment as 
‘protection money’ from government patrols, which they reasoned would steal more 
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than they would pay in tribute’.214 But again, this protection was ultimately 
underscored by the Condominium state’s propensity for violence rather than 
compelled by a perception that the state was somehow well-intentioned. Indeed, this 
dynamic illustrates aspects of how the British-led state was a harbinger of ‘threat and 
guarantee’ or that the idea of the state was ‘located between threat and opportunity’ 
as articulated by Das and Poole and Vaughan, respectively.215  
 
Moreover, akin to Robert Collins’ findings in the Zeraf Valley, there were a few isolated 
examples of the payment of taxes as ‘protection money’, which took place along the 
Condominium’s frontier with Abyssinia. For instance, a 1906 Sudan Intelligence 
Report notes that people in Dar Fung, which stretched across Blue Nile and bordered 
what was Abyssinia, ‘would willingly pay’ taxes as ‘the Government would protect 
them from raids from neighbouring villages if they did’.216 This again highlights how 
the British used taxes in regions where British authority could be contested by rival 
states to ‘woo’ people into British rule.  
 
Meanwhile, other sources underscore that some consensus was emerging among 
British officials in the Zeraf Valley that called for the link between tax collection and a 
government provided ‘service’. However, this call was not universal and had regional 
dimensions within the peripheries. Indeed, Douglas Johnson argues that the only way 
the Nuer in the Zeraf Valley would hand over their cattle was ‘as an exchange for 
some government service’.217 For instance, a Sudan Intelligence Report for 1907 
remarks that:  
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‘He [Chief Diu] was informed [by the British] that any tribute or tax be 
hereafter exacted by Government would follow, not precede, the 
recognition on the part of the people that Government was in reality able 
to render them justice’.218  
 
‘Justice’ often translated to government courts, which taxpayers utilised alongside or 
in addition to ‘customary courts.219 Additional evidence comes from discussions 
about the incorporation of the Lado Enclave into Sudan in 1910. One of the British 
officials working on the handover of the region from Belgian to British control 
remarked that:  
 
The inhabitants are to understand that whenever they have trouble 
among themselves, which their sheikhs cannot settle for them according 
to tribal custom, they must come to the nearest Government post when 
they will receive assistance and their cases will be settled. Sheikhs must 
understand that all serious cases must be brought before the nearest 
Inspector or mamur, and the Government look to the sheikhs to assist 
them in every possible way.220   
 
Here too, sheikhs were key to these interactions as they ‘assisted’ the British-led 
state to mediate disputes. And, justice and courts, as Cherry Leonardi argues in parts 
of what are now South Sudan, were in some ways desirable for taxpayers as they 
permitted a wider range of options to potentially obtain favourable outcomes in 
courts.221 The British attention to how they were perceived might also reflect broader 
trends throughout other parts of empire. For instance, in patterns that were mirrored 
in British occupied Sudan, Michael Tuck illustrates how the British ‘took pains to link 
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taxation with “improvements”’ in colonial Uganda. Indeed, Tuck argues that the 
British were ‘sensitive to the issue of perceptions of authority, as well as its actual 
application’, which partly resonates with how they engaged in the Condominium.222 
Leigh Gardner found similar examples in East Africa and Northern Rhodesia.223 
However, in the Condominium, this project provides evidence for the ways in which 
the British sent deeply mixed messages about the utility of force when collecting 
taxes. This in turn belies how little the British actually understood about the people 
they tasked themselves with ruling.  
 
Meanwhile, in addition to ‘protection money’ some British administrators also wooed 
collaborators by appealing to status that included the participation of sheikhs and 
chiefs on influential courts. An example of this emerges in 1907 in the Zeraf Valley in 
Upper Nile Province, when it was headed by Governor G.E. Matthews. Matthews 
received a request from the Nuer chief Diu to receive a visit from the Governor. In 
return, Diu wished ‘to be recognized as a paramount [chief] under Government in the 
Zeraf valley.224 A subsequent Intelligence Report from 1907 noted that Diu had 
claimed ‘recognition’ by all Nuers in both the Zeraf and Sobat valleys and that his 
name was ‘held supreme throughout the five sub-tribes of Lak, Thiang, Gaweir, Lau 
and Jekang’.225  
 
The following details the encounter, as it captures how the British sought to 
consolidate the territory following confirmation that resident populations in the region 
had submitted to government, which was evident by their willingness to pay tribute:   
 
‘He [Diu] made definite announcement he understood the true intention 
of Government towards him he would hold a meeting of headmen and 
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sheikhs from all parts of Nuer land and would indicate to them the 
attitude they should take up towards Government, and would explain to 
them that Government was prepared to redress all wrongs which were 
reported to it by his people’.226  
 
During these negotiations the British were also concerned about carefully delegating 
authority to key chiefs or sheikhs who would then work through chiefs or sheikhs who 
reported to him. This pattern of rule by governing typifies an early British preference 
for segmenting regions that they thought they could more readily govern as a series 
of collectives. For instance, as part of the same negotiations between Governor 
Matthews and the Nuer chief Diu, Matthews stated ‘it would be impossible for him 
[sheikh Diu] to maintain his control without delegating his authority to subsidiary 
sheikhs’. Vitally, Matthews argued that he and Diu would jointly select subsidiary 
chiefs in partnership with Diu. And, that this would ‘in no ways detract from his [Diu’s] 
personal authority, provided that he continued to evince a desire to abide by the 
intentions and decisions of Government’. Diu agreed to this and:   
 
‘quite readily admitted the necessity of appointing representatives, and 
with an airy wave of his hand promptly appointed the three best known 
Nuers from among the chiefs present to the posts of Khandam, Ajuong, 
and his own district of Duk’.227 
 
A much more defining event that brought home the importance of administering the 
Condominium’s peripheries through customary authorities was the ‘Nyala Rising’. 
This uprising took place in Darfur 1921 and resulted in the death of a British 
administrative official.228 This was an early rebellion against British rule in Sudan; and, 
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this uprising, though they initially tried to blame it on religious ‘fanaticism’.229 The fear 
of religious movements was a hangover from the Mahdist defeat of Charles Gordon 
in 1885 though it was somewhat supplanted with an evocative concern about the 
‘septic germs’ of nationalism in the early 1920s that the next chapter explores. 
 
The Governor-General of Sudan at the time, Lee Stack, remarked that the rebellion 
was in part provoked by the Sultan’s inability to effectively impose new types of taxes 
in the region and the shock of the transition to British rule. Stack reported:  
 
‘Under the rule of Sultan Ali Dinar these people [the Masalit in Darfur] 
were sufficiently strong to evade any but a minimal taxation, and the 
introduction of a closer system of administration inevitably aroused an 
undercurrent of discontent, especially amongst the Chiefs and ruling 
classes…their prejudice against a change of Government, coupled with 
discontent at direct administration would prepare a field in which the 
seeds of rebellion would rapidly thrive’230 
 
The event was later commented upon by C.A. Willis, who had been Governor of 
Upper Nile Province after the rebellion had taken place. Willis retrospectively 
attributed the uprising to the introduction of British rule and acknowledged ‘I think we 
[the British administration] went a little too quick with them and put them on taxation 
etc. too soon’.231 The tax in question was a reportedly a herd tax, but there are 
discrepancies in the historiography over the extent to which Darfur’s tax system 
differed under Ali Dinar versus the British.232 Not all British officials this project 
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surveyed acknowledged their logics as clearly as Stack did. However, Willis’ account 
underscores the emergent perspective that a different approach that relied on 
customary authorities instead of combatting them was needed. The intellectual seeds 
of what would soon be known as indirect rule were planted within the British 
administration; moreover, they germinated prior to the Milner Report in 1920.  
 
The Milner Report was formally known as the ‘Report of the Special Mission to Egypt’, 
which was released in December 1920. This commission was headed by arch-
imperialist Lord Alfred Milner, who had served posts as High Commissioner in South 
Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony and subsequently contributed to the South 
African War in 1899-1902. This document is significant because it provided a high-
level justification for the implementation of indirect rule in the territory, even if in reality 
British policy in the Condominium’s peripheries had already practically started to 
resemble indirect rule. The portion of the document that is dedicated to Sudan is 
brief; approximately 2 of the full report’s 40-pages explicitly engage with the territory 
and the rest is devoted to British policy towards Egypt. This reflects Britain’s interest 
in maintaining Egypt’s access to the Nile, which was one of the main strategic 
justifications the document provides for the sustained British occupation of Sudan. 
Despite the often-violent governance challenges confronting administrators on the 
ground that this chapter has explored in detail, it nevertheless praises British 
administration in Sudan and argues that:   
 
‘When full allowance is made for the simplicity of the problem, viz., the 
introduction of the first principles of orderly and civilised government 
among a very primitive people, the great success actually achieved 
during the long Governor-Generalship of Sir R. Wingate is one of the 
brightest pages in the history of British rule over backward races. The 
present administration is popular in the Sudan, and with few exceptions, 
peaceful and progressive conditions prevail throughout the country’233. 
 
 








The key portion of the Milner Report that was interpreted as the high-level call for 
indirect rule in the Condominium argues that a ‘single supreme authority over the 
whole of the Sudan’ is necessary. But that it was ‘not desirable that the government 
of that country should be highly centralised’. Instead, on account of Sudan’s vast size 
and diverse population, the document argues that ‘the administration of its different 
parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever 
they exist, under British supervision’. This notably echoes Stigand’s 1913 
pronouncement that some sort of locally led administration would lubricate the 
wheels of British occupation in the territory. Moreover, the Milner Report adds that, 
‘wherever possible’ ‘native agencies’ should be used for the ‘simple administrative 
needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would make both for 
economy and efficiency’.234  
 
Another key point that the document makes is that the balance of officials ought to 
change in the country away from Egyptian administrators towards those who were 
drawn from the resident population that would eventually call themselves Sudanese. 
It claims that Egyptian officials were also ‘unpopular’ among people and the report 
consequently calls for their replacement.235 In effect, indirect rule created contained 
units that protected the British from the threat of rebellion in potentially volatile 
regions such as Darfur, Kordofan, Red Sea and Kassala, which constituted the 
Condominium’s peripheries. But a similar strategy was in place with Egyptian 
officials, who the British feared were dangerously nationalist, which also threatened 
their rule.  
 
Indeed, an eerily prescient 1919 report by Lee Stack, who was then Governor General 
of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium argued that anti-colonial political sentiments in 
Egypt had seeped into Sudan. This had notably resulted in a request by ‘some of the 










Condominium’s civil service to remove the ‘Egyptian element from the Administration 
of the Sudan’.236 Stack then noted that ‘Sudanisation’ must gradually take place 
within the administration, which meant replacing Egyptian civil servants with 
individuals who were drawn from the resident population. An incremental approach 
was advised as the Egyptians in the public administration were ‘too useful to be 
dispensed with hastily even though they are not altogether liked by the people they 
have to govern’.237  
 
This strategy also called for the increased utilisation of sheikhs and chiefs in 
administrative matters, which included the civil and criminal judiciary and essentially 
provided an additional political motive for the introduction of indirect rule. Stack also 
argued that there would be a ‘mutual advantage’ in encouraging British 
administrators to establish Town Committees, made up of sheikhs and chiefs, to 
discuss the ‘local Budget and municipal matters and improvements’.238 Stack also 
advised that this policy be extended ‘where tribal organization exists’ and called for 
it to be applied to nomad tribes as well.239 As if singing from the same songbook that 
Stigand sung from in 1913, Stack noted that this was particularly key and stated:  
 
‘I believe that only by developments of this kind, by getting real 
representatives of the people at large to take an interest in their own 
affairs, can we counteract the growth of the kind of class that almost 
monopolizes political thought in Egypt and India’.240 
 
And the Governor of Berber Province stated in 1920 that:  
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‘I think there is now general agreement based on what has occurred in 
India and Egypt, and if our object is genuinely to train the people of 
tropical dependencies to stand on their feet, it is wiser not to leave the 
matter to chance, but to see where we are going and act accordingly. 
We must have a definite policy unless we wish to have the same 
phenomena repeated in countries like the Sudan, the moment they 
awake to some rudiments of national self-consciousness’.241 
 
The Governor recommended responding to this nationalist threat by ‘strengthen[ing] 
the solid elements of the country’, which included sheikhs, ‘before the irresponsible 
body of half-educated officials, students and town riff-raff takes control of the public 
mind’.242 In this Governor’s estimation, urban areas and urbane people, rather than 
the countryside, posed a more significant threat to British rule than the more rural 
peripheries and the people within them.  
 
As subsequent chapters illustrate, taxes and eventually local government emerged 
as the primary modalities through which these objectives, which sought to neutralise 
anti-colonial and nationalist threats to British rule, were pursued. However, the 
principle motive for local leaders to pay taxes appears to have been to gain favour 
with the government and potentially expand their authority. But contrary to previous 
analyses and narratives of British tax policy in the Condominium, instead of a routine 
administrative function, the taxes levied in the peripheries were beholden to British 
political fears of Sudanese nationalism. Likewise, they were also subsidiary to the 
larger British political project of somehow tightening their slippery grip on the majority 
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Three stories emerged in this chapter’s analysis. The first endures throughout the 
entire time the British occupied the territory, which is the reality that the new state did 
not care as much for the monetary value of taxes so much as they did about the 
potential for taxes to control the peripheries. This finding is surprising as it challenges 
prevailing arguments in historical analyses of British colonisation of Africa that the 
revenue imperative confronting colonial states pervaded all tax collection efforts in 
the continent and elsewhere.243 Instead, direct taxes in the peripheries were almost 
exclusively about submission during this timeframe and submission was the 
precursor to indirect rule. The rest of this chapter illustrates how this persisted 
throughout British occupation of the territory into independence in 1956.  
 
The second story is also unexpected, which is that taxes defined which parts of the 
territory were the ‘centre’ and which were the ‘periphery’. In a sense, the type of tax 
people in the Condominium were on delineated where the centre began, and the vast 
peripheries unfurled. Paying tribute marked people as belonging to the periphery and 
the revenue raised from these types of taxes was largely insignificant in the eyes of 
the state and was about a symbolic representation of submission to it. Tribute was a 
vital type of tax in part because of how it was assessed, which was on a group basis, 
that was then collected by a customary authority. This in turn enabled the British to 
govern the peripheries through a series of ‘tribes’, which in effect shaped how the 
British understood and conceptualised the peripheries.  
 
The third narrative in this chapter is that taxes actually compelled the de facto rather 
than the de jure imposition of indirect rule in the Condominium. This chapter also 
illustrates that the distinctions between tax regimes in the centre and the periphery 
started at the beginning at British rule. These are meaningful because they had 
enduring consequences for how the British related to disparate people in Sudan. This 
notably includes how the collection of these taxes was organised and the role that 
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government selected traditional authorities had in collecting and spending them. As 
other parts of this dissertation illustrate, this had repercussion for how citizenship was 
mediated among some parts of the Condominium’s peripheries.  
 
What subsequently emerged from the sum total of these interactions was the 
realisation that the British needed to provide some sort of administration in the 
peripheries in exchange for paying taxes. And one of the strongest, albeit slowly and 
violently learned, lessons was that the best way to administer the peripheries was 
through government selected customary authorities, whom the British needed to 
‘attract’ to government. This process was mediated by the threat of violence in some 
areas and by permitting a degree of personal enrichment in status or material wealth 
in others.  
 
All of this provides fresh insights into how indirect rule emerged in the territory. For 
instance, the British administration in the Condominium did not solely react in a top-
down manner from very senior British authorities in London, Cairo and Khartoum that 
advocated for indirect rule in a 1921 government report. Instead, they reached relative 
consensus on the fundamental basis of the policy, that of working through customary 
authorities, beforehand. But this chapter, and much of this dissertation, reveals that 
this process was not straightforward and was instead violently negotiated between 













Chapter 2: Taxation, Decentralisation & Social Control, 
1921-1929 
 
Though the Milner Report formally called for the imposition of indirect rule in the 
Condominium, by the mid-1920s the push to introduce it became more urgent. This 
was in part because of the perceived threat Sudanese nationalism posed to British 
occupation of the region. This reached a fever pitch in 1924 when Governor-General 
Lee Stack was assassinated in Cairo and a nationalist ‘White Flag League’ challenged 
British rule within Sudan that same year. Similarly, the distorted memory of the 1921 
Nyala Rising simmered in the British imagination as they feared the potential of a 
religiously motivated movement to destabilise British rule, much as the Mahdists had 
achieved against the Turco-Egyptian government in 1885.  
 
Thus, as described in an infamous quote by John Maffey, who became Governor-
General a couple of years after Stack’s death, the British sought to limit the ‘septic 
germs’ of nationalism. In effect, decentralisation, or devolution, was proposed as the 
administrative measure to parcel the peripheries into what the British thought would 
be more readily contained units that they hoped they could better control. The 
underlying logic of indirect rule as an inoculation against nationalism was the British 
belief that customary authorities were less of a menace to British occupation than the 
‘intelligentsia’ that often worked in the British administration.  
 
This task was fraught with hubris. Essentially, the British presumed that the 
predominantly rural peripheries that constituted most of Sudan’s landmass and 
population were more ‘primitive’ and therefore easier to contain. This contrasted with 
the more urban, comparatively better educated, intelligentsia that participated in or 
was sympathetic to the White Flag League.244 Accordingly, customary authorities, so 
the British thought, were not as susceptible to nationalist ideas of self-rule as 
Sudanese and Egyptian administrators were. The basic strategy for implementing 
 







indirect rule was to increasingly contract traditional authorities to perform government 
functions, which notably included tax collection and also some judicial activities.  
 
This chapter illustrates five observations about this timeframe in relation to tax 
collection: The first point is the straightforward reality that 1921 to 1929 are 
something of a transitional period. Violent ‘pacification’ efforts still continued in some 
parts of the territory even as the British were trying to limit the impact of people from 
Sudan who worked in the state administration from playing significant roles as the 
British fears of nationalism rose. Meanwhile, the British sought to construct a 
conservative version of Indirect Rule, which was given the title ‘Native Administration’ 
as a means of governing the peripheries.  
 
Secondly, as a component of this liminal position, the British still sought to maintain 
a low tax regime so as to prevent rebellions, such as the Nyala Rising in Darfur. As a 
third point, the British continued to strengthen the authority of Native Administrations 
as a means of controlling the peripheries. Significantly, taxes were an integral 
component of how customary authorities within Native Administrations monitored 
their people and also demonstrated this control to the British.  
 
Thus, as a fourth observation, the function of tribute and poll taxes as a tool of social 
control for Native Administrations and the colonial state deepened. Indeed, inasmuch 
as poll taxes differed from tribute as a method of tax collection, they required some 
rudimentary counting of men or huts. Eventually, these lists would constitute the more 
elaborate tax registers and Native Treasuries that are discussed in the next chapter. 
Moreover, the British in effect sought to legitimate customary authorities by making  
what they could collect as a tax clearer to themselves, customary authorities and 
taxpayers. Moreover, as this and the previous chapter illustrate, the British had a 
difficult time collecting taxes in animals or crops in the peripheries and poll taxes and 








And as a final observation on British tax policies during these years, 1921 to 1929 
emerges as a time of pragmatic experimentation towards taxes rather than a clear 
ideology or policy. However, the state’s aim is still to establish and effectively deepen 
their administrative control over the peripheries via so-called native authorities, who 
have been granted a regulatory function through poll taxes and to some extent also 
tribute. In sum, taxes continue to make customary authorities legible to the British 
and, customary authorities helped make the people they were tasked with overseeing 
more visible to the state, too. These kinds of functions, which privileged social control 
over revenue raising, continued to define tax policy during this timeframe even as 
new forms of taxes were introduced and different administrative apparatus were 
created.  
 
This chapter explores these developments in three parts. The first identifies the extent 
to which indirect rule was linked to social control and was a vital tool for 
compartmentalising the peripheries into regions that the British thought they could 
more readily control. The second illustrates how this objective clashed with how taxes 
were actually collected in some parts of the peripheries, most notably in Zeraf Valley 
in Upper Nile Province, where the British continued to resort to brutal tax practices. 
This substantially weakened relations between people and government even as it 
became somewhat clearer to the British regime that they would need to work with, 
rather than combat, customary authorities.  
 
The chapter concludes with examination of how the practice of turning customary 
authorities into quasi-census takers via taxes was initiated in the 1922 Power of 
Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance. This ordinance repositioned taxes from being used purely 
to ensure people had submitted to government in the peripheries to a tool that 
enhanced the state’s control over the peripheries. Vitally, it also served as a model 
for how to obtain collaboration from customary authorities throughout these vast 








Part 1: Devolution & Social Control, 1921-1929 
 
British officials in the Condominium explicitly acknowledged the significance of the 
Milner Report in formally introducing indirect rule to the Condominium as it ‘brought 
our [the British administration’s] Native Policy under critical examination’.245 But as 
the previous chapter illustrates, the blossoming realisation that indirect rule was a 
more effective strategy for occupying Sudan predated the Milner Report. The call 
simply accelerated in the mid-1920s into the 1930s. Despite this gradual chorus 
calling for de jure rather than de facto continuity, establishing a coherent policy for 
decentralisation as a means of containing the nationalist threat took multiple steps. 
This section begins by examining these and then illustrates how even at the policy 
level, the function of taxes in indirect rule was more about monitoring customary 
authorities than revenue raising for the national government.  
 
Initially, some British officials assumed that the process of imposing indirect rule 
through what they termed ‘devolution’ had precedents that they could build -upon. 
This is despite the fact that the examples they drew from were not necessarily 
relevant for the entire country and instead liberally inferred from different regions 
within it. For instance, in 1921 Assistant Civil Secretary Harold MacMichael used the 
example of the Fung Kingdom or Sultanate to illustrate how chieftaincies were 
reworked when the Turkiyya began in 1821. The Fung Kingdom or Sultanate spanned 
from Sudan’s boundary with Darfur to the west, South Sudan to the south and 
Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east. MacMichael argued that ‘local chieftains’ were not 
‘interfered with’ by the Turco-Egyptians so long as they collected taxes and followed 
the rules of the government ‘they were left to their own devices and their authority 
was upheld’.246  
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This narrative was also used to legitimate British moves to select and replace 
traditional authorities if they failed to comply with British demands to preserve their 
control over the region. Indeed, MacMichael also argued that in the Mahdiyya when 
‘tribal sheikhs’ became the ‘commander of an unruly contingent of freebooters 
instead of being the leader and arbiter of a peaceful community’ they posed a threat 
to the Mahdists. As such, a rebel sheikh was ‘replaced by another more virile and 
ruthless than himself’.247  
 
These kinds of perspectives reflected how some British officials conceptualised the 
vast peripheries, which constituted the majority of the Condominium’s people and 
landmass, as the ‘authentic’ unspoilt Sudan that they could ruthlessly manage. This 
portrayal of Sudan’s peripheries drastically contrasted with the reality that parts of 
these regions, rather than the northern riverain centre, were still undergoing violent 
pacification campaigns that underscored how difficult controlling the peripheries 
actually was when this statement was made. Indeed, all this was taking place even 
as some of these regions had been violently fighting against the British in the Zeraf 
Valley and Darfur and even killed some British administrators. As the next part of this 
chapter illustrates, this posed a substantial complication to the undercooked idea of 
decentralisation in the Condominium. In sum, as Douglas Johnson argues the British 
had inadvertently eroded relations with many of the customary authorities they 
sought to collaborate with and would need to devise a better strategy for buying their 
collaboration.  
 
Even as the problematic construction of the urban ‘intelligentsia’ as a superior threat 
than rural regions persisted, British fears of a nationalist movement were partially 
realised when the White Flag League resisted British rule in 1924. The White Flag 
League was made up of approximately 150 officials and officers in the Egyptian army 
in Sudan and led to a revolt against British rule, which the British later halted. That 
 







same year, the then Governor-General of the Condominium, Lee Stack, was 
assassinated in Cairo, which further fanned these nationalist embers.  
 
And, even prior to these two events, the 1921 Nyala Rising continued to compel 
British concerns that a religious movement, akin to the Mahdists who had previously 
thwarted British attempts at occupying Sudan might emerge in Darfur.248 The main 
difference in the mid-1920s was that these fears became more urgent and provided 
a new saliency for the British to rethink policies towards the peripheries they often 
trivialised as simple even if they were consistently difficult to pacify.  
 
For example, A.G. Pawson, the Deputy Governor of Blue Nile Province, wrote that 
Sudanese mamurs were dangerous because they had ‘no conception of themselves 
as men of less importance than the Nazirs and Omdas of the district’.249 Nazirs were 
the highest-ranking customary authorities in native administrations that the British 
classed as ‘Arab Nomads’ and Omdas were intermediate authorities, who typically 
oversaw a ‘town, village or group of villages’.250 Pawson added that mamurs and sub-
mamurs understood themselves to be the ‘natural inheritors of power and the future 
Governors of the Sudan’, which speaks to his fears of nationalism following the 1924 
White Flag League.251 Importantly, Sudanese and Egyptian administrative officials 
such as mamurs were the key constituency within the White Flag League that the 
British were so fearful of harbouring anti-colonial sentiments that threatened the 
British grip on the territory.252  
 
Consequently, even though Pawson acknowledged more work was needed to 
establish indirect rule through government chiefs and sheikhs, ‘the danger from a 
 
248 Daly, M. (1980) British Administration and the Northern Sudan, 1917-1924: The Governor-
Generalship of Sir Lee Stack in Khartoum. Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut te 
Instanbul. p.87.   
249 Assistant Civil Secretary MacMichael to Governor Blue Nile, 11 October 1924, NRO Civsec 50/2/10.   
250 Ryle, J., Willis, J., Baldo, S. and Jok Madut, J. (Eds.) (2012) The Sudan Handbook. Woodbridge: 
James Currey. pp.18-19.  
251 Assistant Civil Secretary MacMichael to Governor Blue Nile, 11 October 1924, NRO Civsec 50/2/10.   







powerful native [administrative] official’ was understood to be ‘very real’. Some of 
Pawson’s concerns were rooted in the perceived overlap of administrative roles 
between mamurs and sheikhs and chiefs and their role in ‘decentralisation’. These 
inconsistencies included ‘administrative, judicial, police and perhaps tax-
collecting’.253 Disentangling and clarifying a decentralisation policy therefore emerged 
as a key strategy for controlling Sudan.  
 
Assistant Civil Secretary MacMichael subsequently echoed Pawson’s concerns and 
emphasised a desire to shift administrative responsibilities away from Egyptian 
mamurs and sub-mamurs. This process was described as the ‘Sudanisation’ of the 
British-led administration. As part of Sudanisation, MacMichael argued that though 
Egyptian mamurs and sub-mamurs should leave their roles, they should not simply 
swap out an Egyptian administrator for a Sudanese individual. Instead, Sudanese 
sub-mamurs and mamurs were to leave all ‘tribal and village affairs to the sheikhs 
themselves’ and ensure that the latter ‘received adequate support’.254  
 
This emerged as the first attempt to articulate the deeply political aims of 
decentralisation in the Condominium and raised a host of concerns about how to 
practically implement the policy in the territory. These examples underscore how one 
of the primary British motivations for imposing indirect rule in Sudan was sharply 
undergirded by the British desire to maintain control over the territory. This was in 
part to be achieved by pre-emptively wrestling power away from the perceived threat 
of the urban intelligentsia and somehow reinventing the role of chiefs and sheikhs to 
incorporate but not replicate the roles of Sudanese civil servants.  
 
British discussions about how to implement these policies took place under several 
names, which included: ‘decentralisation’, ‘indirect rule’, ‘native rule’, ‘native 
administration’ and ‘devolution’. Such diverse terminology is evidence of the practical 
reality that the British struggled with both defining indirect rule and developing a 
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coherent policy for implementing it throughout Sudan even as they agreed that it was 
urgently necessary. Moreover, the British were not shy about the untested nature of 
their approaches to indirect rule, or the inconsistent ways in which these efforts 
varied, to the extent that they regularly referred to attempts to introduce indirect rule 
as ‘experiments’.  
 
In moves that reflected the Governor of Berber Province’s fear of Indian-style 
nationalism in Sudan in 1920 discussed in the last chapter, the British continued to 
borrow justifications and strategies towards indirect rule from other parts of empire. 
Likewise, they often applied their reading of what worked in one region of the territory 
to others, using logics such as MacMichael’s reading of how the Turco-Egyptians 
managed chieftaincies in the Fung Kingdom to justify their policies. All of this 
contributed to a relatively patchy theory of indirect rule.  
 
These types of governance experiments were taking place throughout the British 
empire and were not unique to Sudan. As Helen Tilley argues, by the end of the 1920s 
the British had instituted influential initiatives to ‘coordinate’ empire. This meant 
increased interaction among British officials across different British colonies in Africa 
and Asia to try and draw shared observations and lessons for how to govern diverse 
territories. This also coincided with a belief in Western scientific and anthropological 
approaches that sought to view the entire African continent as an object of 
‘transdisciplinary study’. In addition to anthropology, this included medicine and 
economics among other disciplines, and culminated in the 1938 publication of Lord 
Hailey’s African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara.255  
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Indeed, MacMichael’s instigation of indirect rule to manage the Condominium’s 
peripheries also drew on Charles Brooke’s experience of colonising Malaysia. Brooke 
held a variety of roles in the then Malaya before eventually becoming the second 
Brooke Raja of Sarawak at the same time when the Condominium was instituted, in 
1898. Critically, the passage MacMichael cites from Brooke, which is from 1871, 
includes reference to the necessity of ensuring that institutions are not superimposed 
onto those of the colonised territory. This included a direct reference to the criminal 
code and the tax system, neither of which should ‘introduced bodily from the west’; 
instead, Brooke advised that they be adapted to the local circumstances of the 
territory to which they were being introduced.256  
 
MacMichael’s observations from Sarawak underscore the two key elements of 
indirect rule, which involved devolving direct tax collection and local courts to 
customary authorities. These two functions were explicitly part of other efforts to 
introduce indirect rule in Sudan, which drew on the experience of how the British 
colonised Nigeria. This notably included a study by Reginald Davies, who had 
previously held a post in part of Darfur and as he was sent by the Condominium 
administration to Nigeria to observe how indirect rule had been implemented in the 
country with a remit to apply these lessons to Sudan.  Relatively shortly after this 
report was published, Davies would become the Director of Intelligence and 
subsequently advance to other senior positions in the Condominium administration. 
These lessons were soon compiled into a report which was referred to by some 
British administrators as the ‘Davies’ Devolution File’. This document served as the 
first of what would be several attempts to clarify how indirect rule and decentralisation 
could be adapted to Sudan.  
 
Davies also argued that indirect rule was useful in subverting the creation of an 
‘intelligentsia class’ in Nigeria. For example, Davies’ argued that the Nigerian model 
of indirect rule responded to these threats because Native Administrations 
 








maintained a class of petty administrators, such as treasurers and scribes. And it was 
‘inconceivable that they [petty administrators in Native Administrations] should aspire 
to political power’.257 Meanwhile, in the Condominium, Davies observed, customary 
authorities had often been paid less than clerks and had had to follow orders from 
Sudanese officials, so as to ensure traditional authorities were placed in a subsidiary 
position. Once again drawing from Nigerian examples, Davies noted that the ‘big 
Emirs’ in the country were a ‘valuable bulwark against outbreaks of fanaticism’, which 
was the primary aim of the administrative arrangement.258  
 
Even at the policy level, taxes were the central component of the Nigerian model and 
of indirect rule as a broader concept of rule. Indeed, Davies’ recommendations for 
reforming indirect rule in Sudan explicitly drew on aspects of Nigerian tax collection 
methods. He described the Nigerian direct tax system under British rule as being far 
less complex than that in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s. Akin to Sudan’s 
peripheries, the main taxes collected by native authorities in Nigeria included a herd 
tax and a ‘Tribute Tax’ on potential income, which was collected by Nigerian Emirs.259  
 
However, in contrast to the system in Sudan, the Nigerian tribute tax was designed 
to last for about five years and was based on census-figures from Native 
Administrations in Nigeria. The latter provided detailed market-prices along with 
estimates of the cultivable land mass, which the British also did not have anything 
close to in Sudan. These two estimates provided a cash estimate of each village’s 
gross income that could be assessed by higher-level British administrators on a 
District basis.260 As subsequent chapters illustrate, a similar system gradually 
emerged in the Condominium. But it was forged through the fires of repeated failures 
on behalf of the British to tax animals in the Condominium.  
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And, in the longstanding absence of a census the British effectively gave up on taxing 
income and shifted to poll taxes and instead livestock as a proxy for household 
income. Practically, the British preferred payments in cash rather than in kind were 
because of the difficulties they had accounting for the varieties of different monetary 
and non-monetary systems that existed in territories such as Sudan. Poll Taxes were 
first introduced with the 1925 Poll and Hut Tax Ordinance, which was which was 
updated in 1929 and replaced by the Poll Tax in 1932; both taxes were broadly similar 
in that they were imposed on adult males and both had to be paid in cash to 
encourage monetisation.261  
 
Moreover, drawing upon the finding in the first chapter of this dissertation, the 
revenue raising component of taxes and chieftaincy under devolution was again 
subsidiary to their primary objective to construct a firewall against nationalism.262 In 
the 1920s, following Davies’ recommendation, Native Treasuries were considered the 
key measure through which to assess the extent to which indirect rule was in place. 
Indeed, according to some theories of indirect rule, Native Treasuries, which were 
roughly based on the Nigerian model, were considered the key modality through 
which indirect rule was assessed.263 Native Treasuries practically meant that Native 
Administrations raised finances that they accounted for and could eventually, in 
theory at least, use to finance their operations.  
 
And yet, even Davies’ central idea of a Native Treasury had varying interpretations 
across the peripheries, which reflect the way consensus was gradually reached 
across the territory. For instance, later writings on financial devolution to native 
administrations, which responded to Davies’ recommendations, from Equatoria 
Province argued that there were three stages of indirect rule: elementary, 
intermediate and advanced. These were detailed in a proposed note on financial 
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devolution to the Financial Secretary. In the Elementary Stage, Native Authorities 
were to be based on a native court and ‘entrusted with the collection of specified 
taxes and the making of routine payments according to lists issued by the District 
Commissioner’. A Native Treasury was integral to this and subsequent stages, and in 
the elementary stage ‘a limit was placed upon the cash balances to be held in the 
native treasury at any time’. Accounting was to be done by the District Office.264  
 
By the Intermediate Stage local accountants were to be employed and District 
Officers were to be granted increasing authority over accounting for receipts and 
expenditure. They were also permitted to prepare an ‘independent budget’. And, in 
the Advanced Stage, these budgets were to be entirely separate ‘when the sense of 
financial responsibility and proficiency in elementary accounting attained a 
reasonable standard’. But the treasury and court offices were to be kept separate 
although they did not be have to be ‘housed in separate buildings’.265 
 
Taxes, and the ideal of a native treasury, were theoretically key to monitoring 
customary authorities in part because the British aspired to using allegations of abuse 
or misuse of funds as a means of dismissing traditional authorities. But they were 
theoretical in the sense that the British rarely implanted the measures that would have 
advanced financial devolution throughout the peripheries in full, which partially meant 
that the peripheries were kept in a subordinate position to the centre which 
subsequent chapters illustrate in detail. Despite the gap between practice and reality, 
this contributed to discussions about how taxes were linked to the character 
assessment of traditional authorities.  
 
The ability to collect and remit taxes became the key measuring stick of a successful 
Native Administration in British eyes; for instance, whether a customary authority was 
loyal to government but still commended sufficient respect from his community. 
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Loyalty to government was the central barometer for this relationship as was the 
‘respect’ of the people in relation to the sheikh or chief. Failing this, the chief or sheikh 
would be ‘replaced’ by the government; or, if he lost the respect of his people, so 
MacMichael reasoned, the population would depose him in any case.266  
 
Davies also noted that customary authorities were permitted to use an undisclosed 
proportion of the funds they raised as taxes for personal gain. This is despite fears 
that this could give rise to despots who might challenge British rule. For instance, 
Davies acknowledged that a great deal more ‘undesirable graft on his part would be 
tolerated before the question of his dismissal was considered’ by both taxpayers and 
the DCs that oversaw them.267 These types of risks, Davies argued, were amplified by 
the fact that it was difficult for the Nigerian Political Officer to understand ‘what was 
going on under the surface of things’ in areas that were the most indirectly ruled. And 
that this relative loss of control was, to Davies, the main trade-off to the Nigerian 
model.268  
 
Davies estimated that this was probably a more desirable outcome, as they were 
more likely to understand and respect the decisions made by authorities drawn from 
their community than those of an outsider. As a result, even though Nigerian Emirs 
almost certainly made ‘sundry odds and ends of income’ from tax revenue this was 
more permissible by the resident populace. He contrasted the competing tax regime 
in Omdurman, which contained a ‘multiplicity of fees, dues, licenses, local taxes and 
royalties’. Though each of these were legal, Davies argued that they were almost 
certainly experienced as graft by the subject populace.269  
 
Ultimately, Davies’ report speaks to the British desire for native administrations to 
serve as the means for the preservation of British colonial rule. But his 
 











recommendations represented a brutal contradiction given that the claim that indirect 
rule should explicitly draw on native institutions while arguing for the wholesale 
adoption of the Nigerian model of indirect rule, despite the simultaneous emphasis 
on identifying  some sort of Sudanese or tribal ‘purity’ in the sense of ascribing what 
is ‘natural’ to different people.  
 
The British also looked for models of indirect rule closer to Sudan than Nigeria: the 
Governor of Mongalla Province from 1924 to 1929, A.W. Skrine, went on a tour of 
‘chiefs courts’ in Northern Uganda. Skrine was one of the few advocates of the 
supposed financial benefits of indirect rule as opposed to previous methods and 
reported that Native Administration was ‘cheaper and more efficient than the 
bureaucratic method of direct administration’. Skrine also echoed Davies and noted 
that its main advantage was that it was ‘politically sound’ as it was an invaluable tool 
for creating a firewall against nationalism. For instance, he argued that this was 
because the ‘native’ was ‘more personally interested in the Govt., not owing to the 
possibility of becoming a member of the Civil Servant class, but because he feels his 
chiefs and subchiefs are actually of his own class’. Consequently, Native 
Administration was ‘less alien’ and contributed to higher satisfaction with 
government.270  
 
This section illustrates that indirect rule was linked to social control in the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium in the 1920s. Taxes were a key part of this dynamic as they 
served as a barometer of the effectiveness of Native Administrations and increasingly 
as a tool for greater bureaucratic regulation of the periphery through customary 
authorities. These ideas drew from across the British empire and were weaved into 
British efforts to combat nationalism in Sudan by incorporating customary authorities 
into the state rather than relying on the ‘urban intelligentsia’. Crucially, they also 
helped the British compartmentalise the peripheries into regions that the British 
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thought they could more readily control through a designated customary authority. 
The next section paints an even clearer picture of this dynamic.  
 
Part 2: Brutality Continues in Upper Nile Province 
 
Meanwhile in Upper Nile Province’s Zeraf Valley, British pacification efforts 
continued. But in contrast to previous years, new kinds of regulatory orders emerged 
whereby the British sought to govern through sections and sub-sections of the Nuer. 
Significantly, this still involved granting a customary authority taxing power; however,  
the shift from tribute to poll tax increased the state’s power to enumerate populations, 
which was useful in the absence of a census. In turn, the British deepened their efforts 
to make customary authorities and the people the latter oversaw legible to the state. 
The end result was that British policy towards the peripheries treated these regions 
as series of collectives rather than a coherent territory or territories.  
 
For decentralisation to counter nationalist fears as the British hoped, they somehow 
needed to continue working with individuals willing to collaborate with them as 
customary authorities within the decentralised administrative apparatus. However, 
even as consensus was building among some British administrators on the need to 
change their tactics to suit imperialist aims, this seemingly straightforward objective 
was starkly at odds with tax policies for the initial three-decades of rule. This section 
examines how the seemingly straightforward policy aims of decentralisation 
aggressively bumped up against the realities of how taxes were brutally collected in 
the Zeraf Valley.  
 
This was particularly true in Upper Nile Province’s Zeraf Valley, where brutal 
pacification campaigns continued and broader attempts to forcefully break all of the 
region into compartmentalised units were underway. For instance, the Governor of 
Upper Nile Province from 1919 to 1926, K.C.P. Struvé, eventually suspended tribute 







the province government could rethink its forceful approach to submission.271 Under 
Struvé’s governorship of Upper Nile Province, some administrators illustrated that 
coercive methods damaged relations between the British administration and people 
in the province. For example, in 1927 a letter from H.C. Jackson, who had served as 
the Deputy Governor of Upper Nile Province remarked that people were very ‘hostile’ 
when he attempted to collect what he referred as a ‘very light tax’.272  
 
Jackson noted that this was because of the deleterious impact of a DC named 
Borradaile who was ‘anxious to pass into the Staff College’ that was used to train 
administrators and had resorted to violent tax methods.273  In effect, Borradaile was 
in a rush to complete tax collection and therefore resorted to a relatively arbitrary 
application of force when collecting taxes. Indeed, Borradaile had allegedly travelled 
by steamer and sent mounted police to collect tribute in the form of cows from the 
‘Nuer as a whole’ but instead of actually requesting the tribute, the police had ‘merely 
raided the nearest luak [cattle camp]’. Consequently around 40 cows were coercively 
taken by the British.274  
 
But when Jackson visited the following year, he claimed to have been surprised to 
see that people in the area were ready to take up arms against the Anglo-Egyptian 
government. Jackson sought to construct a legal and bureaucratic basis for taxation 
and the consequent shift to poll taxes by limiting his tribute assessment to two bulls, 
which succeeded in getting taxes to be more readily paid.275 Jackson protested these 
violent methods to Governor Struvé and asserted that ‘under no circumstances would 
I again be a party to such methods and for that reason Struve [sic] had me 
transferred’.276 Whether or not Jackson was using Borradaille as a cover for his own 
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ineffectiveness was unclear; critically, however, Struvé agreed with Jackson and 
suggested that tribute collection in the region should change.  
 
Even if in this particular instance Jackson articulated a key point about the deleterious 
impact British tribute collection methods had, he was far from benevolent and his 
tactics also underscored the need to work through customary authorities. Indeed, 
aggressive policies to segment the peripheries into a series of collectives as a 
measure to neutralise nationalism began in the 1920s, which sought to tightly restrict 
physical movement in the peripheries. This legally commenced with the 1922 
Passports and Permits Ordinance, which was significant because it granted the 
Governor-General of the Condominium the authority to declare any part of Sudan a 
‘Closed District’. If a part, or the entirety, of district was closed, trade with the part of 
the district that was affected was limited to internal trade.  
 
Accordingly, in 1927 Jackson, who was fresh from his role in Upper Nile Province and 
then Governor of Halfa Province, wrote to the Private Secretary to the Governor-
General, that he was focused on dividing the Nuer into ‘their proper shiengs and sub-
shiengs’. The basis for the division into what Jackson deemed were the ‘proper’ 
amalgamations of people in specific parts of the territory was justified this ‘so that 
the tax could be properly assessed’. Jackson added that though the ‘Nuers don’t like 
paying taxes – I hate it myself – but they paid up willingly for me when they realised 
that the tax was a fair one and wasn’t going to raid them as in the past’.277  
 
This statement reflects what Paul Nugent describes as a ‘statist version of a 
protection racket in which people surrender their political voice in return for being 
spared from predatory acts’. This is opposed to a social contract whereby an 
‘authority and their subject/citizens enter into some form of negotiation over how the 
rule by the former can contribute to the well-being of the latter’, which is typically 
catalysed by taxation.278 Indeed, Cherry Leonardi argues that this concept is 
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applicable for South Sudan and illustrates that ‘chiefs were said to have “bought” 
protection for their people by working with colonial forces’.279 This dissertation’s 
review of taxes in the Condominium echo both Nugent and Leonardi’s findings.  
 
And yet, even as the British were deepening their protection racket through 
customary authorities, there are some indications that they were categorising 
according to criteria that were limited. This was even noted when the British were 
engaging in these actions. For instance, the colonial social anthropologist E.E. Evans-
Pritchard noted in a 1934 ‘Sudan Notes and Records’ that Jackson poorly translated 
the word and underlying meaning of ‘cieng’, which calls into question the utility of 
Jackson’s initiative. Evans-Pritchard argued that the word ‘cieng’, which Jackson has 
incorrectly understood but inadvertently referred to was in reference to homestead or 
town where a Nuer family was from rather than a family lineage. This type of grievous 
error hints at the futility of British efforts to carve the Condominium’s peripheries and 
its peoples into devolved units when they struggled to understand essential concepts 
within the peoples they sought to rule.280  
 
Nevertheless, even if these types of concepts were misunderstood, other British 
officials also wanted to use taxes to geographically territorialise Nuer chieftaincies to 
effectively govern the peripheries through a series of collectives. Indeed, Coriat 
concurred with Jackson and argued that the division of the Nuer into ‘proper’ shiengs 
and sub-shiengs was an explicit move to ensure tribes that the government identified 
as loyal, based on tribute payments, were not subject to tribute patrols. A core point 
here is that resettling the Nuer was an expressly political, and somewhat violent move 
to ‘lessen the chances of harbouring’ tax resisters in the tribe.281 And, once again, 
political motives outshone all other objectives, and this took place both at the level 
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of administrative devolution and the practice of attempting to govern through 
customary authorities as a key component of indirect rule.  
 
These brutal cataloguing aims were tightly bound to tax practices under the formal 
implementation of indirect rule. Indeed, additional police were also instructed to aid 
with Jackson’s resettlement efforts. Coriat claimed that after settlement was attained, 
impacted people could ‘regain freedom of movement’ and also noted that it was 
extended to other sub-clans within the Nuer, including part of the Gaweir Nuer in the 
district. If the deepening of social control was not already explicit enough, once in 
settlements, a census was taken of the people in the camp, which was ‘made 
possible by the comparative smallness of the area of concentration’. Chiefs were also 
instructed to ‘forbid movement of small sections’ and that ‘there need be no 
restriction of movement provided that the section remained grouped.282  .  
 
Moreover, in a similar attempt to allocate government selected traditional authorities 
based on the number of taxpayers, a 1925 letter from the Governor of Mongalla 
Province, A.W. Skrine to the Financial Secretary, G. Schuster, is indicative of how this 
took place. In the letter Skrine proposed that the number of chiefs’ police for the 
province should be based on taxpayer numbers. Chiefs’ police were police at ‘the 
discretion of the chiefs themselves’ and were advised to be allocated on the basis of 
1 policeman per 100 taxpayers, with a minimum of 2 police per chief.283  
 
In addition to illustrating how the British used taxes to deepen control, these 
governance patterns are also significant because they demonstrate how some British 
administrators, like Jackson, engaged in activities for the sake of being able to 
performatively illustrate to superiors that they were addressing perceived problems. 
It also highlights one of the unsaid motivations that appears to have contributed to 
the persistent application of violence when collecting taxes years after the practice 
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was largely understood as futile: Some administrators perhaps thought it better to 
apply violence to demonstrate the extent of the state’s coercive power according to 
claims to expertise.  
 
For instance, despite Jackson’s protestations of British tax collection practices in the 
Zeraf Valley in 1928, even more forceful approaches resumed when Struvé left his 
post as Governor of Upper Nile. Struvé’s successor, C.A. Willis, took these tribute 
collection methods to even further extremes and resorted to aerial bombardments to 
force people in the province to submit to government.284 Willis’ other methods for 
‘pacifying’ the region included the ‘wholescale burning of villages and confiscation of 
property’ in 1928.285  
 
These exceptionally brutal tribute collection tactics are documented in a letter 
addressed to Willis from Percy Coriat, who was a political officer in Guncol Area in 
Upper Nile Province. In addition to describing the extreme violence associated with 
taxation in previous years, Coriat claimed that tribute patrols remained ineffective, 
with tax offenders successfully evading punishment. He remarked that it was 
relatively easy for people to elude capture in a ‘forest or swamp’ or take ‘refuge in the 
camp of an ostensibly amenable section or a section whose Chief was recognised to 
be loyal’.286  
 
Nevertheless, under Willis’ enduring brutal rule, the British were steadily met with 
other types of resistance from people in the province, some of which was not 
necessarily violent or involved fleeing the British administration. For example, in 1929 
Governor Willis was cynically welcomed to Yirrol with the following Dinka song that 
defiantly protested the imposition of taxes by the British:  
 
 









MALWAL E RECH E KONG ACHE WET A TAP A PEN JANG MITH “BAI 
KAN.” 
(Oh! Malwal e rech e kong [Rumbek-devil-spirit - - could also be a play 
on words: “Malwal e raic e kanga chi pen jang” would mean “the red 
people who spoilt everything have prevented the Dinka having 
children.”) is it not taxation that prevents the Dinka having children? 
Bring something (govt. always saying Bring Something.)287 
 
This passage vividly illustrates that the violence of how taxes were collected in the 
peripheries continued to damage the merits of British occupation in the eyes of 
taxpayers. So, although brutal pacification efforts had largely succeeded in quelling 
violence against the state in the Zeraf Valley and the Nuba Mountains by the end of 
the 1920s, distrust between taxpayers and the British continued.  
 
Further examples illustrate that British tax collection methods had severely damaged 
relations between customary authorities and government right when they attempted 
to rely upon them as collaborators as part of decentralisation’s larger objectives. For 
example, in one case, customary authorities sent emissaries to the British stating 
their displeasure with the violence of British tribute collection tactics prior to the 
formal introduction of indirect rule. Percy Coriat who was a British administrator in 
several provinces, found as much when he was an Assistant District Commissioner 
in Ayod, which was a small town in Upper Nile Province. In 1923 Coriat noted that 
‘real [l]eaders’ were far more reluctant to work with the British government.288 But so 
long as the government chief was able bodied and continued to carry out his duties 
and ‘paid tribute’ Coriat was generally satisfied as it served as adequate proof that 
the individual and their tribe did not have ‘ill intentions’ towards government.289 
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And in another part of Upper Nile Province some ‘real’ chiefs that had rebelled against 
government used tax resistance as a means of securing authority and purchasing 
support from young men who would join the fight against the British. This tactic was 
deployed by the Nuer Prophet Guek Ngundeng.290 As the historian Douglas Johnson 
notes, Guek fell in and out of favour with the British through the years given some of 
his ‘anti-government activities’.291 For instance, he famously had been wanted by the 
British for a 1917 attack that ‘annihilated’ a Platoon of the 9th Sudanese, which had 
been led by a Sudanese officer. But by 1927 in a move to recruit fighters, Guek 
offered ‘freedom from taxation, no work and unlimited Dinka raids’ to people in return 
for securing followers to join his struggle against the Condominium administration.292  
 
Coriat tried to counteract Sudanese distrust of the British in his reported interactions 
with Guek Ngundeng. These accounts illustrate that even one of the most brutal 
administrators recognised the need to collaborate with customary authorities and that 
there were limits to the application of force. For instance, in 1923, Coriat met with 
Guek Wundeng and stated that as a ‘sub-chief’ Guek had to ‘deal direct [sic] with 
Government’ and that Guek could not use a representative or emissary as a go-
between to communicate with the British. But, in reference to this same interaction 
with Guek Wundeng, Percy wrote that he ‘accepted as Chief’ all Nuer ‘who had any 
semblance of control over his section or who appeared to have the makings of a Chief 
in him’.293 Significantly, control, rather than potentially historically embedded 
concepts of chieftaincy was the lone objective in Coriat’s logic.   
 
Additional evidence of the idea that the state tax collection practices contributed to 
Nugent’s idea of a ‘statist version of a protection racket’ also emerged in these 
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encounters. For example, in 1928 when Coriat was unable to induce chiefs to 
construct roads and was contemplating an aerial bombing raid to enforce his 
authority, a group of Dinka Chiefs met Coriat and provided him with a gift of a ‘small 
tusk for Government’.294 This move momentarily placated Coriat and echoes gift-
giving strategies that were deployed by people in the peripheries at the start of the 
Condominium to buy protection from the British in the first chapter. Nor were these 
gifts always items such as ivory. For instance, there is also evidence from Coriat’s 
report that chiefs negotiated with the Anglo-Egyptians to obtain additional military 
troops before securing support from other chiefs in government operations.295   
 
Some of these dynamics described in this chapter appear to have been unique to the 
Zeraf Valley as in other parts of Sudan’s peripheries the British more readily used 
taxes, or the payment of salaries instead of violence, to attract traditional authorities. 
The British in part attempted to embed this through modifications to the 1922 Power 
of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, which was the first major piece of legislation that 
sought to legislate the policies that came to define indirect rule in Sudan. The 
ordinance was subsequently updated in 1922, 1927 and 1928 to include provisions 
for the payment of sheikhs. Vitally, as the next section illustrates, these ideas were 
first tested along the Darfur-Kordofan boundary.  
 
Part 3: Taxation, Salaries and Sheikh Shopping 
 
 
In 1922 the Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance was introduced, which was the first 
piece of legislation that imposed indirect rule in the Condominium’s peripheries. The 
Ordinance is significant because it represented the first time the British state legally 
codified an initiative that governed through traditional authorities, namely by placing 
sheikhs under the state’s central authority and granting them judicial authority 
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through courts.296 And, it also serves as an example of how one piece of legislation 
that was initially intended for a specific group of people, and in a sense, one 
customary authority in particular, was adopted throughout the Condominium’s 
peripheries.  
 
Indeed, this ordinance was specifically tailored to the British strategy for occupying 
Kordofan Province, particularly after they killed the Sultan of Darfur and sought to 
leverage authorities in regions that bordered Darfur as a bulwark against further 
unrest. The ordinance was instituted to enable the sultans of all ‘greater tribes’ in the 
province to hold robust executive and judicial powers, which was essentially an effort 
to ‘woo’ key customary officials into the state.  
 
This notably extended to Sheikh Ali el Tom of the Dar Kababish Arabs. Sheikh Ali’s 
unique relations with the British were one of the justifications for introducing the 1922 
Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance; and, once again, the financial aspects of taxes 
were secondary to other more politically salient concerns. In this instance, the 
ordinance was the precursor for granting ‘nomad sheikhs’ greater control of fee 
collection, initially through court fees and then tax collection, which allowed for ample 
opportunities for personal enrichment as the British sought to bring them into the 
state. According to this logic, Sheikh Ali al-Tom of the Dar Kababish in Kordofan was 
well positioned and therefore played an important role in the British efforts to 
overthrow Ali Dinar, the Sultan of Darfur.  
 
Moreover, after the more formal incorporation of Darfur into the Condominium 
following Ali Dinar’s death, the Kababish became more strategically significant for the 
British. In exchange for collaborating with the British, the British granted him 
preferential treatment, including the power to collect taxes, and more formally the 
power to sit on courts that the 1922 Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance sought to 
protect so as to ‘guarantee stability in the area’, which was remote and politically 
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contentious.297 The British therefore valued collaborating with Ali al-Tom so as to 
prevent exacerbating tensions in the area and eventually named him the nazir, which 
was the highest rank in the native administration. It also granted him power over other 
sections, which was the first time the people the British designated as the Kababish 
were under a single leader.298 
 
But the 1922 Ordinance was less applicable in other parts of the peripheries, 
including parts of Sudan that were home to other ‘Nomad Arabs’ such as Sheikh Ali’s 
Kababish Arabs. For example, in Fung Province the Kenana, Rufaa el Sherg and 
Rufaa el Hoi ‘possessed no power whatsoever’ and when the Powers of Nomad 
Sheikhs Ordinance was rolled out in the province in 1923 and 1924, they were denied 
similar tax powers.299 These inconsistencies undermined British efforts to assert their 
authority over the Condominium’s diverse peripheries by buying their authority as 
sheikhs other than Ali el Tom were less willing to collaborate. Presumably, few other 
sheikhs had the same capacity to enrich themselves through taxes as Sheikh Ali did.  
 
Thus, the British broadened the remit of the Power of Nomad Sheikh’s Ordinance in 
1927 and 1928, where it was known as the Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance in 
some areas and the Village Courts Ordinance in others. These addendums to the 
ordinance gave sheikhs the authority to imprison people under their authority it also 
granted sheikhs the power to establish native courts. Critically, it provided sheikhs 
on the courts with salaried positions. And salaried customary authority posts were 
considered especially vital in the parts of the Beja tribes in Red Sea and Kassala 
Provinces where famine had taken place in the mid-1920s. Crucially, the move was 
seen as a vital way to buy their collaboration. For instance, the payment of sheikhs’ 
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salaries was seen as a means to ‘rebuild tribal organisations and authority’ and the 
individuals who were chosen for salaried roles were going to be the ‘chief instruments 
of the reconstruction’. As such, it was ‘essential, from the beginning, to give them a 
certain standing and social support’ through salaries.300301   
 
But the granting of salaried positions, rather than allowing for tax collection powers, 
to buy collaboration from sheikhs in Red Sea and Kassala took place only after British 
tax policies in the region had catastrophically failed. Which is also to say that the 
British reached the policy of paying sheikhs salaries to rebuild their trust only when 
they finally acknowledged the limits of force and needed to find another way to 
bargain with customary authorities. Indeed, despite the controversy of taxing animals 
that was identified in the first chapter, the practice still persisted in parts of the 
peripheries in the 1920s, which even led to an economic crisis in Red Sea and Kassala 
Provinces.  
 
This economic instability speaks to the extent to which the British were failing to 
understand or know people in the peripheries. For example, in 1924 British animal 
tax policies among parts of Red Sea and Kassala Provinces actually contributed to 
famine conditions. Environmental conditions had deteriorated in previous years, 
which made it difficult for animals to graze during these years, but the British still 
demanded the payment of animal taxes. This contributed to a scarcity of animals, 
which drove up the market price of livestock that eventually exacerbated food 
insecurity that was already plaguing the region at this time.302 Following the economic 
and agricultural troubles that afflicted people Red Sea and Kassala, the British 
grappled with whether and how to collect tax arrears from these regions.  
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In response to the ease with which taxpayers could head into neighbouring Abyssinia, 
MacMichael argued that arrears needed to be collected so as to prevent tribes in the 
province from becoming ‘untraceable’. But the concern from the Governor’s office in 
Kassala was that because the money was wanted from two years prior (1924-1926) 
the taxes due were too far out of date to collect. As the explicit language of 
traceability reveals, taxes were becoming used as a vital mode of social control; 
which in this instance, was surveillance. For example, as it had been a ‘bad year’ for 
crops and grazing in Sinkat and Tamarien Districts, it meant that it was ‘well-nigh 
impossible to recover arrears from people’. This was because tribes ‘had scattered 
in search of what grazing is to be found on the Red Sea Province and Eritrean 
coasts’.303  
 
The British also responded by demanding tax lists from sheikhs to try and make sense 
of the taxes that were attributed to members of the tribe.304. This was especially 
important in this region given taxpayers could ‘disappear’ into neighbouring 
Abyssinia and again outshined the potential for taxes to be used for revenue raising. 
Indeed, a tax list register could be used to assess previously unknown information 
such as income, which deepened the potential for control as the British struggled 
with this seemingly straightforward task throughout the time they occupied the 
territory.  
 
In this particular interaction, because the British needed the support of customary 
authorities in Red Sea and Kassala if they were to successfully control these regions, 
sheikhs in these provinces succeeded in wrangling resources from the state. For 
instance, after the initial, punitive, measures failed, the Nomad Commissioner, which 
was a unique position established to oversee the region, advised that land should be 
given to members of sections of the Hadendowa as a means of ‘educating the wilder 
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hillmen’. The Nomad Commissioner also claimed that this would put them into 
contact ‘with their fellows and with the Government’, which underscored the British 
desire to contain and exercise control over these parts of the peripheries.305  
 
But an alternative lesson that might have been learned from this encounter was that 
under certain circumstances, largely dictated by the extent to which the British 
needed to control an area, the British could buy power from customary authorities by 
granting them taxing power or a salary. Of course, the inverse was also true, whereby 
customary authorities or people claiming to be customary authorities, could obtain 
their positions from the state so long as they could generate tax lists and some 
evidence of tax collection efforts. Akin to subsequent amendments to the 1922 Power 
of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, salaries were also granted to Omdas, as a means of 
preventing illicit taxation or ‘petty peculations’, which is explored in more depth in 
subsequent parts of this chapter, but proved to be less appealing to customary 
authorities than the ability to collect taxes. In turn, the British argued that this meant 
that they were able to ‘use them [omdas] with greater effect’. This is despite the fact 
that a report from one omda in the region supported this claim and argued that ‘now 
that the Government had given him a salary he would have no difficulty [collecting 
taxes] in future’.306   
 
Indeed, similar British attempts to use tax collecting powers to collaborate with 
customary authorities took place in Darfur, which was sensitive for the state because 
of the fear of religious rebellion. For instance, the Governor of Darfur Province, 
Reginald Bence-Pembroke, also called for the introduction of indirect rule in Darfur. 
However, he acknowledged that the patchy extent to which the British had 
incorporated parts of Darfur’s diverse regions necessitated continued 
experimentation with different approaches.307 These practical realities, rather than the 
 
305 Commissioner, Nomad Administration to Financial Secretary thro’ Civil Secretary, ‘Tribute 1929’, 
29 December 1928, NRO Civsec 22/1/3.  
306 Ibid. 
307 Reginald Arthur Bence-Pembroke, ‘The Administrative Policy and Sudanese Nationalism’, 1927, 







loftier aims of modelling indirect rule on the British reading of how indirect rule 
functioned in Nigeria shaped the piecemeal ways in which indirect rule was effectively 
rolled out in the Condominium.  
 
For instance, in 1927, Governor Bence-Pembroke argued that the way to overcome 
‘Mahdist fanaticism’ in Darfur was to ‘resuscitate tribal organisations when and where 
possible’. He added that it was also essential to ‘delegate to native authorities a full 
measure of responsibility in administration’.308 And, in another example highlighting 
the paradoxes of indirect rule, Bence-Pembroke’s statement neglects why the British 
needed to revive ‘tribal organisations’ in the first place.  
 
Indeed, these ‘tribal organisations’ inasmuch as British administrators understood 
them in huge detail were undoubtedly violently disrupted as part of British pacification 
campaigns, which in Darfur culminated in the assassination of the Sultan of Darfur. 
Underscoring the deeply political aims behind this recommendation, Bence-
Pembroke recalled his understanding of how British India functioned with its 
independent Indian states and the Protectorate of Nigeria’s ‘colony of Lagos’. The 
justification for this was yet again that in neither part of the world was it possible to 
imagine a ‘native administration aspiring to obtain political power’.309  
 
Bence-Pembroke also provided homegrown evidence for devolution’s suitability for 
British attempts to contain the peripheries into neutered anti-nationalist quadrants. 
For example, he argued that the parts of Darfur Province that were the most indirectly 
ruled were also the most resistant to nationalist uprisings. This included the ‘Nyala 
Rising’ in 1921 and when the Sultan of Masalit quelled an estimated three Mahdist 
uprisings between 1914 and 1920.310 Notably, in this instance, financial 
considerations as well as administrative efficacy were used to justify the turn towards 
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Native Administration in Darfur Province. This is because, as in other parts of the 
Condominium, costlier budget items, which Bence-Pembroke identified as ‘police, 
transport and climate allowance’ would be removed. As would a layer of junior 
administrative staff as responsibilities would be passed to native authorities.311 
 
Meanwhile, in Kassala, some of Davies’ policy ideas on decentralisation trickled into 
actual practice by the end of the 1920s. As noted in the first part of this chapter, 
Davies argued that the maintenance of native treasuries and the development of 
‘native administration budgets’ were integral to the introduction of indirect rule. Native 
Budgets and Native Treasuries were so vital because this was how salaries were to 
be paid for customary authorities.  
 
Davies advanced this in the province; for example, when he examined the Governor 
of Kassala’s proposed 1929 budget for the Shukria Nazirate, he argued that the Nazir 
should receive a treasury. This was to be derived from ‘the proceeds from taxation, 
of fines imposed by native courts, of market dues, of pound fees and of ghaffirs 
rates’.312  These were to then be passed along to government, with a pre-determined 
amount dedicated to the nazirate according to pre-specified budget items. These 
included: the ‘payment of retainers; the payment of salaries to the Nazir himself; to 
his subordinate sheikhs; to his wakils, scribes and school master; the upkeep of 
buildings; the maintenance of haffirs; and the management of race meetings’.313  
 
But as subsequent parts of this dissertation illustrate, this proved fanciful thinking as 
full financial control was never achieved throughout the peripheries and Kassala was 
one of the rare places where it was initially thought to have taken place. Indeed, 
because monitoring and preventing ‘financial abuses’ among over two hundred 
sheikhs would have been too onerous, the previous rules remained in effect. 
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Meanwhile most of the sheikhs in this time were also allotted government salaries or 
were allowed to pocket a percentage of the tax revenue they collected.314   
 
And yet, though granting salaries was considered a key measure to bring sheikhs into 
the state, not all customary authorities were keen. For example, Sheikh Ali was wary 
of these changes as he suspected they might undermine his ability to remit taxes for 
his own gain, which was a key element of how he amassed his authority, despite 
British attempts to convince him otherwise. And, in a move that illustrates the extent 
of his privileged position in the eyes of the British he managed to avoid adopting 
these changes until a subsequent reform to the ordinance in 1934.315  
 
These examples also practically highlight an overarching manner in which the British 
wilfully turned a blind eye to some ways in which customary authorities negotiated 
their positions. However, akin to how MacMicheal stated during the earliest 
exploration of the policy at the start of the 1920s, a pitfall of working through these 
types of ‘native’ authorities included the possibility they might acquire more power 
than the British desired. Indeed, MacMichael argued that ‘the native prefers to submit 
to a few abuses at the hands of his own sheikh rather than to be pestered with the 
rules and regulations of alien origin’.316 Arguably, Sheikh Ali was on the borderline of 
what the British considered tolerable.  
 
Even so, once government-selected traditional authorities had in essence agreed to 
be the handmaidens of indirect rule, they could benefit from tax exemptions and from 
a new source of authority that was backed by the threat of state-sanctioned violence. 
This proved to be a successful British strategy for gradually wrangling control over 
the people in the Condominium’s peripheries by using taxes to enumerate, categorise 
and control people. In so doing, the British managed to centralise their authority even 
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as they decentralised it to customary authorities whom they otherwise had limited 
ability to control. Taxes therefore became the lynchpin to this strategy for centralising 
authority through decentralisation, which was notably weak when it came to the 
financial aspects of devolution or indirect rule. These patterns continued throughout 
the occupation of Sudan, which pivoted to a more overt focus on decentralisation 
rather than pacification in subsequent years, which is addressed in more detail in the 




This chapter illustrates how taxes in the Condominium’s peripheries gradually 
expanded from being a tool for submission to one that extended to becoming the 
primary conduit for controlling and ordering the population under Native 
Administration authorities. Rather than provide financial support for the state, which 
as the first chapter identified increasingly relied on export revenue, taxes were used 
to contain the peripheries to inoculate the British against what they perceived as a 
nationalist threat. This chapter argues that on-going patterns in what are sometimes 
referred to as ‘divide and rule’ tactics in Sudan and South Sudan have their origins in 
the first decentralisation efforts that took place in the 1920s.  
 
This chapter explored these developments in three parts. It first illustrated the extent 
to which indirect rule was used to segment the peripheries into regions that the British 
thought they could more readily control. Counter to many contemporary definitions 
of these concepts, decentralisation, or devolution as it was also frequently referred 
as, was deeply political and far from a benign, mundane or routine state exercise. 
Instead, the British fear of Sudanese nationalism contributed to the urgency with 
which the British sought to rely on customary authorities in the Condominium’s 
peripheries instead of Egyptian or Sudanese administrators.  
 
Significantly, the British also drew on their experience of colonising Nigeria, and even 







tax collecting customary authorities was actually fairly desirable. The British 
essentially reasoned that a reasonably content chief was more likely to collaborate 
with the colonial state, which was acceptable to the British so long as he did not 
amass too much authority. 
 
The second section illustrated that this lesson was particularly difficult to put into 
practice in parts of the Zeraf Valley in Upper Nile Province, where the British 
continued to resort to brutal tax practices. This substantially weakened relations 
between people and government even as it became somewhat clearer to several 
people within the British regime that they would need to work with, rather than militate 
against, customary authorities. In some parts of the vast region that is now South 
Sudan and encompasses the Zeraf Valley, bargaining between customary authorities 
and some British administrators even took place. But on the whole, the British were 
slow to adopt the practice and only after it proved successful in other parts of the 
peripheries. By all indications, the British had primarily succeeded in imposing a 
protection racket between people and customary authorities and to some extent 
between customary authorities and the violence of the colonial state.  
 
The final part of the chapter examined how the 1922 Power of Nomad Sheikhs 
Ordinance laid the groundwork for the repositioning of the application of taxes from 
a tool to ensure people had submitted to government to being advanced as a carrot 
to buy the collaboration of customary authorities. Moreover, the converse was also 
true, as people claiming to be customary authorities also had the chance to buy their 
positions from government so long as the met the state’s minimal demands for taxes 
and more pressing desire for tax lists. These authorities were drawn from the resident 
population and either were sheikhs or omdas already, or they were potentially 
influential members of the population who were willing to assume these positions. 
And, if the potential for personal enrichment was not sufficiently motivating, the 








These arguments add nuance to what Mahmood Mamdani poignantly calls 
‘decentralised despotism’ in government-backed customary authorities.317 Rather 
than an aberration, this facet of British colonial rule in Africa whereby customary 
authorities ruthlessly collected taxes was to some degree intended by design in the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Indeed, the British were weaker than they liked to 
acknowledge in the overwhelming majority of the Condominium, this is despite the 
fact that violence proved to be counterproductive. Taxes and decentralisation both 
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Chapter 3: Does the Government Really ‘Believe’ in the 
Decentralisation of Finance?, 1930-1946 
 
By 1930 British pacification campaigns in the Zeraf Valley concluded and attempts 
to solidify indirect rule in Sudan by establishing Native Administrations were 
underway. As these administrative steps advanced, British considerations on how to 
deepen their control over the people in these expansive regions reached a turning 
point. Rather than largely trying to control the population through customary 
authorities, the British sought to influence individual taxpayers in the peripheries.  
 
Moreover, 1930 also marks the beginning of a period in which the pragmatic use of 
taxes to impose control over the periphery detailed in the previous chapters gave way 
to a much more ideological debate over the nature and purpose of taxation as a key 
function of Native Administration. And yet, rather than producing any clear policy, this 
tended to generate more paradoxes as the British started to envision how to 
modernise and transform Native Administrations into Local Governments with control 
over their own finances even as they grew increasingly concerned that economic 
modernisation and their use of the poll tax was having a disrupting, individualising, 
effect on societies in the peripheries.  
 
Ultimately, these latter concerns tended to dominate British thinking on taxes during 
this timeframe, which consequently meant that financial decentralisation was more 
rhetoric than reality. This in turn led to attempts to strengthen collective governance 
through tribute, rather than a poll tax. It also resulted in British experiments with clan-
based taxation in Equatoria, the most extreme example of which took place under 
the Southern Policy and MacMichael’s notorious emphasis on governing the 
peripheries as a ‘series of self-contained racial or tribal units’.318  
 
 








In sum, the prevailing centripetal, anti-nationalist, imperial logic that remained behind 
British tax policies in the peripheries and decentralisation was in stark tension with 
other ideas on how to reshape these regions. These two competing endeavours are 
important because they impacted the relationship between the peripheries and the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s political centre in ways that persisted into 
independence. Indeed, they arguably remain unresolved today. They also reflected 
broader tensions within the entire British imperial project, which in part justified its 
presence in Africa to emancipate the region even as it favoured administrative 
measures that deepened the subjugation of people on the continent.  
 
This chapter explores these patterns in four parts. The first briefly analyses Sudan’s 
national budget from 1930 to 1946 and argues that the Condominium was becoming 
even more financially centralised than it had in previous years as revenue windfalls 
from cotton rapidly expanded the budget. In effect, when the peripheries became 
less volatile for the British in the 1930s and 1940s the limited tax revenue that they 
generated diminished even further the importance of these regions to the central 
government. This is despite the fact that they constituted the majority of the territory’s 
population and landmass. This project provides evidence for the ways in which the 
non-centrality of local government finances, and the British lack of trust in the 
capacity for people in the peripheries to self-govern, in national political calculations 
doomed the potentially emancipatory policy rhetoric some administrators applied. 
More crucially, they also underpinned the continued application of taxes as a tool for 
social control in the peripheries.  
 
The next two sections are interlinked and examine the British-led state’s revised 
focus on what a tax was and how taxes were collected in the peripheries. In the 1930s 
and 1940s the British were no longer solely focused on whether customary authorities 
had paid tribute to illustrate that they submitted to government as they had in 
previous years. They were also increasingly concerned about extending their control 
to the taxpayers under a customary authority’s remit. This was primarily achieved by 







of the chapter examines.  As part of this shift, chiefs and sheikhs were therefore not 
only tasked with collecting taxes in cash, they were meant to teach their people the 
value of money and of what money could ostensibly bring. This notably took place 
through widespread efforts to monetise taxes through paid, typically agricultural 
labour, which is traced in section three of the chapter. 
 
Significantly, these twinned discussions were deeply shaped by anthropological and 
ethnographic theories, which masked and even legitimated policies that deepened 
the state’s control over these regions. Paradoxically, even as the new monetary 
orientation took shape its potential implications for financing regional or national 
budgets were largely overlooked by the administration. Using taxable labour to 
control the most potentially volatile members of society, able-bodied men, was more 
of a priority than ensuring the taxes they generated contributed to the national 
budget, which was flush with cotton export revenue. Taxable labour refers to a mix 
of labour that could replace taxes and labour from which wages could be earned and 
then taxed.  
 
British policies paid lip service to civilising and modernising while perpetuating 
politically repressive policies. All the while, some taxpayers in the peripheries 
responded to these challenges in new ways. These are explored in the fourth part of 
the chapter, which reviews how some people in Equatoria escaped taxes and the 
tyranny of customary authorities by turning to the state.  
 
Part 1: Revenue Centralisation in Sudan, 1930-1946 
 
In 1930 the British implemented the ‘Southern Policy’ which completed the series of 
Closed District Ordinances imposed throughout the Condominium’s peripheries that 
limited the flow of people and of trade in different parts of the territory. The imposition 







inequity between Khartoum, the political centre, and the peripheries.319 But even 
without these ordinances, the fiscal power of the state was rapidly centralising even 
as lip service was being paid to fiscal decentralisation from figures such as Reginald 
Davies and increasingly Douglas Newbold.  
 
For instance, even in the midst of World War II, which devastated other parts of the 
global economy, the Condominium’s national budget was substantially boosted by 
revenue windfalls from cotton exports.320 Concordantly, the direct tax revenue that 
native administrations raised, which was almost exclusively derived from tribute and 
poll and hut taxes, declined. This section briefly explores these developments and 
indicates that even in the 1930s and the early 1940s the financial repercussions of 
direct tax policy were largely overlooked even as discussions around monetising 
taxes were underway.  
 
For instance, the national budget nearly doubled from 4,693,623.00 EGP in 1930 to 
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Table 3.1: Total Direct Tax Revenue and National 
Revenue, 1930-1946 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations based on Annual Reports of 
the Governor General (1906-1949), Sudan Archive, Durham.  
 
But, even as the national government increased the total amount of revenue it 
generated, the percent direct tax revenue of total revenue declined by more than half 










































The proportional decline in direct tax revenue in the national budget was in part the 
outcome of how rapidly the national government’s budget expanded due to 
additional revenue from other sources. But some of the decline in the percent of direct 
tax revenue to total revenue is explained by an overall drop in the total amount of 
direct taxes collected during these years. Table 3.1 illustrates how direct tax revenue 
fell from 440,386.00 EGP in 1930 to 341,665.00 in 1946, which is a shortfall of 98,721 
EGP.  
Table 3.2: Percent Direct Tax 
Revenue of Total Revenue, 
1930-1946 
 
Author’s Calculations based on 
Annual Reports of the Governor 









Significantly, the amount of revenue from direct taxes that explicitly came from 
Sudan’s economic peripheries, which were tribute and poll and hut taxes, also 
declined as a proportion of direct taxes during this timeframe. For example, poll and 
hut taxes fell from 16% of the total direct tax revenue raised in 1930 to just 5.2% in 
1946. In contrast tribute expanded from 9.4% of total direct tax revenue in 1930 to 
35.4% of total revenue in 1946. However, as the next section illustrates, this reflects 
the impact of British policies that pushed most people in the peripheries onto tribute 
rather than poll and hut taxes. This shift took place after a brief experiment with poll 
taxes that took place in the 1920s into the early 1930s, which the previous chapter 
identified. However, in contrast to the earliest years of British rule described in the 
first chapter, tribute was in effect an overarching method for collecting taxes in the 
peripheries that the British adapted differently throughout these regions. This is also 














Significantly, this brief budgetary review indicates that even as the British were 
tightening their grip on the peripheries through Closed District Ordinances and 
monetising taxes, they were not actually raising more revenue from these regions. 
Significantly, revenue from these taxes was not enough to finance local governments. 
 
In addition to Southern Sudan, other closed districts included parts of the Nuba 
Mountains in Kordofan Province that were cordoned off in 1924, the Beja Mountains 
in Red Sea Province and Blue Nile Province. Likewise, parts of Darfur were also 
closed, which meant that trading licenses and the movement of people in and out of 
Table 3.3: Poll & Hut Taxes and Tribute as a Percent Total of 
Direct Tax Revenue 
 
Author’s Calculations based on Annual Reports of the Governor 







these regions was more closely regulated by government.321 The justification for 
closing these regions was in part motivated by British attempts to ring-fence different 
parts of Sudan’s peripheries into homogenous tribal or ethnic units. The most 
extreme expression of these was made explicit by Civil Secretary MacMichael and 
other senior officials in the 1930 Memorandum on the Southern Policy. This policy 
limited trade and migration in the territory that is now South Sudan using the following 
infamous justification:  
 
The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a 
series of self contained racial or tribal units with structure and 
organisation based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and 
good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage 
and beliefs.322 
 
But Closed District Ordinances were not unified policies and the Condominium’s 
peripheries were effectively cordoned off along a spectrum. A region could be 
‘absolutely closed’, which meant that no northern Sudanese or non-Sudanese 
individuals were permitted within the province. Or, it could be a fully ‘closed district’, 
such as the Southern Policy, which meant that ‘ingress shall be permitted subject to 
such conditions and for such purposes as may be set forth in the said order’, which 
the Governor General could determine.323  
 
The historical literature on Sudan and South Sudan has devoted significant attention 
to whether and how Closed District Ordinances ossified the internal, regional and 
ethnic, divisions that have come to define the contemporary politics of both 
countries.324 However, their budgetary implications, which are some of the most 
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meaningful reflections of their impact, are often overlooked. A review of the revenue 
trends in the territory in these years provides a more complementary indication of the 
extent to which power had been centralised in Khartoum, which in turn exacerbated 
inequities between Khartoum and the peripheries. Significantly, in contrast to 
previous analyses, this review suggests that the Southern Policy did not simply create 
a north-south division but represented a broader policy of governing and 
marginalising the peripheries.  
 
And yet, just as local governments had access to fewer revenue sources, the push to 
advance Davies’ suggestion that local government finances were essential persisted. 
Indeed, Douglas Newbold, perhaps more so than any other British administrator, 
firmly espoused a rhetoric that implied that he believed in fiscal devolution. As the 
second chapter notes, in 1929 into the early 1930s Newbold held posts in Red Sea 
and Kassala Provinces and was the Nomad Commissioner of the Beja Administration 
that traversed along the Sudan-Abyssinian boundary. But, by 1933 he was the 
Governor of Kordofan Province. As part of these roles, Newbold had witnessed the 
importance of salaries to retain customary authorities who were willing to collaborate 
with the British-led state.  
 
Although he was relatively unsuccessful, Newbold devoted a fair amount of thought, 
and ink, towards innovating solutions that he thought would more effectively share 
revenue between the centre and the peripheries in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. 
Indeed, Newbold exchanged ideas with two of the most influential thinkers on indirect 
rule, Frederick Lugard and Margery Perham, to hone his ideas even further. These 
letters illustrate that Newbold’s pursuit of native treasuries crudely sought to 
reconcile the state’s centralising, anti-nationalist, aims into a more paternalistic vision 
of local government that would transition the peripheries into a ‘modern’ state.325  
 
 







Some of Newbold’s efforts caught on, for instance, by the 1940s British officials made 
limited statements about the need to try and grant Native Administrations greater 
financial authority. These included calls to increase the responsibilities of 
government-selected traditional authorities in local public administration. This in turn 
fostered the creation of eleven rural administrations with ‘independent budget status’, 
which the Governor-General considered essential for local governments to pass into 
the ‘intermediate stage of financial devolution’.326  
 
If this had been implemented as proposed it would have theoretically included greater 
spending authority. For instance, one move to transition responsibilities was the 1941 
recommendation from the Governor-General that local councils should shift away 
from town councils being ‘merely advisory bodies’. The proposed increase in financial 
responsibility would have meant that town councils were to be ‘formed on an electoral 
system and possessing executive powers’.327  
 
The following year the Governor-General even stated that Native Administrations had 
‘responded well to the increased responsibilities laid upon them’ as part of indirect 
rule and this was taken as ‘further proof of the soundness of their structure’. 
Expanding financial devolution to local rural administrations was therefore a ‘keynote’ 
policy aim for the British administration at this time. However, some of the push 
appears to have been practical given changes to British administrative capacity 
during these years. Even as more revenue was going into the central government, the 
British pulled administrative staff away from its peripheries as part of wartime 
administrative efforts.328  
 
Despite increased attention, these plans failed to expand local government finances. 
Even though revenue was theoretically divided between the centre and local 
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authorities ‘in such a way as to enable local authorities to pay their own way’, this 
was more of a wish-list than a reality.329 Moreover, from 1930 to 1946, paying one’s 
own way meant little more than paying a part of customary authorities’ salaries in the 
areas where customary authorities received them, along with other small 
emoluments. The latter included salaries for native court clerks, police officers and in 
some cases medical and veterinary staff.330  
 
Nor was the policy of paying salaries new: as the previous chapter illustrated, these 
ideas emerged as the British officials such as Newbold wrangled control over Kassala 
and Red Sea Provinces in the 1920s. The logic behind it was to create a degree of 
‘regard’ for customary authorities, which turned out to have been vital for buying their 
collaboration with government.331 But once these concerns were essentially 
addressed, there was little meaningful attention to develop local budgets in order  
to reduce the extent to which local governments were dependent on the central 
government.  
 
Surprisingly, reducing the financial dependency of local governments on the national 
budget barely seemed to register as a meaningful justification for changing policy. 
Instead, in keeping with the prioritisation of social control over financial 
considerations, chiefs and other types of customary authorities were to pay the 
salaries of their employees rather than government in order to buy their loyalty. So 
long as the staff within local governments, such as police and other local government 
officials, were loyal to the customary authority because they were paid by him, the 
British were satisfied. For instance, a statement from Equatoria Province in 1938 
declared that:  
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‘The African being what he is, he has a special regard for the person 
who gives him his pay; this regard has been recognised in one of the 
fundamental principles of Native Administration by which all N.A. [Native 
Administration] employees receive their pay from the chief and not from 
the Government.’332 
 
Even then, this clear division between the chiefs paying for salaries instead of the 
state rarely seemed to go into effect. As direct tax revenue declined throughout the 
1930s and 1940s local government administrations remained dependent on the 
central government for fiscal transfers. Meanwhile, the extent to which Native 
Administrations were dependent on the central government was fairly large. For 
instance, fiscal transfers included ‘gifts’ in the form of buildings, generally 
constructed using local labour, and capital grants, which were a type of large fiscal 
transfer to local governments.333 And, despite claims that it was vital for chiefs and 
sheikhs to finance local government salaries, across Sudan the national government 
paid ‘the whole or part of salaries of local officials’ and ‘grants towards sub-grade 
education’ for native administrations.334  
 
And yet, despite the increase in national revenue and decline in local revenue during 
these years, in practice the central government still had an unclear and unpredictable 
system for sharing revenue with local governments. For instance, the system for 
transferring funds from the central government to local governments or vice versa 
was not based on a formula. Proposed formulas included population data, but the 
British did not have census data until 1955, or operational costs, which the British 
had a clearer understanding of.335  
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And, several years after the policies were advanced, in 1938, no native administration 
had a native treasury.336 This effectively meant that customary authorities had limited 
abilities to spend their own monies, which the British did not attempt to redress until 
the last decade of British rule.337 As this chapter argues, this contributed to the 
centralisation of revenue in the national government, which was also acknowledged 
by some British officials as deepening the centralisation of financial and political 
control in Khartoum rather than the peripheries. For instance, the Mongalla Province 
Handbook notes that in 1933: 
 
‘…as long as native authorities are precluded from accumulating funds 
[in native treasuries], in other words are denied any responsible financial 
existence, they will never be able to say “we have saved enough money 
and should like to buy a coffee huller [which could have been used to 
expand income generating opportunities]”…’338 
 
In sum, by all indications, although British officials advocated for the importance of 
local government budgets as a central focus of indirect rule, this did not result in any 
reported increases in the revenue for these regions in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Moreover, as the Mongalla Province Handbook laid bare, native authorities were not 
meaningfully acquiring any financial independence from the central government 
despite concerns that this hampered their economic development. This is despite the 
fact that it was listed as a vital part of indirect rule; if anything, as this section’s 
budgetary review illustrates, local governments were actually becoming more 
dependent on the central government well into the 1940s.  
 
Thus, by the middle of the 1940s, just 10-years before independence, these 
proclamations amounted to little more than lip service and Native Administrations 
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were not granted greater revenue raising and spending authority. Despite the rhetoric 
of development and progress, fiscal authority remained tightly held by the central 
government even as there was increased talk of expanding the authority of Native 
Administrations through financial devolution.  
 
The next section of this chapter reviews the changing nature of politics of taxes in the 
Condominium’s peripheries during these years. Building from this section’s 
budgetary review, it starts with the simple question: What were the politics motivating 
tax policy in the peripheries in the 1930s and 1940s years, since they clearly were not 
focused on increasing local or national budgets?  
 
Part 2: Taxing the Group Rather than the Individual 
 
Just as taxes were linked to submission and then regulation for the first 30-years of 
British rule, into the 1930s and 1940s taxes remained subsumed by the political logics 
of colonial subjugation that also shaped closed district ordinances. Following an 
influential report from Kenya, British officials argued that taxes needed to maintain a 
British vision of traditional society in African and some extent societies that the British 
identified as Arabs or Nomadic Arabs, which privileged the group over the individual 
in these regions. Yet paradoxically, British tax policy during these years was also tied 
to attempts to steward the ‘modernisation’ of people within the peripheries, which 
frequently meant linking taxes to the cultivation of cash crops, such as cotton.339  
 
Some of these ideas were influenced by what was taking place throughout Sudan 
while others were adopted from various parts of, or thinkers on, the British empire. 
For example, Margery Perham, an historian and authority on colonial administration 
in Africa at the time, argued that taxes should be monetised rather than collected in 
kind as they previously had been in the peripheries, and that native treasuries were 
needed to modernise Africa and Africans.  
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Perham advanced some of these ideas in a paper read at the joint London meeting 
of the African Society and the Royal Society of the Arts in 1934. In this document, 
which refers to Africa as a whole rather than Sudan, Perham suggested that 
traditional authorities, such as government selected sheikhs, omdas and chiefs, 
would be the first to acquire money consciousness and that this would then trickle 
down to the rest of the populace.340 Money consciousness was so vital, according to 
Perham and other influential British thinkers on imperial rule, because it acted as a 
civilising and modernising device. This idea was directly influenced by Frederick 
Lugard’s theory of indirect rule, which stated that direct taxes for Africans were 
important because they provided a ‘moral benefit to the people by stimulating 
industry and production’.341  
 
Even as Perham stated money consciousness was desirable, she also argued that it 
threatened what she considered the traditional family unit. This was a threat because 
it risked ‘individualising’ society rather than preserving the group. For instance, she 
noted that money ‘weaken[ed] the necessity for co-operation which holds together 
the small kinship groups’. She also claimed it contributed to conflicts between age 
groups as the ‘greater ease with which that money is earned by the young than the 
old upsets the characteristic African balance of authority’.342  
 
In other words, Perham acknowledged that the ability to earn money through labour 
was potentially easier for younger members of African societies, and for young able-
bodied men of working age in particular. And this was a problem because these 
young upstarts might therefore challenge older authorities if they could more readily 
 
340 Perham, M. (1935) ‘Some Problems with Indirect Rule in Africa’, Journal of the Royal African Society, 
34(135) (Apr. 1935). pp.1-23.  
341 Lugard, F.D. (1922) ‘Lugard’s Political Testimony’ in Kirk-Green, A.H.M. (1965) The Principles of 
Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents, 1900-1947. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; 
Hermann, R. (2011) ‘Empire Builders and Mushroom Gentleman: The Meaning of Money in Colonial 
Nigeria’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3. p.395.   
342 Perham, M. (1935) ‘Some Problems with Indirect Rule in Africa’, Journal of the Royal African Society, 







obtain money and other social and economic benefits from actively participating in 
the monetary economy. More bluntly, this was a concern because indirect rule 
depended on governing through government-selected traditional authorities, whom 
the British often presumed to be elders within different groups.  
 
 
Meanwhile in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, experiments with poll taxes were 
coming to an end. This shift was in part justified by claims that poll taxes 
‘individualised’ people in ways that Perham identified. Thus by 1944 tribute was 
meant to be collected according to a ‘unit’ of taxpayers, which was decided along 
kinship ties, which was then monitored by British officials. The number of taxpayers 
was decided on the basis of ‘able bodied males’. To be able-bodied was roughly 
defined as being free from debilitating disease and young enough to enter the labour 
force, though a specific age limit was not clearly specified. For example, individuals 
who were in Leper Camps or under continued ‘medical surveillance’ upon release 
from a Leper Camp were exempt. As were people who were in ‘Sleeping-Sickness 
Camps’ or had been released but were under periodic inspection. And, individuals 
who were ‘of old age or infirmity’ were also released from having to pay.343 But this 
too held coercive ends, since able bodied men were the most likely to rebel against 
the state, as they had done during the first three-decades of British rule in the 
peripheries.  
 
Further, customary authorities, which were designated ‘heads and elders of the unit’ 
had the authority to determine the ‘division of assessment for the unit among the 
persons composing the unit’. The authority to determine the division of assessment 
for each unit was an important government-backed power for government selected 
traditional authorities. This is because it granted them the authority to mediate the 
proportion of taxes levied on each eligible taxpayer.344  Able bodied men would 
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therefore be too busy earning wages to pay taxes to chiefs and sheikhs to cause any 
trouble for government.  
 
But this was still meant to receive oversight from the British. For example, in 
Equatoria, collection was to be done by the end of September each year, with 
anything remaining to be ‘treated by the District as arrears’, though Zande District fell 
outside of this on account of its cotton growing scheme. And, district commissioners 
were to verify each assessment every three years, though it did not ‘matter whether 
1/3 , 1/2 or all the district is checked in any one year’.345 
 
The British had in turn firmly gotten into the business of defining or redefining how 
people in the peripheries organised themselves, which of course touched on thorny 
questions about ‘kinship’, ‘tribe’, ‘clans’ and so forth. And, as the last chapter’s 
account of Jackson’s messy attempts to divide some parts of the Nuer into sections 
to make taxes easier to collect exemplifies, on the whole the British were not highly 
sensitive or skilled in these distinctions in the peripheries.346 Meanwhile, Evans-
Pritchard’s critiques did not just extend to H.C. Jackson, and other critiques further 
highlight the ways in which the British administration in Sudan was bending 
supposedly anthropological ideas to suit their objectives to control people in the 
territory.  
 
For instance, Evans-Pritchard’s study of the Nuer had been commissioned by the 
Condominium government, the anthropologist was nevertheless a critic of British 
policy in Sudan. Indeed, in a 1938 Oxford University Summer School on Colonial 
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Administration, Evans-Pritchard noted the glaring tension between government-
selected customary authorities and other forms of authority:  
 
[T]here is much difference between the status of a native chief and the 
status of a Government chief. The functions of a native chief are to 
represent the unity of the tribe, maintained and expressed by warfare 
which he initiates; to store and distribute wealth, generally food, which 
he receives as tribute and disperses in gifts and hospitality; to embody 
in his person the sanctity of law and custom, which are enacted in his 
name; and to be the symbol of his people’s purpose and the pivot of 
their system of values. A Government chief, by contrast, acts as the 
bureaucratic agent of an alien administration. He collects taxes, 
organizes road-making, hears cases in Government-controlled courts, 
and dispenses Government-made law. Instead of tribute, he received 
wages from the administration. His functions are not tribal functions but 
Government functions, and he tends, in consequence, to become 
alienated from his people and even to use the support of the 
administration to exploit them.  
 
A Government chief derives his authority, not from tradition and the 
moral backing of his people, but from the support of the Government, 
which often gives him more power than he ever exercised previously.347  
 
While much of Evans-Pritchard’s critique resonates with this dissertation’s findings, 
he overstates the extent to which chiefs and other types of customary authorities 
were paid government salaries rather than paid their own way from tribute proceeds. 
As interactions between Sheikh Ali and the British in the 1920s illustrated, some 
customary authorities much preferred to derive their income, as well as a likely bonus, 
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from tribute. Moreover, as the second chapter argues, this was one of the more 
substantive ways the British obtained collaboration from customary authorities in the 
first place. These patterns proved difficult to break in the 1930s and 1940s and 
persisted into independence.  
 
And yet even as these types of critiques unfolded, Perham’s ideas that a monetary 
economy was essential to ‘modernity’ even though it could be in tension with other 
ideas about traditional society that was ordered along older customary authorities 
overseeing a group was also found in the Condominium. This included efforts to 
‘displace in the minds of cattle-herding tribes the idea of cattle currency by a money 
standard’. This led to failed discussions in Equatoria Province in 1937 to encourage 
the appeal of money by placing ‘the image of a cow upon it’. The contorted logic 
behind this move was ‘to put the person whom you wish to persuade to adopt a 
particular course of action in the position of thinking he has sprung the idea 
himself’.348 Moreover, given the persistence of cattle, which were embedded in 
individualised social relations rather than individualised like money or other types of 
currencies, these ideas failed to align with what taxpayers actually felt.349  
 
Despite the pervasiveness of Perham and Lugard’s ideas, not all British 
administrators in Sudan were enamoured with their perspectives on monetisation and 
opinions contrasted about what was appropriate for the peripheries. For example, in 
1937 the Bor District Commissioner wrote to the Governor of Equatoria Province, 
M.W. Parr, that the introduction of a ‘money standard’ instead of an exchange based 
one was not ‘necessarily the correct solution’.350 This was because the DC thought 
the monetisation of the economy would ‘perpetuate the enslavement (for want of a 
better word) of women’. Parr’s understanding of divorce cases justified this view, 
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which he argued were ‘the fundamental basis of Dinka social life’. And, he added that 
because divorces were expensive, women could not escape from a violent partner.351 
The impact of money on socio-economic and gender relations in the Condominium 
falls outside of the full scope of this project; however, this example usefully illustrates 
what British thought was on this subject, as the actual effects were almost certainly 
vastly more complex.352  
 
Indeed, though Parr’s claim that divorce was somehow the cornerstone of Dinka life 
is spurious, divorce was contributing to a new relationship with money among some 
peoples in the peripheries. For instance, as the historian Cherry Leonardi argues, in 
the 1930s and 1940s women were increasingly using courts in Equatoria Province to 
‘define and enforce their rights in relation to the labour and other duties of their 
husbands’. And, ‘in so doing, they were reinforcing the role of the chiefs’ courts in 
mediating the changing relations and ideas of rights generated by the colonial 
economy’.353 And as the anthropologist Sharon Hutchinson notes, divorce rates 
‘nearly tripled’ between 1936 and 1983’.354 These patterns reflect other instances 
when changes in tax policies resulted in changes that impacted the daily life for 
people under British occupation. For instance, Michael Tuck argues that similar 
trends also emerged in colonial Uganda. Whereby bridal dowries were impacted, as 
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Importantly, this also emerges as one of the few instances in which British 
administrators comment on the gender implications of a tax policy that was 
exclusively gendered as male throughout British occupation. For instance, poll taxes 
were collected by men on other men, not women; indeed, in Nuba Mountains the 
Governor struck down the idea of taxing women on account of the additional 
administrative effort it would take, since it would require enumerating a larger number 
of people.356 Meanwhile, tribute was assessed on a group basis that a male chief or 
sheikh or omda determined. Similarly, government backed customary authorities and 
members of the state were male.  
 
This is despite the fact that the imposition of taxes along stark gendered lines likely 
impacted household dynamics. For instance, Michael Tuck also notes that in colonial 
Uganda, even though men were taxed women ‘bore the burden of growing the new 
crops’. Thus women had a vastly increased workload while Tuck argues men had 
control over the household budget and also sought wage employment and ‘were 
more integrated into the expanding cash economy’. Likewise, Tuck also argues that 
the push for monetisation also contributed to increased criminality in British occupied 
Uganda and also led to some men not seeking marriage so as to avoid the hut tax 
altogether.357 The question of whether and how these dynamics manifested in the 
Condominium did not emerge in this dissertation’s review; however, they would 
benefit from further study.  
 
Returning to the role of courts and monetisation, courts also served as a kind of 
bureau de change through which traditional social life was to some degree 
monetised. Similarly, Leonardi argues that chief courts might have been 
‘manipulated’ by younger men who might not have had high status and therefore 
could not afford bride wealth in cows. However, since some of these men could more 
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readily obtain cash-based wages to pay for marriage in cash rather than livestock, 
they might have used courts to escape having to pay bride-wealth in cows and to 
instead pay in cash.358  
 
Indeed, Parr also recognised the complex ways in which money among some tribes 
in Equatoria Province could be obtained, which were not solely through labour. For 
instance, among some Dinka sub-clans when settling debts in court, if a calf was 
demanded but one was not available ‘substitutes’ were found. This could include a 
calf from the future dowry of a ‘marriageable female relative’ but it could also include 
goats, ‘agricultural produce, or perhaps, in [agricultural] hoes’.359 Though this 
example is related to court payments, it usefully provides evidence of the challenges 
that some British officials experienced in applying a tax regime to peoples that did 
not necessarily construct value or define or conceptualise money in the same terms 
as the British.  
 
This was possible ‘because there was an established relationship between classes 
of animals, tins of grain, girls, hoes and spears’, which was ‘expressed in units of 
things, based on one goat being one thing’. As a result, higher courts recorded rulings 
in ‘things’ and then had to figure out how the payment could be made in the agreed 
upon ‘unit’.360 And yet more nuanced understandings of the monetary and non-
monetary economies in the Condominium were not at all widespread and the search 
to impose monetisation through the collection of taxes in money persisted. Further, 
a significant justification for this continued search was to stimulate cash-crop 
cultivation or waged labour. Thus, taxes were crucial to the colonial economy not so 
much for their monetary value, but as the tool for generating exports and also building 
the infrastructure to generate these exports that were essential for government 
revenue.  
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Meanwhile, other vaguely anthropological or ethnographic ideas were essentially 
being warped to legitimate the subjugation of the peripheries. For example, the 1936 
‘Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into and Report on the Financial 
Position and System of Taxation of Kenya’ shaped considerations about whether poll 
taxes disrupted ‘the family unit’ in Sub-Saharan Africa.361 This document, which is 
usually referred in sources as the ‘Pym Report’, argued that poll taxes disrupted the 
‘sense of clan or family group responsibility’ in what the British understood as 
‘African’ societies.362  
 
Poll taxes were perceived as dangerous because they might push taxpayers to 
become primarily interested in their own tax obligations rather than those of the 
group. This adhered to the Perhamite logic of Africans as traditionally community 
oriented. But it also conveniently supported British arguments for governing through 
customary authorities. The year after the Pym Report was published, this thinking 
shaped British considerations around taxes in the Condominium and also contributed 
to the perspective that poll taxes should be abolished.  
 
Importantly, this impacted parts of what are now South Sudan, Darfur and Kordofan 
the hardest as these were the main parts of the peripheries where poll taxes were 
levied. For instance, the Equatoria Province Annual Report for 1937 questioned the 
applicability of the individual poll tax in the province on the grounds that individual 
taxes were ‘described as dangerous by the Pym report on East Africa’. The Equatoria 
Province Annual Report consequently suggests shifting direct taxes away from 
individual assessment towards the ‘family or clan wherever such organisations have 
survived the upheavals of the years 1850-1900 [the years in which the slave trade 
impacted Equatoria]’.363 
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Thus, from 1937 until the final year of closed district policies in 1946, the British 
renegotiated how taxes fitted within these traditionalising and modernising tensions. 
Akin to the Pym Report, poll and hut taxes and paid labour were suspect among 
some British administrators as they were thought to privilege the individual over the 
group. But as there was not a universal legislative basis for this throughout the 
Condominium, administrators borrowed from what had taken place in other parts of 
the territory.  
 
These changes to how taxes were collected also held implications for government 
chiefs and sheikhs. The British intended for the function of customary authorities to 
act as a kind of shepherd within the unit or group, ensuring that it did not fall apart or 
drastically change, which again drew on Lugardian and Perhamite theories of indirect 
rule. This function extended to how customary authorities were to collect taxes, to 
ensure principles of fairness were embedded. For example, an Equatoria Province 
Annual Report adds that the point of taxes was largely political and non-monetary 
and essentially about fostering a sense of fairness and community:  
 
‘The object [of taxes] is ultimately to educate the people into 
appreciating that the rich should pay more tax than the poor, by leaving 
the division between individuals to the elders of the tribes 
themselves’.364 
 
Similar discourses persisted into the middle of the 1940s and were reflected 
throughout the Condominium and not just in Equatoria. For instance, the Financial 
Secretary wrote to the Governor of Darfur in 1944 and noted that another strong 
educational motive for transitioning people from poll taxes to tribute was to introduce 
a fairer tax system:  
 
 







‘This [poll tax] implied inequalities of taxation amongst individuals within 
the unit (a very hard principle to inculcate after years of equal individual 
poll tax) and also implied that the rich man – whether pensioner, soldier, 
policeman or merchant ought to help his community to pay their taxes 
and thus relieve his poorer brothers of some of the burden’365 
 
Nor was the idea that poll tax unfairly taxed rich and poor alike and was therefore 
regressive, or unfairly imposed on poorer individuals or groups, relegated to Darfur. 
It was also evident in other parts of the peripheries and contributed to the push to 
eradicate them. For example, in 1944 the Governor of Kordofan argued that poll tax 
had a ‘peculiar nature’ which was that it was a ‘flat-rate tax on rich and poor alike’.366 
Of course, the tax had been legislated since 1925, so it is revealing that nearly 20-
years later these considerations were only just being raised. This, of course calls into 
question the extent to which the British really understood how taxes were collected 
in these regions.  
 
Meanwhile, in 1944 the Financial Secretary wrote to the Governor of Darfur, who was 
similarly trying to transition the region from poll taxes to tribute much as his 
counterparts were in Equatoria and Kordofan. In this communication the Financial 
Secretary recalled that the main justification for transitioning taxpayers in Equatoria 
was to ‘uphold the corporate unit’ rather than the individual:  
 
‘From my memory of Equatoria the whole idea of introducing tribute was 
to get away from individual poll tax and to impose a corporate 
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At this point, even as the Condominium was supposedly shifting towards a more 
‘modern’ system of Local Government Councils, it was reverting to the earliest and 
ostensibly most rudimentary form of taxation in the peripheries. Indeed, following the 
Pym Report’s example, in 1938 the Governor of Equatoria pushed for the wholesale 
transition of direct taxes of the province onto tribute. But as there was no legislative 
basis for this, the Governor requested permission from the Civil Secretary to follow 
measures that had taken place in Kordofan and Darfur Provinces.368 This notably 
included the 1922 Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance and subsequent amendments 
to the policy.  
 
The imperial logic of ‘dangers’ of personalised poll taxes, labour and British notions 
of tribe also filtered into efforts to transition Equatoria from poll taxes to tribute. In 
words that could have been penned by Margery Perham rather than a British 
administrator in the province, 1939 the Yei District Commissioner wrote to the 
Governor of Equatoria Province that:  
 
‘The individualising factors of personal poll tax and personal wages had 
begun to operate against the old tribal community spirit. Is it surprising 
that since they have been purposely taught that personal labour is a 
commodity, they should shirk the imposition and exaction of such labour 
unremunerated?’369 
 
Here, ‘individualism’ was demonised largely because it meant labourers were 
unwilling to work without pay. Tradition, in this British official’s relatively ahistorical 
imagination, meant that money consciousness was new and undesirable as it meant 
Sudanese were more likely to demand money for their services. Indeed, in the less 
frequent application of military force to get people in the peripheries to ‘submit’, the 
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British increasingly needed to deploy other methods to motivate people to meet their 
demands. And money, which the British could more closely regulate, was the way 
selected to achieve this.370  
 
Despite the ways in which monetisation appeared at odds with how people in parts 
of the peripheries actually lived, and British uncertainties about whether monetisation 
was indeed beneficial, monetisation efforts persisted. Crucially, the British could also 
control the money supply in ways that were more straightforward than other types of 
currencies, which increased their capacity to monitor and control the territories they 
occupied.371 In sum, the tax policies that resulted from these ideas paradoxically 
meant that even as closed districts explicitly sought to protect British ideas of racial 
and tribal purity in the peripheries, they had a surprisingly unified approach to 
governing these areas. This now meant ensuring that the ‘group’ rather than the 
‘individual’ was the fundamental building block of how Native Administrations 
functioned.  
 
Even if these logics were at odds with local conceptions of money or even where 
customary authorities derived their legitimacy from, they were imposed in order to 
expand social control over the peripheries. Taxes essentially continued to serve as 
the glue to recombine the traditional in the peripheries to suit colonial logics of 
domination and subordination. These priorities overshadowed all others, including 
the financial gain that could have been acquired from taxes, which the next section 
illustrates in more detail.  
 
Part 3: Taxes, Labour and Expanding State Control 
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In line with Margery Perham and Frederick Lugard’s theories of indirect rule, taxes 
were also couched in related discourses about the need to ‘civilise’ or ‘modernise’ 
people by increasing their participation in the labour economy. An obvious 
inconsistency within this logic was that closed district ordinances limited the flow of 
people and of goods that might have expanded economic opportunities. 
Nevertheless, a notable feature of the increasingly unified logics of economic control 
under the guise of protection was that tax policy throughout Sudan’s peripheries 
drew upon a shared thinking that linked taxes to agricultural production.  
 
These efforts emphasised crop cultivation on the group rather than the individual 
basis so as to adhere to the prevailing logics explored in the previous section. And, 
in addition to supposedly being more acceptable for these communities, it was also 
conveniently easier for the British to monitor cotton production through customary 
authorities who were charged with collecting taxes on behalf of the group. Taxes 
effectively became an integral component of a top-down strategy to realign economic 
production in the Condominium’s peripheries under the guise of British ideas of 
tradition and modernity.  
 
Given these seemingly duelling objectives to modernise and maintain tradition, some 
of the suggestions for maintaining the group while also modernising through markets 
are likely to appear curiously socialist to a contemporary audience.  Nevertheless, 
historians of Africa have commented on the ways in which ‘individualism’ was the 
‘antithesis of indirect rule’.372 Indeed, Joey Power argues that in colonial Malawi, 
indirect rule was intended to ‘thwart class formation’ and that mass political 
dissatisfaction could somehow be channelled into cooperatives and rural 
administration.373 Likewise, the Mongalla Province Handbook for 1934 suggests 
introducing ‘cooperatives trading schemes’, which were to be headed by chiefs:  
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It is possible that a system of cooperative trading under which chiefships 
would form cooperative societies with their local shops, supplied and 
supervised from a central depot at Juba might prove a satisfactory 
solution, the more so as such a scheme would be extremely consonant 
with the communal outlook of the African and would have a high 
educative value...374 
 
These cooperative trading schemes did not take off. But this example nevertheless 
highlights the experimental nature that defined efforts to modernise and traditionalise 
the peripheries through market participation. It also underscores the extent to which 
British administrators had diffuse perspectives on what today might be called local 
economic development in these regions.  
 
Despite the vagaries of these ideas they nevertheless became an important indicator 
for whether a region should be transitioned from poll taxes to tribute. For instance, in 
1944 the Governor of Kordofan Province wrote to the Financial Secretary and argued 
that an area should be transitioned to tribute once it was more economically 
advanced:  
 
‘It seems to me that if any Poll Tax area has advanced economically to 
the stage where exemptions have become meaningless, impracticable 
or anomalous, it is for consideration whether that areas should be put 
onto a different tax basis – e.g. Tribute’.375 
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Economic advancement in the context of taxes in the 1930s and 1940s notably 
included cash crop cultivation and cotton cultivation in particular.376 And exemptions 
were only applied if the taxpayer was not cultivating. This was made explicit in the 
Financial Secretary’s note to the Governor of Equatoria Province that argued tribute 
was a more desirable tax to push people onto in order to encourage cultivation:  
 
‘The justification for exemption [from Poll Tax] for the most part was 
based on the ability or otherwise to cultivate or the ownership of 
animals. Poll Tax was in fact a substitute, convenient in its assessment 
and collection, for the tax paid under the Animal Tax and Ushur 
Ordinance. We have departed from that concept now; in most districts 
we have substituted an assessed form of tribute which in intention is a 
form of income tax on general wealth, and not the particular wealth that 
comes from the cultivation of crops or possession of animals, though 
this must still form the greater part of wealth’.  
 
There is therefore little justification for the present exemptions 
particularly as the proviso that the person exempted does not cultivate 
is leading us into difficulties. We wish to encourage [emphasis original] 
cultivation by employees’.377  
 
But even prior to this announcement, throughout the Condominium’s peripheries 
there were attempts to introduce cash crops, with cotton largely emerging as the 
most popular type. For instance, there were efforts to introduce cassava in Bahr el-
Ghazal in the early 1930s, but these were largely unsuccessful. And, the Eastern 
District Notebook from 1935 wrote that:  
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‘From 1932 to 1935 we have been pushing cassava at the Dinkas, and 
they, the Dinkas, must be almost as sick of the words ‘Mabior Amol’ as 
we are, for many fines and terms of imprisonment have been incurred 
on its account, but at least we have it dispersed throughout the 
country... Although it’s the most obvious means for natives to procure 
their tax money, there’s never a year that we don’t have to send out 
Government police to hustle them up in bringing along the grain.’ 378 
 
Other reports from southern Sudan in 1944 acknowledge that there might have been 
additional reasons for the low levels of enthusiasm associated with cassava. For 
instance, there was a ‘general lack of keenness in planting this very useful crop’ in 
part because ‘elephants devour it’.379 This was despite British efforts to use it as a 
food crop during difficult years. This reflects a broader challenge that undermined 
other British efforts to encourage the cultivation of food crops as a means of obtaining 
tax revenue throughout the Sudan.  
 
In what was considered a more viable alternative to the struggles associated with 
crops that frequently failed to take, which also included coffee and dura, cotton was 
frequently pushed as a cash crop throughout the peripheries.380 Outside of the Gezira 
cotton growing scheme, cotton was attempted in Equatoria, Kassala, the Nuba 
Mountains, and Darfur. As the communications between the Governor of Equatoria 
and the Financial Secretary highlight, both tribute and poll taxes were part of 
discussions to foster the promulgation of cotton cultivation. And in parts of what are 
now South Sudan, poll taxes had been directly tied to cotton cultivation, which 
complicated the transition to tribute as taxpayers already had a system in place.  
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As a component of the efforts to link the direct taxes levied in the peripheries to cotton 
cultivation, the British were keen to maintain one type of tax rather than introduce a 
more complex tax regime or one that resembled the riverain north’s. In Mongalla, for 
example, ushur, which was a tax commonly applied in the north on the tenth of the 
profits from the sale of a crop, was not to be applied as it risked discouraging cotton 
cultivation. This was despite the fact that ‘no doubt ushur [was] the correct form of 
tax’, in large part because ushur was a tax on cultivation and some British officials 
still sought to model were the tax system in the peripheries on northern examples.381  
 
The mention of ushur as the ‘correct form of tax’ is notable as it highlights the 
overarching political concern to expand control over the majority of people in the 
peripheries instead of loosely modelling it on the north. In this example, the British 
were ultimately more concerned about maintaining a tax system that was relatively 
easy to monitor through cash crop cultivation instead of imposing a universally similar 
tax system in Sudan. This was essentially a top-down demand for control coached in 
the ostensibly benevolent language of modernity and tradition.  
 
Other calls to push cotton as the main cash crop to pay taxes illustrate how much 
Margery Perham’s theories of indirect rule resonated among British administrators, 
even if her ideas on fiscal decentralisation were largely not realised. For instance, the 
1937 Equatoria Province Annual Report notes that the ‘compulsory growing of cotton, 
or even any cash crop’ had an ‘educative and permanent value’. It adds that the 
British wanted cash crops to help teach the ‘need for money and what money will 
bring’ and that this only came with ‘a successful effort to get it [money]’.382  
 
As evidence of the enduring primacy of social control over fiscal decentralisation, 
there are further indications that despite these theoretical objectives, the money 
raised from cotton cultivation in the Condominium’s peripheries was often paltry. 
Indeed, at times it barely raised enough to pay taxes, let alone any other goods or 
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services that could be bought with money.383 In contrast to how cotton was 
introduced in Equatoria, in Kassala, the decision to switch to cotton cultivation in the 
1930s was in part because of changes to how the British collected tribute that 
aggressively ‘neutralised two good years’ of dura crops. Dura [sorghum] is a food 
crop and therefore served a dual function as both a potential monetary crop that 
could be taxed but also one that could feed communities as and when necessary. 
But British taxes in the region had eradicated any monetary gain to be had from 
selling the crop.  
 
The events were the result of policies pursued in the late 1920s, when the British had 
levied excessive taxes in Kassala just as economic conditions deteriorated among 
some members of the Hadendowa, which are traced in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
The British eventually acknowledged their culpability in these events and stated taxes 
on dura had ‘led, undeniably, to economic and administrative disaster’.384 
Consequently, the British declared that cotton that was cultivated in the Tokar and 
Gash deltas would be the chief revenue sources in the province.385  
 
But this was not the only response to the budding realisation among some British 
administrators that taxes had the potential to drastically shape economic and political 
futures in the province. The British also discussed whether, and how, to tax animals, 
even though this was a deeply unpopular and difficult practice among many nomadic 
and semi-pastoral peoples in the Condominium. These challenges also supported 
the decision to introduce cotton as a crop on the basis that it could be cultivated 
collectively.   
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But, as previous chapters illustrate, animals in particular continued to plague British 
tax collection efforts even though they were a widespread source of income in 
Sudan’s peripheries, since they could be sold when needed. Indeed, as the British 
learned in Darfur in 1921, taxing animals could lead to rebellion and by the mid-1920s 
in Red Sea and Kassala, taxing livestock heavily resulted in devastating economic 
conditions. Meanwhile, throughout the first three decades of British occupation of 
parts of the Zeraf Valley in Upper Nile Province, taxing cows in part contributed to 
military action between upset taxpayers and the British. Moving away from taxing 
animals was therefore a sensible strategy of appeasement in order to deepen control 
over the territory. But it also gave rise to the question as to what else the British could 
tax, which contributed to attempts to monetise through agricultural production.  
 
Indeed, the persistent difficulties of taxing animals in the peripheries were so extreme 
that Paul James Sandison, an Assistant District Commissioner in Kassala, questioned 
the entire applicability of direct taxes after these calamitous events. Sandison stated 
that he felt torn by the imposition of taxes as on ‘one hand’ he felt that direct taxes 
were a ‘mistake’ in this territory given its economic hardships. Sandison added that:  
 
‘[T]he vast bulk of the English pay no direct taxation, and never had 
done’ but still managed to ‘preserve their allegiance to the state without 
the anthropologist-Perhamite device of an ‘acknowledgement tax’.386  
 
While on the other he recognised that in light of economic pressures that confronted 
the district, particularly in the build-up to World War II, ‘the government will need 
every penny it can get’.387 The latter is one of only a few examples that emerged 
during the 1930s and 1940s that linked taxes to national budgetary considerations, 
even if direct tax contributions to the national budget fell by over 50% during this 
same timeframe.  
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Part of the unique focus on national budgetary considerations is likely influenced by 
Kassala’s proximity to Italian-occupied parts of Abyssinia. The British eventually used 
a military force drawn from members of the Hadendowa, which they called ‘Frosty 
Force’, after a British nickname for a Hadendowa chief, to act as a military buffer 
between the two territories during the war.388 These geopolitical and national 
budgetary considerations aside, this passage is also pertinent for the ways in which 
it continues to underscore the ambivalence that some British officials felt towards the 
multifarious aims of direct taxes in the peripheries.  
 
Indeed, Sandison’s comment also reflects a conscious modelling of the territory’s tax 
system on the British imagination of the UK tax system. Nevertheless, some of the 
assumptions that Sandison made about British taxes were incorrect or questionable. 
For instance, though the individual tax burden of direct taxes is difficult to ascertain 
and often targeted more affluent Britons, direct taxes had been levied in the England 
well into the 18th century.389 Some of the error in Sandison’s assumption might also 
come down to the shifts in how direct taxes were levied in the England. Indeed, 
debates on direct taxes in England considerably varied even when they were levied 
in the early 19th century.390 This observation highlights that the confusion over the tax 
regimes has long been a factor in the UK and is not limited to British overseas 
territories such as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.  
 
In a sense, since pacification was more or less complete in the peripheries in the 
1930s and 1940s, taxes gave rise to an internal questioning among the British 
administration. Now that the British effectively occupied the peripheries, the larger 
consideration as to what to do with the people within them emerged. This is distinct 
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from the first 30-years of British occupation where logics of submission between the 
British-led state and customary authorities, rather than the majority of taxpayers, 
predominated. Critically, however, the idea of modernising or civilising through taxes 
belied how little British administrators such as Sandison understood about how taxes 
were actually assessed by customary authorities.  
 
Indeed, for the first time, taxes emerged as one of the most significant ways that 
British administrators performed a variation on what the political scientist Christian 
Lund usefully refers to as ‘stateness’.391 In a sense, evidence from these years 
illustrate that the British state was often collecting taxes performatively both to 
taxpayers and to British administrators in the peripheries. This was to convince 
taxpayers to pay taxes to help construct a modern Sudanese state, even though the 
terms of modernity were narrowly defined by the British and the privileges of 
belonging were largely confined to customary authorities. No less significantly, similar 
logics appeared to have been relevant to members of the British administration to 
perpetuate the notion that they were occupying Sudan to redress what they had 
labelled as a deficiency in the region. According to this thinking, people in the 
peripheries needed to be coded as ‘traditional’ or ‘primitive’ to legitimate the British 
presence in the region.  
 
Moreover, British policy during these years effectively points towards a preference 
towards cordoning people in the peripheries into what was effectively a liminal state 
between British ideas of modernity and tradition. Sudanese in the peripheries were 
adequately modern so as to begin learning the value of money and what money would 
bring, presumably for the first time, but sufficiently primitive to still need to be guided 
by a government selected customary authority. They were also, to British eyes, 
sufficiently simple so as to not mind the transition to a new form of government 
backed customary authority. But the memory of state-backed force in propelling 
these dynamics between customary authorities and government and between 
 







customary authorities and their people, to paraphrase Evans-Pritchard, was 
conveniently forgotten by the British.  
 
And yet somehow, Margery Perham and Frederick Lugard, and quite a number of 
contemporary scholars effectively argued that a kind of fiscal social contract would 
be triggered by taxes. However, this seems unlikely given how taxes were actually 
collected, which the final chapter explores in more detail. More realistically, the 
closest thing that seemed to resemble a social contract around taxes took place 
between British administrators and local elites who became government chiefs or 
sheikhs.  
 
Moreover, the contract seemed to amount to little more than authority could 
essentially be bought and sustained through taxes with indifference about what this 
meant for people under a chief or sheikhs’ control so long as they paid their taxes. 
Without actual budgets that went beyond barely paying for the salaries of customary 
authorities it is unclear what value the state really posed for the majority of people in 
the peripheries other than something to try and somehow subvert to their own ends. 
Meanwhile, rather than recognise this dynamic or try and meaningfully change it, on 
the whole the administration decided to continue performing tax collection rather than 
interrogate the questionable foundations of the endeavour they were engaged in. 
 
In the 1940s, the debates about transitioning from poll tax, and ushur where it was 
still levied, to tribute continued to advance. These discussions among British 
administrators were unified in their intention to ensure that tribute did not interfere 
with animal ownership, as in Kassala, or with cotton cultivation, which was to become 
the primary cash crop for paying taxes if the British could have their way. And, social 
control, rather than revenue raising or power sharing between the centre and the 
peripheries, was the prevailing logic.  
 
As in Kassala and Equatoria Provinces these debates eventually transitioned to a 







peripheries. Whereas, in reality it was a reversion to an archaic form of taxation that 
had been applied at the start of the Condominium and would have been far from any 
other concepts of an income tax in other contexts. For instance, in 1944 the Governor 
of Upper Nile Province acknowledged that in most districts of the province tribute 
was introduced as:  
 
‘a form of income tax on general wealth, and not the particular wealth 
that comes from the cultivation of crops or possession of animals, 
though this must still form the greater part of wealth’.392  
 
These developments marked a broader transition in how the British used taxes to 
experiment with different ideas about how to govern Sudan’s peripheries. At the start 
of British rule, they were integral to ensuring people had ‘submitted’ to government. 
But as pacification campaigns wrapped up in the 1920s, they were increasingly tied 
to regulation. However, by the 1930s and 1940s taxes were a vital tool for social and 
economic transformation that was still subordinated to the British state’s desire to 
control the peripheries.  
 
Meanwhile, to paraphrase James C. Scott, the collective cultivation of goods that 
required labour over a long timeframe, as well as taxes levied on these cultivation 
efforts, continued to help make the peripheries ‘legible’ to the state. And, even as 
British attempts to transition people in Sudan’s peripheries from poll taxes to tribute 
were diffuse, the overarching aim of using taxes to force people into labour and taxes 
were distinct efforts to coercively impose order on these regions and compel people 
to produce cash crops for the export economy, even if it came at the expense of 












Part 4: Escaping ‘Implied Tyranny’ via the State 
 
Even as the British strengthened their grip on the peripheries through efforts to 
control customary authorities and the people these officials oversaw, some taxpayers 
in the peripheries found innovative ways to avoid the state’s efforts to control. This 
notably emerged by obtaining exemptions by working for the state, which in some 
instances granted exemptions from taxes, rather than adhering to British ideas of 
tradition that privileged chiefship, shiekhship and kinship structures. This section 
explores British reports of how Sudanese taxpayers in Equatoria implicitly critiqued 
or navigated these changes to how taxes were defined and collected.  
 
Strikingly, it also illustrates some of the unexpected ways they managed to flee the 
deepening control of the tax regime by participating with it. However, this analysis is 
restricted to Equatoria Province owing to limited number of other sources that 
reported on what would, by some accounts, have been failures of these policies. Even 
if drawn from a limited geographical scope, they nevertheless raise compelling 
questions about the impact that these increasingly repressive tax policies had on 
relations between people and government that would otherwise be absent.  
 
Indeed, cash-crop cultivation was claimed by some Sudanese as a type of forced 
labour and money consciousness was also undermined by the undesirability of the 
very things that could be purchased with money. For instance, in 1939 in Meridi in 
Equatoria even when cotton growing was ‘encouraged but not compulsory’:  
 
‘Originally every taxpayer had to grow at least 1⁄2 acre, and cultivation 
etc carefully supervised – “but this constant ‘prodding’ of the people 
evoked a general distaste for the whole crop which has not yet been 
outgrown. To the people’s mind cotton is a Government ‘forced 
labour’... This distaste grew up when money and the things that money 








People [are] now more money-conscious – cotton should be 
encouraged as the only viable cash crop’.393  
 
As this example illustrates, British efforts to monetise through cash crops sometimes 
failed to produce any money beyond that which could be used to pay taxes. So, while 
the British notion of money consciousness might have emerged among some 
taxpayers through the cultivation of cash crops, it was one that frequently associated 
crops such as cotton as a type of ‘forced labour’. However, as Tosh notes, the failure 
of cash crops in what is now South Sudan is not solely attributable to these types of 
complaints. Tosh notes that transport costs were higher since the southern region 
was a net importer of food from the north throughout most of the timeframe between 
1930 and 1953. As a consequence, the price of food was much higher, which meant 
that the revenue from cotton cultivation stretched even thinner than it might have 
already done.394   
 
For other taxpayers, even in the face of closed district ordinances that limited the 
travel of individuals into other parts of Sudan or neighbouring countries it made more 
sense to migrate to other districts to earn higher wages. For instance, the 1939 Juba 
District Annual Report notes that though there was ‘plenty of local labour’, some 
individuals:  
 
‘[…] sought work outside the district, at the Lure mines, Juba and Torit. 
A certain small amount was employed regularly at Iwatoka [...] It still 
appears that these migrations are stimulated not only by the need to 
earn tax money but also by the desire to avoid the numerous 
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unremunerated services which are required of them by the 
Government.”   395 
 
This highlights related contradictions about whether and how imposing taxes could 
introduce the ‘Perhamite device of an acknowledgement tax’ that bound people to 
the state without the provision of any sort of public services in exchange for taxes. 
That same year the District Commissioner of Yei District in Equatoria Province 
provided additional evidence for how British tax policies were undermining these 
efforts when writing to the Governor of the province:  
 
“It is undoubtedly the imposition of these unremunerated services that 
is stimulating migration. Juba, Lure, Torit and central Uganda are full of 
Yei citizens, seeking for work or now settled there. In migration they have 
found a means of escape. The labour, exacted at home as a supertax, 
they find convertible to their own uses – drink and clothes. Those who 
remain at home are alone available for the Chief’s governmental 
demands.”396 
 
Labour migration also included travel to neighbouring Uganda, even though 
movement was restricted and monitored by chiefs owing to efforts to limit sleeping 
sickness between the two countries. For instance, the same report noted that ‘[a] 
British recruiter from Uganda drew 500 men from Yei district’.397 Moreover, in order 
to migrate people had to have paid their taxes to chiefs who then granted travel 
passes, which meant that customary authorities had the authority to determine who 
could travel to Uganda and benefitted from taxing migration.398  
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As illustrated in the first section of this chapter, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, 
direct taxes almost exclusively funded the salaries for customary authorities and 
other types of emoluments. This was opposed to linking taxes to the delivery of 
notionally public or state-provided services, which were provided by missionary 
societies rather than the state in parts of the territory such as the southern provinces. 
Moreover, as Native Treasuries were not extensively developed during this time, even 
if they raised enough taxes, there was little ability for customary authorities to devote 
tax revenues towards public services in the first place.  
 
And even if the state attempted to increase the extent to which direct taxes funded 
any type of public service, some officials still had a very limited insight into how direct 
taxes were collected by government chiefs and sheikhs. The limited extent to which 
British officials understood how taxes were practically assessed by traditional 
authorities was highlighted by the Juba District Commissioner in 1940:  
 
‘All are supposed to be on tribute in theory but [it is] difficult to find out 
how it is working in practice. Do clans really assess all members 
irrespective of whether they are on the tax lists or not? Probably a few 
chiefs see that this is done.’ 399 
 
The same file acknowledges that there was evidence that taxes were being unfairly 
levied, which contributed to complaints to the British:  
 
‘[Because] there have been a few complaints by police, dressers and 
other Government paid servants possibly it [tax assessment through 
clans] is gradually taking place. I would like to see a much stronger line 
taken and not have any Government paid persons excused [from taxes]. 
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In fact every one as soon as he has reached tax paying age should [be] 
listed and only those excused who are exempted by the clans etc. Surely 
this is allowing the Native Administration to regulate its own affairs. They 
know better than we do who should be and who shouldn’t be 
excused”.400  
 
As this passage illustrates, in addition to limited financial oversight, some officials 
were unclear about how much independence Native Administrations should have in 
the first place. These types of uncertainties contributed to a series of communiques 
among British officials to try and establish the basis for how taxes were to be 
assessed by customary authorities, including how exemptions were determined.  
 
More significantly, government employees were immune from paying tribute and poll 
taxes. Government employment was broadly defined as individuals who were ‘in 
direct receipt of pay or pension from the Sudan and Egyptian Governments provided 
they do not cultivate or possess animals’. This did not include ‘daily or monthly paid 
labourers not permanently employed and ex-soldiers and ex-policemen’ and it also 
did not extend to ex-soldiers or ex-policemen who had been convicted under the 
Sudan Penal Code. Traders who held a licence were also exempted.401  
 
In addition to more straightforward government employment, exemptions were also 
granted to teachers and students. Akin to salaried and pensioned government 
employees, teachers and students in mission schools were also free from the tax, so 
long as the former did not ‘cultivate or possess animals’. Any of the latter who were 
in a ‘non wage earning capacity for over six months in the year and were not taxable 
before they entered the school’.402  
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Given these strictures that notably excused people who were either not able-bodied, 
too young, or in education from paying taxes the most reliable path to obtaining a tax 
exemption was through government employment. This had tremendous implications 
for what the idea of government might have practically meant in the lives of people in 
the Condominium’s peripheries that drastically contrasted with British aspirations for 
what direct taxes could achieve.  
 
For instance, the opportunity to acquire a tax exemption motivated people to apply 
for government employment in Equatoria. And this, according to the Governor of the 
province, was a deeply worrying development. Indeed, in a blunt note to the Financial 
Secretary in 1946, the Governor of Equatoria Province, B.V. Marwood, used the 
following vivid example to illustrate how people were drawn to government to escape 
taxes to his immense displeasure. The example concerns recruits from the resident 
populace applying to government administration. These recruits were sitting for the 
1945 Special Entry Examination into government administration and were asked the 
following essay question: ‘would you rather work for the Government or a merchant 
at 15% higher wages’? 403  
 
The recruits’ answers disturbed Governor Marwood and triggered broader 
discussions among the British administration about exemptions in the province. 
Marwood vividly commented on the recruits’ answers and his views on it in the 
following passage:  
 
‘All but two of some 40 candidates voted for Government Service and 
nearly all for the same reasons which were as follows:- The usual 
reasons were given in favour of Government employment – security of 
tenure, small but assured pay, sick benefits, housing, pension etc. But 
the most striking and deplorable reason given in favour of Government 
 








employment was the fact that it meant freedom from the chiefs and from 
the obligation to pay Poll Tax’.404   
 
Marwood then argued that this was an indication that government selected traditional 
authorities were engaged in despotic tax collection practices:  
 
‘Employment by Government meant an escape from the implied tyranny 
of the chiefs and a throwing off of all tribal loyalties and obligations. The 
Government Official joined a special privileged class which owed service 
and obedience only to its particular departmental superiors but that 
service did not appear to extend beyond the office and, in the general 
rejoicing at not having to pay taxes, any idea that he had any duty to 
perform for the general good seemed to have been forgotten’.405 
 
Though more research is needed to study the extent to which chiefs had become 
despotic owing to their power to collect taxes, this example of ‘tyrannical’ chiefs also 
resonated in other parts of the peripheries. For instance, Chris Vaughan argues similar 
accounts of despotism emerged in Darfur and Justin Willis reports of the same 
dynamics among the Dar Kababish in large parts of northern Kordofan.406 Nor was 
this unique to Sudan: Leigh Gardner argues such outcomes were widely found 
throughout British occupied territories in Africa and personal enrichment was a 
‘motivating factor in instances of financial malfeasance’. Gardner adds that this might 
have even allowed the colonial state to leverage these practices to their advantage 
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Meanwhile in the Condominium, the idea that anyone would  ‘rejoice at not having to 
pay taxes’ was so troubling to the British administration that it led to collective head 
scratching among British officials. This eventually culminated in a meeting of all the 
District Commissioners in Equatoria Province in February 1946. During this meeting 
participants echoed Marwood’s concern with the following pronouncement:   
 
‘[E]xemption from payment of Poll Tax or Tribute by a salaried 
Government servant etc. who thus tended to regard himself as a 
member of a privileged class free from any obligations to his Chief, 
community or tribe. We regarded this as a most deplorable trend which 
should be counteracted’.408 
 
Marwood went on to report that the District Commissioner of Eastern District in 
Equatoria Province suggested removing all exemptions to prevent this behaviour. 
Moreover, the ability to fall outside of the chief or other traditional authority’s remit 
was said to have caused a ‘bad psychological effect on the man who is exempted’. 
This was because he tended ‘to regard himself as entirely outside the law, particularly 
if his employment is only indirectly under the Government’.409  
 
Vivid as Marwood’s claims were, they further underscore how changes to the ways 
in which taxes were assessed in the 1930s and 1940s were almost exclusively about 
social control in Equatoria. According to this logic, taxpayers were not to join the 
state; they were explicitly to be subordinated to customary authorities who then 
reported to government. In Marwood’s estimation this meant that the non-taxpayer 
essentially became a ghost in the eyes of the state, which was especially troubling 
for the British administration.  
 
 









Marwood bluntly stated as much when noting the ‘unitentionally [sic] far-reaching 
results of the exemption, which provide that a man whose name is not registered for 
any civic duties at all’.410 This included some of the non-monetary roles that taxes 
played, such as electoral rolls and acting as a type of census. He suggested that the 
‘trouble begins’ when an individual was exempted from paying the tax as it resulted 
in them being ‘cut off from his tribe and environment’.411 
 
Marwood was also concerned that exemptions would poison the minds of the 
everyday taxpayer and go against his imagination of taxes that linked poll taxes and 
tribute perform the function of Margery Perham’s idea of an ‘acknowledgement tax’. 
Marwood noted that he ‘[held] strongly, with Miss Majory [sic] Pehram, that great 
importance should be attached to an acknowledgement tax of suvereignity [sic] by 
the ordinary individual’.412 And he went headfirst into the claim that poll taxes were 
unfair with the following statement:  
 
‘I reject as inapplicable in Equatoria Lord Cromer’s dictum that “Poll 
Tax” is immoral as it is tantamount to taxing the individual for existing. It 
is in fact the one tax that is understood and is acceptable to the people 
of this Province in their present stage of development.413  
 
This represented a significant spanner in British plans to transition taxpayers in the 
peripheries from poll taxes to tribute. In Marwood’s eyes, taxpayers were too primitive 
to comprehend anything other than poll tax and this type of tax should therefore be 
maintained in the Condominium. In his estimation, poll taxes were necessary as they 
ensured that people understood their ‘civic duties’ to the group, and therefore 












Marwood feared that the ‘deplorable’ pattern of seeking government employment to 
avoid taxes would spread across the taxpayers in the province:  
 
‘The exemption does not extend to the individual unit head to 
contribute. This is where the trouble begins. The ordinary inhabitant 
himslef [sic] individually exempt. The unit head is in a far better position 
to pay than Pauper “B”. “A” [the exempted taxpayer] being encouraged 
in his individualistic out-look opposes the obligation laid on him by his 
tribal head and claims exemption under the aegis of “government 
employment”. […] It is this attitude which we must combat.414  
 
To support his assertions, Marwood drew upon a 1946 budget speech by the 
Financial Secretary in Kenya.415 This starkly outlined the British thinking of direct taxes 
across the African continent, which emphasised the challenges of dealing with 
‘backward communities’ who did not belong to the monetary economy. This 
characterisation of individuals in ‘backward communities’ was such that they required 
currency to only be used for ‘certain limited purposes’, which included taxes, farming 
equipment, clothes and other ‘simple requirements’.416 In this sense, the language of 
‘backward areas’ also becomes a proxy for the economic periphery, which was in 
part defined by falling outside of, either deliberately or because of exclusion from, the 




This chapter explored how the British used taxes to expand their control in the 
peripheries from customary authorities to the taxpayers customary authorities 
oversaw in four parts. The first illustrated how revenue was steadily centralised in the 
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central government in Khartoum as local governments relied on the central 
government for fiscal transfers. This emerged despite a few British officials calling for 
a local governments to retain a proportion of local revenue to be spent locally and 
giving the local government some control over their spending.  
 
Moreover, British official portrayal of their inability to control the ‘implied tyranny’ of 
some chiefs further exacerbated the deleterious impact of British policy towards the 
Condominium’s economic peripheries. This narrative also, of course, disguised the 
reality that official taxation was such a burden for some taxpayers that people went 
to great lengths to escape it. Much to some officials’ chagrin, the state emerged as a 
place for people to hide from both the labour associated with paying taxes and the 
tax burden itself. 
 
All the while, even as the British claimed that their taxes were modernising Sudan’s 
peripheries in the 1930s and 1940s, on terms of modernity that the British narrowly 
defined, they reverted to a collective tribute, which was a conservative tax that was 
largely imposed to maintain control through chiefs and kinship structures. This 
chapter also furthers one of this dissertation’s central arguments, which is that taxes 
continually were a key way in which the administration performed like a state. And, in 
some ways this performance of stateness appeared to be more important than the 
actual outcomes or impact taxes were having on Sudan’s peripheries. 
 
No less significantly, similar logics appeared to have been relevant to members of the 
British administration to perpetuate the notion that they were occupying Sudan to 
redress what they had labelled as a deficiency in the region. According to this 
thinking, people in the peripheries were coded as ‘traditional’ as well as ‘primitive’ to 
legitimate the British presence in the region. Crucially, as the next chapter illustrates 
how these dynamics continued to take shape, most notably by expanding to ideas 
about local government, in the final decade of British occupation held implications 
for conceptions of citizenship. It also greatly impacted the ways in which the state 







Chapter 4: Taxes, ‘Financial Bondage’ & Local 
Government, 1946-1956 
 
Despite the British rhetoric of the 1930s and 1940s that taxes could engender a sense 
of belonging to the state in Sudan’s peripheries, taxes effectively remained a tool for 
social control until and beyond the end of British rule in 1956. Indeed, even with the 
introduction of new local government legislation in 1951, prior modes of centralised 
control endured. Thus, as in previous decades, state power was highly concentrated 
in the riverain north while decentralisation continued to rely on government sheikhs 
and chiefs to control the peripheries. The centralisation of revenue was so acute that 
one report noted that the local governments of the peripheries were in ‘financial 
bondage’ to the central government.417  
 
This chapter explores the enduring legacy of taxes and decentralisation as tools for 
controlling the peripheries in two parts. The first briefly contrasts emerging Sudanese 
narratives on taxes and decentralisation with a more detailed study of how local 
government finances were controlled at the end of British occupation. As previous 
chapters illustrate, the overarching story of fiscal decentralisation in the 
Condominium is one of continuity rather than disruptive change.  
 
The second section of this chapter expands this analysis and weighs emergent 
Sudanese discourses on taxes in the final decade of British occupation. It illustrates 
that taxes also remained a tool for social control into independence even as 
contrasting discourses around taxation and citizenship emerged. This part of the 
chapter also considers how tax collection by customary authorities might have 
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Part 1: Local Governments at Independence 
 
The road to independence from British occupation was partially paved by the Sudan 
Administrative Conference that took place on 22 April 1946. Among other outcomes, 
the Conference advocated for ‘Sudanisation’, which meant replacing British 
administrators with Sudanese officials in preparation for independence, which was 
gradually being negotiated. This section analyses the discussions that took place 
over decentralisation during the final decade of British rule and illustrates that its role 
as a mode of social control persisted even when Sudanese officials took over.  
 
Sudanisation processes were in part ushered in via two sub-committees, one of 
which was on the central government while the other was on local government. On 
the former, the Conference suggested that Sudanese, rather than British officials, 
were to be better represented across the central government.418  The Conference also 
established a system of Parliamentary Government, including a Legislative Assembly, 
but this was largely comprised of urban elites from the riverain north. Civil servants, 
who were also almost exclusively northern, could even jointly serve as politicians in 
the Legislative Assembly, though the blurring between civil servants and politicians 
was unique to Sudan.  
 
The Legislative Assembly was exclusively granted the purview to ‘speak with an 
authority in the name of the whole Country’. This was despite the fact that peripheries 
had comparatively limited opportunities to participate in the election of Assembly 
members, particularly in the South: there were thirteen appointed representatives 
from southern Sudan and forty-seven individuals from the north at the Legislative 
Assembly’s inception.419  
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Meanwhile the civil service was also heavily manned by individuals from the northern 
riverain core rather than the peripheries. A 1980 survey on the home regions of civil 
servants who retired in 1970-1980 and constituted the main part of the civil service 
in the 1950s is illustrative of this imbalance. Of these, 86% were from Khartoum and 
riverain provinces and ‘only 8% were from Kordofan’.420 It is unclear where the 
remaining 6% were from. However, the northern riverain elites were no monolith. 
Indeed, C.R. Tripp notes that it was a ‘heterogenous elite’ which came from ‘a range 
of different families, clans, towns, sufi brotherhoods and socio-economic 
backgrounds’.421   
 
Just over a year later, in June 1947, the report of the Sudan Administration 
Conference was discussed in the Juba Conference in southern Sudan. This meeting 
was meaningful because it contributed to the end of Closed District Ordinances, 
which meant that restrictions on trade and movement were subsequently lifted that 
year. Vitally, it also concluded that the Southern Provinces would remain in Sudan 
and be represented by the Legislative Assembly. In addition to these substantial 
changes, in July 1947 Sudanese nationalists in the Assembly took an interest in taxes 
and argued that they should have the authority to reject legislation that notably 
included tax policy:  
 
‘[the Assembly] as from now, [should be granted the authority] to 
approve taxation in accordance with the well-known principle: “no 
taxation without representation”’.422  
 
Vitally, this statement represents the first-time taxation became a focus of nationalist 
politics. This rhetoric suggests a break from British considerations about taxes, which 
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as previous chapters illustrate, sought to manage or limit the impact of change in the 
peripheries while effectively subjugating these regions to the centre. Indeed, as other 
parts of this chapter indicate, local government finances were still very poorly 
understood by the British and local governments were largely reliant on fiscal 
transfers from the centre instead of being self-sustaining. And yet, the Legislative 
Assembly made this evocative claim despite any evidence that taxes had previously 
contributed to increased representation in Sudan; and, as this thesis illuminates, this 
was especially true in the peripheries. Likewise, there was still considerable 
uncertainty over how the taxes applied in the peripheries, which were tribute and poll 
and hut taxes, were defined and collected, which this section of the chapter illustrates 
continued into the end of British rule.  
 
What is also striking about this statement is that the Legislative Assembly was 
leveraging an ideal of taxation based on individual right to political representation, 
which widely diverged from the tax systems in the peripheries that reinforced 
collective subjugation under chiefs and other customary authorities. Two different tax 
systems were therefore being conceptualised: One for the north and another for the 
peripheries, which would hold potentially different implications for how citizenship 
would be conceived in different parts of the territory.  
 
Moreover, this is one example of how elected officials were performing like a state, 
again via what Christian Lund terms ‘stateness’, which was modelled on Western 
ideas or slogans related to the state and democratic ideals.423 As Richard Rathbone 
argues in colonial Ghana, the deployment of this kind of nationalist language might 
have been intended to appeal to British overseers of the Condominium so as to 
illustrate the territory’s preparedness for independence.424 Indeed, despite the 
Legislative Assembly’s statement, the national budget still remained largely under the 
Financial Secretary’s rather than the Legislative Assembly’s control for a few more 
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years. This endured until changes were introduced in the 1951 Local Government 
Act.425  
 
In further contrast to the concerns about taxes and representation raised by the 
Legislative Assembly in 1947, that same year the Financial Secretary still firmly 
maintained that taxes were a tool for social control in the peripheries. This was 
primarily mediated through a bond between people and a customary authority rather 
than between people and government:  
 
“[On] June 4 Governor Equatoria Province has […] point[ed] out that the 
exemption of salaried government official from payment of tax [sic] to 
having the official to regard himself as a member of a privileged class 
and insofar as taxation is way of tribute through tribal [means], free of 
any obligation to his chief, community or tribe. This [erosion] of tribal ties 
we regard a most deplorable trend which must be counteracted. 
Information as to the extent you consider exemption from taxation 
affects the tribal [authority would] be appreciated.426  
 
In 1947 the Civil Secretary replied to the Financial Secretary that:  
 
In Equatoria, even in so-called Tribute areas, a flat rate Poll Tax is 
collected and is the only thing that is understood by the people. […] 
 
Such persons [who obtain exemptions from poll tax or tribute] tend to 
regard themselves as a class apart from their tribe or local units. 
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Taxation is a tenuous but important bond and for social reasons it is 
advisable that all should be liable.427  
 
Thus, in 1947 taxes were linked to two contrasting notions of citizenship. Sudanese 
members of the Legislative Assembly, who would have roughly constituted a rising, 
primarily northern, elite, asserted that taxes linked government to people and 
enhanced representation. But for the remaining British administrators in southern 
Sudan, and the Sudanese officials who succeeded them, taxes were understood as 
a tool for linking people in the peripheries to ‘their tribe or local units’ rather than 
directly to government.428   
 
There were two ways in which these contrasting dynamics unfolded even as Sudan 
transitioned from British to Sudanese rule. The first, which explored in this part of the 
chapter, concerns decentralisation processes that fiscally maintained control in the 
central government instead of expanding it to the peripheries. This continued despite 
discussions that touched on the ‘evils of centralisation’.429 The next relates to how 
taxes were actually understood, or rather very poorly understood by the state, and 
how the state continued to rely on customary authorities to collect taxes in the 
peripheries. The latter is also salient because it contributed to centralisation and had 
implications for how taxes shaped burgeoning ideas of citizenship. These 
considerations are addressed in part two of this chapter. 
 
On the former, the 1951 legislation that sought to control how local governments 
functioned at the end of British occupation was largely based on the findings 
presented in a 1949 study of local government generated by Arthur Marshall. Marshall 
was a Treasurer to the Coventry City Council at the time who had been brought in by 
the still British-led government to review local government in Sudan along the lines 
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of the British local government system that was meant to be a model for Sudan.430 
This study was called the ‘Report on Local Government in the Sudan’ but was 
generally referred to as the ‘Marshall Report’. Marshall’s recommendations strongly 
echoed earlier ideas such as Douglas Newbold’s, who died in 1945 before the report 
was ‘unanimously adopted’ by the Legislative Assembly in 1949 and became law in 
the 1951 Local Government Ordinance.431  
 
Indeed, the main difference between Newbold’s suggestions and those in the 
Marshall Report and the 1951 Local Government Ordinance that it contributed to, 
was that Native Administrations were renamed Local Government. More importantly, 
the Marshall report also echoed Newbold’s identification of government finances as 
the main problem with local government in the country. According to the Marshall 
Report the most substantive problem was that there was a large variation in how 
native authorities were financed. Local governments were only unified only in their 
disarray. Given this disorder, the report provides insights into the extent to which 
local governments were financially autonomous prior to the introduction of the 1951 
Local Government Ordinance.  
 
For instance, some of this variation extended to whether and how native authorities 
had ‘separate budgets’, as separate budgets were only granted to native authorities 
if they were ‘deemed to be sufficiently advanced’. And, ‘advanced’ native 
administration budgets were those that detailed taxes and revenue ‘of a purely local 
kind’ against a list of the local expenses. Local expenses included native 
administration salaries and the ‘local services for which the native authority was partly 
responsible’, which primarily referred to courts. But direct taxes were not necessarily 
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linked to local expenditure although ‘a separate budget became the aim of every 
ambitious native authority’.432  
 
Ultimately, separate budgets, which were Marshall’s firm indication of whether a 
native administration had the authority to raise and spend its own revenues, also 
varied depending on whether the region was considered rural or urban. Rural councils 
raised far less locally derived revenue than councils in towns. As the last chapter also 
argued, Marshall found that the ‘finances of rural authorities were consequently 
complicated, and little understood even by the local authorities themselves’.433  
 
Rural councils therefore had less financial and political autonomy from the central 
government than urban councils as they raised less revenue. Poor financial 
management was used as a justification by the central government to expand its 
control over rural councils. Indeed, rural areas, which the state deemed ‘backward’ 
were subject to ‘even more stringent financial tutelage than with urban authorities’.434 
And, since they could not raise funds independently, rural authorities were ‘therefore 
dependent for their existence on receiving back, in one way or another, some of the 
proceeds of direct taxation, the collection of which they are the agents’.435 Or, in other 
words, rural authorities continued to deeply depend on the national government for 
revenue transfers.  
 
The evocative outcome was that local governments, in Marshall’s estimation, 
regarded themselves as being in ‘financial bondage to the state’.436 Though Marshall 
reported on the contours of this bondage in an accountant’s dry language, their 
salience remains. For instance, he lamented that revenue and expenditure from 
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different provinces in the territory did not necessarily correspond with what was 
collected or budgeted within each local government authority. This is despite the fact 
that local governments had very small budgets, which presumably would have been 
relatively easy to manage. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 3, local government expenses 
notably included salaries for customary authorities and local government staff such 
as police.437  
 
Marshall also noted that for most areas outside of southern Sudan, tribute was an 
important part of their local budgets.438  This finding is informative because the 
government’s efforts to transition people from poll taxes to tribute, which was a focus 
on the 1930s into the mid-1940s had largely succeeded only in areas of the periphery 
outside of the Southern provinces.  
 
Significantly, the 1951 Local Government Ordinance also resulted in a newly created 
office, the Assistant Civil Secretary for Local Government, which was located within 
the Civil Secretary’s Office and, in 1954 a Ministry of Local Government was created. 
By 1955, the Ministry of Local Government attempted to play a robust role in the 
finance systems of local governments including discussions on the risk of 
centralisation.439 This also broadly fell in line with the dynamics Alden Young 
describes during these years whereby Sudanese politicians and administrators 
‘accelerated the development of a national development strategy’. The explicit aim 
of this was to ensure their path to independence, but this notably precluded 
involvement from the peripheries, which were ‘[written] off’ as ‘risky and 
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strategy was notably devoid of a changed status of local governments, which 
remained tethered to the centre for financial control.  
 
For instance, in 1955 the Sudanese Director of the Ministry of Local Government, 
A.H. Abdulla, wrote to the Governor of Blue Nile Province and communicated his 
views on the essentials of ‘Local Govt. Financial System[s]’. Abdulla argued that a 
‘local government council is an autonomous body’ and that the Local Government 
Ordinance provided provisions for the levels of contribution between local 
governments and the national government. This also included the requirement that 
‘[e]very council […] render annually its Budget Estimates for approval by the Minister 
of Local Govt.’ According to this edict, the Ministry of Local Government had 
exclusive control over local budgets as ‘Local Govt. Councils [sic] Budgets are 
outside parliamentary control’.441  
 
Despite this attempt, rather than centralise authority over local government finances 
in the Ministry of Local Government, the decision was supported across government 
that Governors had the authority to ensure that taxes were unique to each province. 
Some of these debates notably touched on the ‘evils of centralization’, which echoed 
Marshall’s reports of local governments being in financial bondage to the centre, and 
permitted an ostensibly deconcentrated decision-making over some matters. For 
instance, the British Governor of Bahr el-Ghazal Province, T.R.H. Owen argued ‘with 
all humility’ that it ‘might be better in the long run to allow a Provincial Governor…to 
be the best judge of such details within the Province’.442  
 
An earlier statement from the Civil Secretary, J.W. Robertson, was used to bolster 
arguments for decentralised authority over revenue in Sudan’s peripheries. 
Robertson argued that ‘I personally do not believe that the law intended the Financial 
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Secretary to be the final arbiter or it would have said so, and I believe that the 
Governor is the best judge of what is needed locally’. He added that he understood 
that the Governor was the ‘real authority, otherwise the law would have given you (or 
we) the power. Our [the Civil and Financial Secretaries’] consent is presumably to be 
given to ensure that Governors behave reasonably’.443 This was supported by the 
1951 Local Government Ordinance, which noted that the ‘initiative and authority’ for 
reforms resided ‘in the hands of the local authorities and the Governor’.444 
 
Moreover, even as concerns about the financial bondage of local governments to the 
state were raised, the Sudanese inheritors of the Condominium government failed to 
redress this. Their excuse was that it would be too administratively onerous for the 
Parliament to ‘scrutinize’ Council Budgets. A sticking point was that the 1951 
Ordinance legislated that ‘the revenue side of any [local council] budget is approved 
only when related to the expenditure side of the budget’.445  
 
Confronted with this resistance, Abdulla continued his earlier attempts to centralise 
the decision making over local government finances in the Ministry of Local 
Government, which he oversaw. He expanded his argument by adding that oversight 
from the Legislative Assembly would indeed ‘add too much work on the parliament’ 
because there were 70 local government budgets to review. Moreover, local 
government budgets ‘exceed[ed] in volume and detail those of the Central 
Government’. Abdalla proposed that the way to overcome this was to have his office 
approve ‘all taxation and rating proposals submitted to him by councils without 
reference to the parliament’ [emphasis original].446  
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The final point Abdulla remarked upon was that the ‘golden rule in Local Government’ 
was that the ‘council be left free to tap every source of revenue to the utmost to 
enable it to render as much services as the locality will need’.447 However, as detailed 
in this chapter, the revenue that was generated in the peripheries was still largely 
limited to tribute and poll taxes. This is despite the Appropriation of Taxes Ordinance 
1954, which largely applied to the riverain north as the taxes detailed were: rainland 
Taxes (equivalent to ushur), animal taxes, entertainment taxes, land taxes and local 
rates.448 But in the peripheries, akin to earlier years of British occupation, the main 
taxes remained poll taxes and tribute, which were still primarily not levied for financial 
reasons and did not raise substantial amounts of revenue for local governments.  
 
Interestingly, Abdalla proposed financing public services by rates, which the national 
rather than the local government controlled.449 While this proclamation might have 
theoretically worked for northern parts of the territory, in the absence of other sources 
of revenue in the economic peripheries, these regions faced an uphill battle to finance 
local government services. Nor was the state providing much in the way of what might 
be considered public services beyond courts and basic infrastructure, which was 
limited.  
 
Thus, even when the ‘evils of centralisation’ due to budgets that could not raise 
enough revenue to pay their own way were raised they failed to match up to what 
was actually possible. Indeed, A.L. Chick, the Financial Secretary at the time, 
explicitly acknowledged that the ‘revenue aspect’ of proposals surrounding the 
collection of tribute and poll taxes was ‘insignificant’.450  Moreover, the extent to 
which different government selected traditional authorities could spend locally 
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derived revenues still widely varied. As Marshall pointed out, this authority was very 
limited in rural parts of the Condominium and particularly absent in southern Sudan.451  
 
Abdulla’s suggestion was therefore too ambitious, or out of touch with local realities 
and the political concerns of Province Governors who appeared wary of losing their 
authority to the central government. It also speaks to a substantial disconnect 
between the self-financing local governments he wished for rather than speaking to 
the ulterior motives of taxes in the peripheries that were less overt but nevertheless 
remained.  Indeed, as the next section of this chapter illustrates, they went against 
the continued ‘real politics’ of direct taxes in the peripheries, in which poll taxes and 
tribute were used as a tool for social control rather than revenue raising.  
 
Even so, given the challenges of raising revenues in the peripheries, several creative 
methods to build local budgets were deployed, but all required a dependence on the 
central government. For instance, in Gedaref, which bordered Abyssinia, if there was 
a revenue shortfall and local government operational expenses were not paid, the 
central government ‘stabilised’ local government budgets, which meant that the 
central government paid for the budget that could not be locally generated. And in 
other parts of the peripheries, some of the expenditure, such as the ‘administration 
of justice and salaries of tribal hierarchy’ was earmarked as central government 
funds.452  
 
Other approaches included ‘fixing, on the basis of the budget each year, the amount 
of direct taxes to be retained by the local authority’, ostensibly to make it easier for 
the central government to plan for how much to transfer to local governments. But 
this nevertheless meant that the amount varied from year to year since ‘the local 
authority [was granted] the percentage of expenditure or on a formula basis’.453 And, 
in southern Sudan, local governments did not have separate budgets to pay for 
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chiefs, even though they ‘were made responsible for law and order and tax 
collection’.454  
 
The question of financial decentralisation was given some consideration in debates 
around federalism that emerged in the Pan-Southern Conference that took place in 
Juba, the capital of Equatoria Province, in 1954. The Pan-Southern Conference took 
place in October of that year and debated the political future of Sudan and of the 
south before southerners decided their positions. Prior to elections on the status of 
this question, in which they unanimously voted for independence from the British and 
against a union with Egypt, southern politicians called for federalism.  
 
Although the analysis of this record is drawn from the south, it is still relevant because 
discussions around federalism as a potential form of government in the new country 
were, and remain, tied to considerations about decentralisation and taxation. 
Specifically, for the purposes of this dissertation, federalism debates are of note 
because they raised questions about how to pay for different parts of the state that 
touch on taxes and revenue sharing. Moreover, they also provide some indication of 
the extent to which a broader swathe of people outside of customary authorities and 
predominantly British officials considered whether and how to pay for the state.  
 
Significantly, the 1954 Pan-Southern Conference was arguably more representative 
of the south than the Sudanisation that had taken place in the Legislative Assembly 
and the civil service. For instance, participants included 250 delegates from the three 
southern provinces, ‘including chiefs from rural areas, representatives from the 
southern diaspora in Khartoum and seven members of the ruling National Union 
Party’.455 In these debates, Necodemo Gore from Juba raised the lingering question 
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‘In case we receive Federation where shall we get our people to run it? 
How shall we Finance it?’456 
 
Another participant, Buth Diu, a member of the House of Representatives, dismissed 
Gore’s consideration with a lengthy impassioned reply that concluded with the direct 
statement that:  
 
“Mr. NECODEMO GORE we are here for Freedom and not money.” 457 
 
This blunt statement hardly concluded the debate about federalism and other forms 
of relations between central and local government such as decentralisation, which 
was used in subsequent legislation for Sudan well into independence. Indeed, they 
also emerged in the Constituent Assembly on 19 December 1955 when a push for 
Sudanese Independence was rushed through. Southerners in the Constituent 
Assembly accepted northern proposals for independence so long as federalism was 
adopted; however, this was rejected in December 1957.458 This is despite the fact that 
the increasingly Sudanese government promised federalism following the 1955 Torit 
Mutiny, in which units within the Equatoria Corps rebelled in Torit, which is in southern 
Sudan near the border with Uganda and which in turn sparked a wider uprising.459 It 
is also indicative of a broader trend towards dismissing the relevance of taxes to pay 
for the state that persisted into independence. This is despite the longevity of these 
debates, which were addressed through different terminologies through the years.  
 
So, if Rudolf Goldschied’s dictum that the ‘budget is the skeleton of the state stripped 
of all misleading ideologies’ were applied to local government budgets in 1949, the 
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core.460 Given that the peripheries likely constituted most of territory’s population and 
undoubtedly were the physically largest parts of the territory, the omission of these 
realities from national discourses when the country was decolonising is all the more 
striking.  
 
Returning to the significance of the decisions made on the eve of Sudan’s 
independence from the British in 1956 little was understood by the central 
government about what constituted a tax or how budgets would be paid for or spent. 
Nor did the Legislative Assembly or the increasingly Sudanising civil service 
recognise the ways in which taxes were actually being used to assert control over the 
peripheries rather than raise money from them. More cynically, the Legislative 
Assembly’s 1947 claim that taxation should lead to representation paints either a 
disconnect on tax policy in the peripheries or a strategic move to advance Sudanese 
independence by speaking the language of liberation. However, to investigate the 
enduring relationship among taxes, state centralisation, and citizenship in more 
depth, the next section explores how taxes were collected during the final years of 
British rule.  
 
Part 2: Sudanese Faces; British Tax Policies 
 
Despite local governments’ overarching financial dependence on the central 
government, the non-monetary orientation of tribute and poll taxes continued until 
the end of British rule. This included sustained efforts to spur individuals into the 
monetary economy by providing an incentive for people to find a way to earn the cash 
needed to pay taxes. And, even though poll taxes were more onerous to collect owing 
to the additional administrative effort they required, they still persisted. This is despite 
the objections that were raised in chapter three that poll taxes were a threat to indirect 
rule.   
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Indeed, on the one hand the increasingly Sudanised administration considered taxes 
a useful tool to push people into the monetary economy. However, some resistance 
to change also came from some government chiefs, who argued that poll taxes were 
a lower rate than the other types of taxes proposed by the British and were therefore 
preferable because they were less financially burdensome. And, in one instance, a 
chief refused to comply with the demand to change to any other type of tax on the 
grounds that any other types of taxes were unjustifiable unless the state provided 
better services.461  
 
Regarding some chiefs’ resistance to shifting away from poll tax, in 1955, the 
Governor of Equatoria wrote to the Permanent Under Secretary in the Ministry of 
Finance and Economics that poll taxes were ‘very successfully working as a strong 
insentive [sic] for work’. He added that ‘[w]e [the British administration] have to face 
the bitter fact that the vast majority of the [people] here need an impetus for work’.462 
Nor was this perspective unique to Equatoria. The same link between taxes and 
participation in the labour economy was echoed in a minute to the Permanent Under 
Secretary of Internal, Finance & Economics from the Governor of Blue Nile Province 
in 1955.463  
 
Other non-monetary applications for the uses of taxes as a measure of social control 
included using Poll Taxes as a form of census that included preparing electoral rolls.  
For instance, in discussions about whether to abolish poll taxes, the Director of Local 
Government argued Poll Taxes had ‘many advantages in connection with the 
preparation of Electoral Rolls both for Local and Central Government Elections’. More 
critically, in 1955 the Governor of Darfur Province, who was by then Sudanese, 
remarked that ‘however abominable’ poll taxes were, they were also vitally used for 
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the purposes of ‘the identification of individuals for security and other purposes’.464 
Tentative discussions about poll taxes also touched on whether they could be used 
to discourage the migration of people from rural areas to towns, as evident in a series 
of exchanges between the Financial Secretary A.M. Baird to the Governor of Bahr el 
Ghazal Province, T.R.H. Owen, in 1949. Baird writes that Poll Tax rates were 
increased from 40 P.T. to 50 P.T. in the town of Wau in order to ‘penalise urbanism 
and discourage the drift to the towns’.465  
 
These attempts to prevent ‘urbanism’ were in part motivated by concerns that when 
people moved to towns this disrupted cash crop cultivation and ‘traditional’ society 
ruled by customary authorities. But this too was a move to control the population to 
suit British objectives. For instance, in the Nuba Mountain region Kamal Osman Salih 
notes that the move to towns was considered a threat to the British because it would 
lead to ‘detribalization (and in turn Arabization)’.466  
 
Meanwhile, the increasingly Sudanised state’s efforts to tie people to land or a 
specific territory through taxes also continued. In some instances, taxes were used 
to ‘punish’ nomadic livelihoods in part because the state could more readily monitor 
settled cultivators. ‘Itinerant peoples’, which included individuals the British called 
‘nomadic Arabs’ and semi-nomadic pastoralists in southern Sudan, were much more 
difficult to ‘make legible’ in the eyes of the state, to paraphrase James C. Scott.467 
Nor was this the only attempt to lead people to a ‘settled life’. In 1954 the British 
District Commissioner for Eastern District in Equatoria Province wrote:  
 
But I think, in most cases here, the only sign of alligience [sic] to the 
Government is the payment of tribute and poll tax by the wandering local 
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tribes. The obvious alternative is to introduce animal tax, Ushur, etc. etc. 
But the introduction of such taxes is not practically possible before the 
excavation of Haffirs [small water reservoirs] and sinking of wells which 
will, no doubt lead to a settled life. Any attempts to list herds of cattle, 
sheep and goats will result in failure and it is not worth the trouble and 
expense that will be involved. Furthermore, any other form of taxation 
will be much resented and may lead to undesirable results, let alone the 
considerable difficulty in enforcing it.468  
 
Thus, to some state officials, taxes remained the sole bond between people and 
government, which were to be mediated by customary authorities, well into the 
1950s. Moreover, these types of comments illustrate the limits of the state’s capacity 
to impose particular taxes; in a sense, poll taxes and tribute persist in large part 
because alternatives were unworkable because of resistance. And, this example also 
highlights how the British attempted to ‘settle’ people using wells, which would have 
been impracticable for people while they were dependant on seasonal rains 
sources.469 Thus, at the end of British rule, the government wielded taxes to 
consolidate peoples in the territory so as to make them more governable. These 
efforts deepened and now specifically targeted groups that the state most struggled 
to control.  
 
Moreover, in the final years of British rule the logic of tax collection also loosely 
extended to what the British considered equivalent to public services. But this also 
amounted to another way to buy collaboration from people and to pastoralists in 
particular so as to prevent resentment or ‘undesirable results’, such as conflict or 
rebellion. For instance, though the revenue from poll taxes did not necessarily 
contribute to local government public services they still were justified on the grounds 
that the ‘itinerant cultivator’ still benefitted from ‘social services in the area’. These 
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included, ‘Dispensaries, Water Supplies, etc. etc.’.470 More critically, the central 
government accounts that emerge from this timeframe fail to detail whether these 
‘services’ appealed to the people in these regions.  
 
Despite such allusions to a fiscal social contract, the enduring colonial ideologies and 
policies of taxation denied the diverse individuals within the peoples of Sudan’s 
peripheries an autonomous or individual identity or rights. To the extent to which they 
were taxed as individuals this was exclusively to be mediated through a government-
selected customary authority who collected taxes from his collective subjects on the 
government’s behalf. Instead of forging ties between people and government, tribute 
and poll taxes sought to bond taxpayers in the Condominium’s peripheries to a 
government chief, sheikh or other customary authority. And as the Financial 
Secretary’s 1947 remarks underscore, this was an intentional aim.  
 
Even though poll taxes were a primary mode of social control in parts of the 
peripheries well into the 1950s, several of the discussions among Sudanese and 
British officials focused on whether the tax system in the Condominium’s peripheries 
should align with taxes in the riverain core. So even though poll taxes proved useful 
to control the peripheries, debates continued on whether to abolish them. 
Significantly, the tone of these discussions is misleading because it painted a picture 
of an administration in relative command of tax policies in the peripheries, when in 
reality the state still had a weak authority over how taxes were defined or actually 
collected. For instance, a 1951 file on direct taxes in southern Sudan addresses some 
of this confusion and explicitly notes:  
 
“Tribute is not strictly speaking a tax but a method of collecting Poll Tax, 









lost sight of due to the fact that the Tribute Ordinance does not indicate 
how it is to be assessed […]”.471   
 
By 1954, at least in some parts of southern Sudan, a ‘graduated form of Poll Tax was 
introduced’.472 As part of this operational rather than legislative variation on the Poll 
Tax, there was an ostensible attempt to ensure that these types of taxes were fairly 
distributed on rich and poor individuals.473 This represented the extent to which the 
tax was intended to be fair or less burdensome for taxpayers, which was an enduring 
critique levied on the type of tax that had also been raised in the 1930s and 1940s. 
But even then, considerations about how to effectively assess wealth remained 
unresolved.  
 
Importantly, these exchanges were not just relegated to administrators in the 
peripheries and also included the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning as well as the Civil Secretary in Khartoum. They 
eventually culminated in a Governors’ Meeting about poll and hut taxes that took 
place in 1955, at which arguments were made for and against unifying the tax system 
across the peripheries by abolishing poll taxes and replacing them with tribute.  
 
The involvement of central government officials and ministries in these debates with 
province governors is also notable because it contrasts with earlier years of British 
rule in the territory. Indeed, tax policy was initially more individually driven by 
Governors and District Commissioners with limited oversight from the central 
government. And, as previous chapters illustrate, in the first three decades of British 
rule, the primary considerations were using taxes as a ‘tool’ of government that 
gauged the extent to which people had ‘submitted’ to or ‘acknowledged’ 
government. But now, with increasing Sudanisation of the national ministries, these 
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views were espoused by Sudanese as well as British officials and across government 
rather than largely from Governors and District Commissioners.  
 
The 1955 Governors’ Meeting sought to definitively resolve the push that began in 
the 1930s over whether and how to transition the peripheries from poll taxes to 
tribute. This meeting ultimately concluded that the distinction between these taxes 
was meaningless as the primary purpose of both taxes was that they were intended 
for ‘backward’ areas of the country and ‘primitive’ peoples.474 Each had also often 
been modified to local circumstances, even if they were ostensibly unified across the 
territory through national or provincial legislation or ministerial decree.  
 
Though the line between these two taxes was blurred, other sources note that there 
was an urban-rural divide between tribute and hut and poll taxes that was visible at 
the end of British rule. Moreover, it reflects a difference in the methods of collection 
rather than the type of tax; urban residents were therefore more likely to be taxed on 
an individual basis by a junior administrative official such as a sub-mamur, whereas 
in rual areas the group was the unit of taxation, even individuals were listed within the 
group.  
 
For instance, a 1954 policy note that contributed to the 1955 Governors’ Meeting 
reports that ‘generally speaking’ poll taxes were collected from urban areas and 
tribute applied to rural areas.475 The complete list of areas where tribute and poll and 
hut taxes were collected in 1954, just two years before independence, presents a 
more detailed synopsis of the physical territory that constituted the economic and 
social peripheries of the Condominium. Areas where these taxes were still collected 
included: all of southern Sudan, Kordofan and Darfur and northern parts of the 
Condominium, such as Kosti, which is 300 kilometers south of Khartoum.476  
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In the build-up to the 1955 Governors’ meeting, in 1954 the Sudanese Governor of 
Kordofan Province, Meccawi S. Akrat, reported some of the objections to poll taxes 
in the province. Akrat noted that in the areas where the taxes were collected the local 
government councils ‘do not agree to abolish the poll tax but would like to have it 
given any other name i.e. National Tax’.477 This reflected a divergence between the 
concerns of the Legislative Assembly, which linked taxes to political representation 
and liberation from colonial occupation and the desire for chiefs and other customary 
authorities to be ‘seen’ by the state as equal rather than ‘primitive’ and therefore 
subjugated to a lower status of personhood in the eyes of the state.  
 
And in a move that reflects one of the few references to financial considerations of 
these tax policies, Akrat expressed reservations about the potentially lost revenue 
that would occur if the tax was abolished.  But his solution for overcoming these 
changes was to transfer people from poll taxes to animal taxes and introduce ushur, 
which was a tax that was almost exclusively only applied in the riverain north of the 
country. As addressed in the first chapter of the dissertation, ushur, which is Arabic 
for ‘tenth’, was imposed on the sale of agricultural production.  
 
Furthermore, it also touches the question raised by the Legislative Assembly in the 
first part of this chapter: was this proposed change in tax linked to the ‘well-known 
principle’ of ‘no taxation without representation’? Troublingly, Akrat failed to advance 
any arguments that suggested that the substantive relations between people and 
government in exchange for paying the tax would in any way change. Rebranding 
poll taxes as a national tax was little more than a superficial cover up for a tax that 
had a deeply extractive, ultimately forceful, history. Moreover, it also contributes to 
this chapter’s argument that the transition from British administrators to Sudanese 
ones did not result in a meaningful change in attitudes towards the peripheries. 
Troublingly, these regions were to remain effectively subjugated to the national 
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government at the subnational level through a dependence on fiscal transfers from 
the centre.  
 
Even so, the Governor of Kordofan Province was not the only individual to think that 
a quick change of the name of the tax would seamlessly resolve objections to Poll 
Taxes owing to logics that it would somehow undermine chiefs and sheikhs. For 
instance, the Governor of Bahr el Ghazal Province suggested changing the name of 
Poll Tax to a ‘Town Tax’ in towns and ‘to conceal it, in rural areas, under tribute’.478 
As another example, in 1955 the Governor of Blue Nile Province, H. A. Abdalla 
advocated replacing Poll Taxes in rural council areas with ushur and animal taxes. 
Abdalla enthusiastically endorsed the substitution as it would ‘not only cover the Poll 
Tax figure of LE.7410, but will also provide an over-all increase of LE.450’. Practically, 
Abdalla suggested that ushur could be collected in markets. But, if this proposal were 
to fail, Abdalla simply suggested that ‘the same Poll Tax can continue but disguised 
under the cloak of tribute’.479  
 
But there were limitations to these proposals, which proved that it was not quite so 
simple for the government to deceive taxpayers by changing the name of a tax. It 
also, of course, speaks to the overarching paternalism and demeaning attitude the 
increasingly blended national government had towards the peripheries, which they 
continued to deem ‘primitive’. In these administrators’ opinion, the simple people of 
the peripheries could be easily duped by taxes that were ‘cloaked’ or ‘concealed’ in 
different names without any meaningful changes or concessions to treating these 
regions differently.  
 
Meanwhile, some taxpayers did not agree to these nominal changes for reasons that 
appear rooted in practical considerations. Importantly, it also underscores the extent 
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to which parts of the peripheries could still push back against the centre in ways that 
endured through and beyond independence. For instance, switching taxpayers from 
Poll Tax to Animal Tax was only feasible in areas where cattle were not socially and 
spiritually meaningful. This precluded Dinka areas, which the Governor of Kordofon 
Province acknowledged.480 But it also limited Nuer and some Shilluk parts of the 
country that the British had struggled to ‘pacify’ for the first 30-years of British 
occupation.  
 
As another example, in Upper Nile Province in southern Sudan a compendium of the 
diversity of direct taxes in the province was compiled by the Ministry of Local 
Government in 1955.481 The Ministry of Local Government’s aim was to try and see 
whether it was viable to transition taxpayers away from hut and poll taxes onto other 
forms of taxes that were practiced in other regions in the territory. Akin to other parts 
of the Condominium, the main alternatives to hut and poll taxes largely included 
animal taxes, but as identified throughout this dissertation, animal taxes were the 
most volatile taxes imposed in the Condominium.  
 
Additional taxpayer objections to the changes to the direct tax regime are evident 
from other sources that were generated during the final years of British rule in Sudan. 
For example, in Eastern Nuer District no poll taxes were collected in the district; 
instead, tribute was collected on a group basis and was assessed on the basis of ‘the 
average [group] wealth in [the] form of cattle and grain’. In Western Nuer District 
tribute was collected, which was based on the idea of poll tax.482  
 
But, when the chiefs in the district were questioned about their sense of the poll tax, 
they argued it should still be collected as they were ‘quite happy with the present 
system’.483 Whether this was because they benefitted from the ability to obtain 
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authority and some power to collect taxes for their own personal gain is unclear from 
these sources. Further insights come from Zeraf District, where cattle were the only 
form of wealth and it was reported that:   
 
‘[T]he Chiefs and the multitude of the population are opposing animal 
tax for two reasons (1) they do not like their cattle to be counted (2) the 
new system [which proposed shifting away from poll taxes to tribute] 
may result in a remarkable increase in the tax itself’.484 
 
Indeed, the disdain among some taxpayers in the peripheries to have their cows 
taxed was so formidable that the Minister of Local Government concluded that he 
‘could not foresee any possibility for the time-being, for any change in the system’.485 
In contrast, in Shilluk District, among pastoralists such as the Shilluk, tribute was the 
main tax collected and the government argued that the only viable alternative to this 
type of tax was again animal tax. But this posed similar challenges on the grounds 
that people understood that the nominal value of the tax would be higher than the 
pre-existing system and that it would lead to ‘counting of animals which the people 
try to avoid’.486  
 
Likewise, in other parts of Southern Sudan, such as Bor Rural District Council, Poll 
Taxes were only collected in Bor Town, which reflects the urban orientation of poll 
taxes. But, the main justification for maintaining the tax was that any change would 
lead to increases in rates, which were unwanted. All the while, among ‘a number of 
Nilotic members of Parliament and Lou Chiefs’ in Lou Nuer District, poll tax was 
discussed but they preferred to remain on tribute ‘until social and economic 
conditions change a great deal’.487  
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This reply from Southern political elites at the end of British rule is notable because it 
illustrates one of the first objections in the sources that reflects a desire to change 
the tax regime so as to improve economic outcomes in the region. Meanwhile, in 
Pibor District, pastoralist members of the Dinka and Mabaan tribes paid tribute on a 
‘per capita basis similar to poll tax’. In these areas, once again, it was ‘found 
practically impossible to introduce a herd tax on their cattle’ because cattle 
ownership ‘normally changes very quickly from one hand to another because of 
marriage customs’.488  
 
The increasingly Sudanised administration’s efforts to transition away from poll taxes 
to other types of taxes were more successful in other parts of the country where cattle 
were not as integral to the resident populace’s livelihoods and cosmologies. For 
instance, in 1954, Gederaf, Eastern Kordofan and Kosti had successfully transitioned 
away from Poll Taxes and Tribute towards ushur. But, importantly, the basis for why 
these initiatives succeeded was because these were areas where ‘cultivation 
provides the main basis of wealth’ rather than cattle or other pastoralist livelihoods.489 
And, following the 1954 Annual D.C.’s Meeting, the Director of Local Government 
argued that Poll Tax could be ‘partly replaced by raising the rate per animal’. But this 
was only in areas where animal wealth was the main source of income.490   
 
Meanwhile the concern about poll taxes and tribute as being intended solely for 
‘primitive’ peoples again persistently emerges in multiple sources and reflects how 
some Sudanese officials had adopted aspects of British colonial perspectives. For 
instance, in a 1955 communique to the Director of the Ministry of Local Government 
the Governor of Kordofan Province, Meccawi S. Akrat, bluntly contributed to the poll 
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I do not think that the imposition of poll tax in the backward areas where 
it is levied is contrary to dignity or that it is obnoxious – and I suggest 
that it should be maintained for at least two years before a final decision 
as to its abolition is taken.491  
 
Perhaps unwittingly, Akrat’s view mirrors some of the language and categories 
associated with different taxes, notably that tribute and poll taxes were for ‘backward 
areas’ or ‘primitive’ peoples, that his British predecessors also used. Moreover, it also 
reflects how the administrative officials who collected taxes in the peripheries 
assumed the perspective that the peripheries were ‘backward’ and therefore 
deserved a distinct ‘simple’ tax system that they could understand.  
 
Akrat’s perspective is also notable because of his long history within the Sudan 
Political Service, which he had served in from 1927. Of his more substantive roles 
prior to becoming Governor of Kordofan Province in 1954, he had also first served as 
a Local Government Officer in the Civil Secretary’s Office in 1946. Prior to this, he 
had served as the Under-Secretary for Finance from 1949-1952 and had held a post 
in London as the Sudan Agent from 1953-1954.492 The ways in which Sudanese 
officials such as Akrat adopted British views suggests a practical disposition towards 
tax policy that prioritised control over the ‘backward’ peripheries rather than financial 
gain or public service provision. This is opposed to the substantive changes to how 
taxes could have been linked to ‘representation’ as advanced by the Legislative 
Assembly in 1947.  
 
The debates surrounding Poll Taxes at the end of British occupation also reveal how 
considerations endured about whether and how taxes acted as a glue between chiefs 
and their people and in turn informed ideas about citizenship. For instance, in an 
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extract from the minutes of the 50th meeting of the Finance Committee on 26 May, 
1955, reported:  
 
‘The Poll Tax is the only line between the Citizen and his Chief here, the 
disappearance of which will cause the Cheif [sic] or Sultan to loose [sic] 
the ability of locating and supervising his subordinates, the matter which 
has a great Administrative importance’493 
 
Meanwhile, these enduring debates about the poll tax, which was individually 
assessed, and tribute, which was levied on groups are meaningful for two reasons. 
From a theoretical perspective, it draws on what Megan Vaughan refers to the 
disjuncture between ‘unitization’ and ‘objects’ versus the ‘creation of individual 
subjectivities’. Vaughan defines unitization as the ‘procedures by which people are 
counted (sometimes over and over again) for tax purposes or in censuses, weighed 
and measured […], and in some cases, “given” medical histories and medical 
records’.494   
 
Vaughan argues that in colonial medical discourse, colonial Africans were 
conceptualised ‘first and foremost as members of groups (usually but not always 
defined in ethnic terms’. And at the group-, rather than individual-, level distinctive 
theories of the black African colonial subject emerged. This was embedded to such 
an extent that there was even a robust theory held by colonial psychologists that 
‘denied the possibility that Africans might be self-aware individual subjects, so bound 
were they supposed to be by collective identities’.495  
 
Crucially, the view that groups that the British colonial state deemed insufficiently 
modern were excluded equal citizenship rights was also not unique to Sudan. 
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Mamdani argues that this was a clear objective of indirect rule and the colonial 
endeavour as a whole. Indeed, citizenship, according to Frederick Lugard’s 
conceptualisation of indirect rule, was a ‘privilege of the civilized’. Rather than 
political rights, such as increased representation, the ‘uncivilised would be subject to 
all-round tutelage’, which Mamdani suggests provides a ‘modicum of civil rights’.496 
As the previous section of this chapter illustrates, ‘tutelage’ also expressly included 
central government oversight of local government budgets, which enforced 
centralisation through decentralisation in Sudan and South Sudan that persists today.  
 
These challenges associated with poll taxes in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s 
peripheries contributed to the soon to be independent Sudanese state’s decision to 
maintain a diverse tax regime. And a conclusion to these debates was reached on 31 
December 1955, which was the literal eve of Sudan’s independence, when the 
Sudanese Director of the Ministry of Local Government, A.H. Abdulla wrote to 
Attorney General Sayed Attabani:  
 
‘This Ministry is in general agreement with the views raised by the 
different Governors with regard to maintaining poll tax and appreciate 
the difficulties if poll tax was abolished abruptly’. The policy which this 
Ministry therefore recommends to be followed is not to rush or hurry the 
expressed wish of the Parliament in a way which may be detrimental to 
public interest and poll tax should only be abolished when satisfactory 
and acceptable alternative taxes have been devised’.497 
 
Thus, by the end of British rule, the only areas that successfully abolished poll taxes 
were: ‘the three rural Councils of Gedaref, in Roseries [sic] and southern Darfur’.498 
While the Ministry of Local Government declared that the Poll Tax was to be 
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abolished from the beginning of the 1955 financial year it remained in place nearly 
ten years after independence when it was abolished in 1965.499 And, in a 1989 text 
by Abdin Ahmed Salama the only areas in which it remained in place at the time it 
was repealed included Southern Sudan and parts of Kordofan and Darfur.500  
 
Likewise, according to Salama’s calculations it also continued to contribute a 
marginal proportion of total government revenue after independence, ranging from 
1.7 to 1.1 percent of total local government revenue between 1956 to 1965-66. In a 
further continuation of pre-independence patterns, the ‘base source of the tax’ 
remained Kordofan, the three Southern Provinces and Darfur. Similarly, local 
government spending in these provinces still continued to be spent on little other than 
salaries into the earliest years of independence.501 Indeed, even during the 1980s the 
Southern Regional Government remained dependent on central government for fiscal 
transfers, which again only covered salaries.502  
 
This section investigated the debates around the main types of direct taxes that were 
introduced in the peripheries, tribute and poll taxes, which persisted into 
independence. Akin to the British, some Sudanese administrators adopted some of 
the same perspectives towards the peripheries that favoured assessing taxes on a 
group rather than an individual basis as this was easier for the state to control. 
Likewise, the financial implications of the taxes levied in the peripheries remained 
secondary to the state’s efforts to make these regions legible.  
 
But these efforts were thwarted by how little Sudanese and British officials 
understood of how taxes were collected in these regions or essential considerations 
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such as what constituted wealth among taxpayers. Likewise, even though 
pacification campaigns had ended and the British were handing over to Sudanese 
counterparts, the government remained cautious of the potential for taxes to trigger 
animosity or resentment against the state. The peripheries therefore remained poorly 
understood by the central government, but also still had a degree of autonomy from 
the political and economic centre as a consequence.  
 
Moreover, as far as citizenship claims were concerned, as Cherry Leonardi and Chris 
Vaughan note, citizenship in the southern and western peripheries of the 
Condominium was ‘primarily negotiated within local political communities’. These 
notably included chiefdoms and districts and the primary way that people claimed 
rights was through appeals to state authority in courts or via chieftaincies and 
presumably also sheikhships. Thus, Leonardi and Vaughan insightfully argue, the 
‘boundary between subjecthood and citizenship was continually blurred and 
contested’.503 However, other scholars of Sudan such as Mark Massoud have actually 
argued that because the Condominium relied on export revenue rather than direct 
taxes, the state was ‘insulated’ from ‘bothersome queries about taxation without 
representation’.504  
 
This chapter adds to these contrasting arguments as it highlights that the conception 
of subjecthood was also tied to tax assessment, which was notably enforced on a 
group basis and collected and mediated by a customary authority. This is key 
because it reinforced the centrality of chiefs and sheikhs in peripheral areas as the 
primary mediators between people and the state. Even as some members of the 
Legislative Assembly deployed western-inflected rhetoric of taxation and 
representation, taxes remained essential for customary authorities rather than local, 
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let alone national, budgets. Of course, as this dissertation highlights, customary 
authorities were also recorded using these tax collecting powers for personal 
enrichment.  
 
Thus, so long as this remained the case, local courts appear likely to have remained 
the primary venue for people to make the claims, which as Leonardi and Vaughan 
detail were often against chiefs for ‘favouring their own clan or lineage group’.505  
Indeed, other work by Vaughan argues that the British had an ‘endless focus on 
chieftaincy politics [which] created a hegemonic system of local governance’. This 
notably meant that claims against customary authorities were typically directed at the 
individual chief rather than the state.506 Or, to paraphrase Tayeb Saleh’s novelistic 
portrayal of tax policies in the riverian north, ‘[i]n this way [the British] sowed hatred 
in the hearts of the people for us, their kinsmen [including customary authorities] and 
love for the colonizers, the intruders’.507  
 
However, this dissertation makes a compelling case for the ways in which tax 
collection through customary authorities might have fostered the spectrum of 
debates between people and government and customary authorities and people. 
Indeed, a 2014 article by Øystein Rolandsen and Cherry Leonardi adds that the 
‘central role of chiefs in policing and security helped to maintain the government 
focus on justice’. However, the arguments in this dissertation highlight an overarching 
way in which the centrality of chiefs was underpinned via their principle role as tax 
collectors in the eyes of the state.508 In sum, taxes might be the mechanism that 
contributes to the blurring of citizenship and subjecthood that characterised people’s 
relationship with government in the peripheries at the end of British rule. But among 
the emerging elite, which was primarily drawn from the riverain core, dynamics linking 
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tax revenue to increased representation from the state emerged; however, these 




This chapter illustrates that even at the end of the Condominium, British and 
increasingly Sudanese leadership continued to use taxes to socially control the 
peripheries and financially subjugate them through fiscal dependency. Likewise, the 
state inadvertently centralised through decentralisation in large part because the 
peripheries remained almost wholly dependent on the centre for revenues. But this 
transition cannot be easily explained by a narrative that Sudanese officials simply 
adopted the language of the coloniser. Instead, the increasingly Sudanese 
government’s reforms to the tax system and local government finances failed to 
acknowledge the ‘real politics’ of both, which were rooted in social control and 
subjugation of the peripheries and the people within them.  
 
To borrow Karen Barkey’s analogy, Sudan in the final decade of British rule thus 
emerges more like a wheel with spokes tensioned by bargained relations between 
the centre and local elites.509 These spokes pointed to Darfur, the Nuba Mountains 
and parts of Kordofan, Kassala and the region that is now South Sudan. But the 
state’s grip on these regions was tenuous and almost unilaterally determined by 
economic and social control that was mediated by taxes and local government 
reforms. The British and increasingly Sudanese state was wary of a spoke splintering 
and shattering its illusion of control that was underscored by its performance of 
stateness that taxes and tax collection were part of.  
 
These relations would have lasting repercussions for how Sudan would be governed 
in ways that remain salient today. People in Sudan’s, and the region that has become 
South Sudan’s, peripheries seem likely to have faced an uphill battle to obtain 
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financial or political gains from taxes in ways that resemble, predominantly western, 
narratives on the fiscal-social contract. This is despite the fact that members of the 
Legislative Assembly deployed language that indicates that they somehow aspired 
for taxes to adhere to this model of taxes and the fiscal social contract. However, 
more research is needed to determine whether and how people might otherwise be 
able to shape the decisions made by chiefs and other types of customary authorities 
remains.  
 
Nevertheless, people in the peripheries were subordinated at the local level under 
chiefs and other types of customary authorities, largely because it was 
administratively easier for the state to govern through them. They were also controlled 
through fiscal dependency, since local governments in the peripheries depended on 
handouts from the central government to function. The story is one of continuity, but 
it also crucially speaks to the deeper ‘rules of the game’ that defined relations 
between the centre and the peripheries in ways that more clearly illustrate how the 













This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter one illustrates how the British 
practically understood that the monetary value of taxes was far less important than 
the potential for taxes to control people in the peripheries. It also analyses how a 
particular kind of tax known as tribute effectively defined the geographic and 
ethnographic boundaries of the centre and the periphery. It concludes by illustrating 
that these patterns compelled the de facto rather than the de jure imposition of 
indirect rule, as the British begrudgingly realised that violent tax collection practices 
undermined their grip on the peripheries. The periodisation of this chapter is dated 
from 1899, which was the start of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, until 1921, when 
indirect rule was formally legislated following the Milner Report.  
 
The second chapter identifies the extent to which indirect rule was linked to 
administrative decentralisation as both were vital tools for dividing the peripheries 
into regions that the British thought they could more readily control. It also traces how 
brutal tax methods during the pacification campaigns in Zeraf Valley in Upper Nile 
Province substantially weakened relations between the people and the government, 
even as it became somewhat clearer to the British regime that they would need to 
work with, rather than combat, customary authorities. It then illustrates how the 
practice of obtaining collaboration from customary authorities was initially advanced 
through the 1922 Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance. Vitally, it also served as the 
precursor for how to implement indirect rule throughout the peripheries by leveraging 
tax collection powers and tax exemptions. This chapter expands from 1921 until 
1929, which was approximately when the pacification campaigns concluded in the 
Zeraf Valley and chiefs in the area were increasingly bargaining with government 
regarding tax collection powers.  
 
Chapter three briefly analyses Sudan’s national budget from 1930 to 1946 and argues 
that the Condominium was becoming even more financially centralised than it had in 







effect, when the peripheries became less volatile for the British in the 1930s and 
1940s the limited tax revenue that these regions generated diminished in importance 
compared to that of the central government. Nevertheless, experimentation with 
taxes continued as a tool for social control in the peripheries. This chapter is dated 
from 1930, which was when the last of the Closed District Ordinances that cordoned 
off the peripheries was enacted, until 1946 when these policies ended.   
 
During these years the British were no longer solely focused on whether customary 
authorities had paid tribute to gauge whether they submitted to government as they 
had in previous years. They were also increasingly concerned about extending their 
control to the taxpayers under a customary authority’s remit. This was primarily 
achieved by collecting taxes on a group rather than an individual basis. Significantly, 
these discussions were deeply shaped by ideas that were considered anthropological 
and ethnographic at the time, which masked and even legitimated policies that 
deepened the state’s control over these regions. Paradoxically, even as the new 
monetary orientation took shape, its potential implications for financing regional or 
national budgets were largely overlooked by the administration.  
 
The fourth chapter explores the enduring legacy of taxes and decentralisation as tools 
for controlling the peripheries. It proceeds by briefly contrasting emerging Sudanese 
narratives on taxes and decentralisation with a more detailed study of how local 
government finances were controlled at the end of British occupation. This chapter 
also weighs emergent Sudanese discourses on taxes in the final decade of British 
occupation and illustrates that taxes also remained a tool for social control into 
independence. This chapter spans from the start of the 1946 Sudan Administrative 
Conference, which sought to transition the administration of the state from British to 
Sudanese rule, until unified Sudan’s independence from British occupation in 1956.   
 
Evidence from this chapter suggests that the emergent Sudanese leadership and the 
remaining British officials in government just before independence failed to 







peripheries remained primarily concerned with social control rather than revenue 
raising at the end of British rule and at least into the early years of independence and 
perhaps into the present. 
 
Though this dissertation’s analysis fills an important gap in the historiography on state 
centralisation in Sudan and South Sudan there are still several outstanding questions 
that could be addressed in future research. For instance, the looming question of 
what a tax means to taxpayers when it has not been generally used to pay for 
governments remains. As noted in the fourth chapter, this likely holds significant 
insights into the spectrum of citizenship that might exist in the peripheries in ways 
that are still not well understood but are likely to be clearly shaped by Sudan’s 
historical trajectory. Though taxes were used to bind customary authorities to 
government, the mechanisms through which people can hold customary authorities 
to account are not well studied in both Sudan and South Sudan.  
 
This might bear insights into how people conceptualise citizenship and stateness in 
both countries that are historically contingent and better reflect how power actually 
functions rather than imagined using western inflected discourse on these terms. For 
instance, as Andrew Mawson notes, in the 1980s members of the Agar Dinka in 
Southern Sudan used the term ‘juer’ for paying taxes and for religiously sacrificing 
animals.510 Thus, when people are paying taxes in either territory, do they imagine or 
conceptualise themselves as citizens and what do they understand themselves to be 
‘buying’ when they remit them? As also noted in the introduction, does the word 
‘juer’, or sacrifice, still apply among the Dinka Agar when paying taxes and what might 
this say about their idea of the state? 
 
Historians such as Paul Nugent have made similar arguments in West Africa’s 
borderlands, whereby social contracts, including citizenship ‘hinged on the interplay 
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between the centre and the geographical margins’.511 However, more research on the 
taxes that actually impacted the majority of people in European colonies in Africa, 
such as tribute and poll taxes, even if these same taxes were marginal for colonial 
budgets, is deeply needed. As this dissertation illustrates, the real story, of social 
control and state centralisation through taxes remains understudied and is unlikely to 
be unique to Sudan or South Sudan. Indeed, similar dynamics might have also 
emerged in Sierra Leone, depending on interpretations of the 1898 hut tax war.512  
 
The ways in which taxes, revenue sharing and federalism continue to shape how the 
state has centralised in Sudan and South Sudan also deserves further study. For 
instance, from 1969 to 1989 Douglas Johnson argues that southern Sudanese 
discussions about federalism had been replaced by ‘decentralisation’ and 
‘regionalisation’. Johnson also espouses a narrative of the peripheries as largely 
being acted upon by the centre rather than playing an active role in their relations that 
continued into independence. Indeed, ‘the central government retained its power in 
part by devolving its responsibility for providing services to the regions who, 
nevertheless, were denied the [financial] resources to bear the burden of that 
responsibility’.513 Though I illustrate this relationship under British rule was more 
nuanced than all powerful core bending the peripheries to its will, the overarching 
point that there was continuity holds.  
 
Nor were these patterns unique to the south. For instance, scholarship on local 
government and fiscal federalism by Atta El-Hassan El-Battahani and Hassan Ali 
Gadkarim argues subsequent changes to local government similarly subordinated 
regional and local governments. This included changes to local government 
legislation made in the People’s Local Government Act of 1971, which abolished 
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native administrations in areas in Sudan outside of the south. This legislation is 
significant because it even tried to ‘mobilise local resources so that regions and 
localities could cover shortfalls in fiscal transfers from the centre to regional 
governments’. And yet, it too failed to achieve this just as the legislation under British 
occupation had done.514 Indeed, Al-Agab Ahmed Al-Teraifi argues that it was also 
criticised because it concentrated power in province headquarters.515  
 
Meanwhile, following the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement or Addis Ababa Accord that 
ended the first civil war between southern Sudan and the  Sudanese government, the 
south was granted semi-autonomous regional status. But centralisation continued 
under this effort to decentralise too and some critics even noted that it might 
contribute to ‘regionalism’ that ‘might encourage separatist sentiment’.516 For 
instance, Nick Devas’ 1982 paper on the legislation’s impact on the south argues that 
‘local councils have done little more than pay the salaries of their own administrators’. 
And, the administrative costs of provincial local governments still did not fall 
proportionally on different regions within southern Sudan.517 Indeed, ‘revenue sharing’ 
amounted to little more than regional governments depending on the central 
government for revenues as was the case in previous years.518  
 
Subsequent legislation that impacted local governments in Sudan and southern 
Sudan included changes to the 1994 federal constitution that created 26 federal 
states, ten of which were in the south. But the state only seemed to centralise power 
further throughout the peripheries. For instance, other writings by Douglas Johnson 
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argue that in South Sudan, ‘[b]y 1999…it was clear from the implementation of these 
agreements that the Khartoum government’s vision of federalism was highly 
centralized’.519 Additionally, separate analyses by Johnson go so far as to suggest 
that the failure to take into resource constraints during decentralisation efforts, which 
dates back to British rule, has led to on-going ethnicization of territory in South 
Sudan.520  
 
Additional ways in which the legacy of British tax practices might persist into the 
present is also a compelling subject for further inquiry. For instance, during South 
Sudan’s wars for independence that continued after unified Sudan became 
independent in 1956, the main rebel group, the Sudan’s Peoples’ Liberation 
Army/Movement (SPLA/M), collected ‘unofficial’ taxes.521 This likely remains salient 
today, given research by Kaspar Hoffmann, Koen Vlassenroot and Gauthier Marchais 
in contemporary Democratic Republic of the Congo suggests these types of patterns 
are likely to endure into the present. 522 This likely has deep implications for how state 
formation, or state deformation is taking place in South Sudan that will also be of note 
for a wide range of audiences. Conversely, the impact of pre-Condominium tax 
practices on the Condominium into the present also demands further study. It is 
unlikely that British occupation uniquely invented these dynamics though it is likely 
they transitioned during their occupation of the territory. 
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Another striking strand throughout this dissertation is the fact that taxes were highly 
gendered throughout the duration of British rule in the peripheries. Poll taxes were 
collected on able-bodied men, not women. Tribute was assessed on a group basis 
that a male chief or sheikh or omda determined. Government backed customary 
authorities and members of the state were distinctly male. Moreover, when concerns 
about monetisation were raised, such as over the risk that they made it more difficult 
to escape a violent marriage as money was difficult to obtain in the peripheries they 
were made from a paternalistic perspective. Indeed, women’s voices on what was 
surely a significant feature of their economic and social lives are starkly missing from 
the sources that this dissertation reviewed.  
 
The impact of monetisation considerations more broadly deserves further attention; 
as this dissertation shows, while the British attempted to monetise through taxes, 
they largely failed. And yet, recent research by Eddie Thomas argues that 
monetisation has begun to take a deeper hold in South Sudan following the wake of 
devastating conflict and forced displacement after the 2013 violence. Money, much 
more so than during British occupation, now appears vital to pay for food to prevent 
food insecurity and famine.523 So the questions as to how money might be shaping 
social relations in South Sudan, and potentially also in Sudan, remain particularly 
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